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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
“TO HOLD THE WORLD IN CONTEMPT:” THE BRITISH EMPIRE, WAR, AND
THE IRISH AND INDIAN NATIONALIST PRESS, 1899-1914.
by
Susan Ann Rosenkranz
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Rebecca Friedman, Major Professor
The era between the close of the nineteenth century and the onset of the First
World War witnessed a marked increase in radical agitation among Indian and Irish
nationalists. The most outspoken political leaders of the day founded a series of widely
circulated newspapers in India and Ireland, placing these editors in the enviable position
of both reporting and creating the news. Nationalist journalists were in the vanguard of
those pressing vocally for an independent India and Ireland, and together constituted an
increasingly problematic contingent for the British Empire. The advanced-nationalist
press in Ireland and the nationalist press in India took the lead in facilitating the exchange
of provocative ideas—raising awareness of perceived imperial injustices, offering
strategic advice, and cementing international solidarity.
Irish and Indian press coverage of Britain’s imperial wars constituted one of the
premier weapons in the nationalists’ arsenal, permitting them to build support for their
ideology and forward their agenda in a manner both rapid and definitive. Directing their
readers’ attention to conflicts overseas proved instructive in how the Empire dealt with
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those who resisted its policies, and also showcased how it conducted its affairs with its
allies. As such, critical press coverage of the Boxer Rebellion, Boer War, Russo-Japanese
War, and World War I bred disaffection for the Empire, while attempts by the Empire to
suppress the critiques further alienated the public.
This dissertation offers the first comparative analysis of the major nationalist
press organs in India and Ireland, using the prism of war to illustrate the increasingly
persuasive role of the press in promoting resistance to the Empire. It focuses on how the
leading Indian and Irish editors not only fostered a nationalist agenda within their own
countries, but also worked in concert to construct a global anti-imperialist platform. By
highlighting the anti-imperial rhetoric of the nationalist press in India and Ireland and
illuminating their strategies for attaining self-government, this study deepens
understanding of the seeds of nationalism, making a contribution to comparative imperial
scholarship, and demonstrating the power of the media to alter imperial dynamics and
effect political change.
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Introduction

The British Empire was at its zenith—a marvel of modernity and a model of
efficiency, confounding the world with its ability to colonize, civilize, and organize.
British troops marched in formation across desert, mountain, and plain, the sound of their
polished boots echoing from Sandhurst to the Hindu Kush.1 British missionaries fanned
out across Africa and Asia, proselytizers determined to convince and convert, while a
non-stop parade of civil servants—sufficiently civilized and servile—classified and
categorized all things imperial. The envy of its rivals, Britain held dominion over the
seas and dominated world trade, its factories alive with the hum of machinery and the
soothing clink of profits. Railway and steamship made possible the smooth
transportation of men and horses, guns and goods, all heading to the next site of conquest
or point of resistance.
It was the uninterrupted transmission of information, however, that transformed
the Empire into a paragon of proficiency. Snaking under the ocean and strung across vast
continents was a network of telegraph cables—the arteries of the Empire—carrying news
to and from Britain, linking colony and settlement, territory and town. That splendid
conduit of information not only helped maintain the efficiency of the Empire, but also
fueled the rapid growth of the press—serving as a lifeline for journalists, now capable of
relaying to their readership in Britain timely news of discovery, expansion, resistance,
and war.

1

The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst has been the training ground of British Army officers since 1813.
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For Britain’s restless subjects in Ireland and India, access to that information
would prove invaluable. The years between the close of the nineteenth century and the
onset of the First World War witnessed a marked increase in radical political agitation
among nationalists in Ireland and India. Irish and Indian journalists were in the vanguard
of those crusading vocally for self-government, and together constituted an increasingly
problematic contingent for the British Empire. The nationalist press in India and Ireland
facilitated the exchange of provocative ideas—in the process raising awareness of
perceived and real imperial injustices, offering strategic advice to each other, and
cementing international solidarity. The British Empire, reeling from an embarrassing
setback in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid in South Africa, and facing intensified
rivalries from Russia and Germany, found itself under sustained assault from its own
Irish and Indian subjects, who relentlessly drove home their advantage.2 The dissertation
argues that Irish and Indian press coverage of Britain’s imperial wars constituted one of
the premier weapons in the nationalists’ arsenal, permitting them to build support for
their ideologies, forward their agendas both rapidly and definitively, and help precipitate
the waning of the British Empire.
For a country that had long boasted of its liberalism, the British tradition of
freedom of the press was more than a badge of honor; it was a defining characteristic.
The British newspaper was not merely a chronicler of events. It was prima facie
evidence that in the British Empire words were a valuable currency and public opinion
2

The 1895 Jameson Raid was a failed attempt by Leander Starr Jameson to rouse British workers
(uitlanders) in Johannesburg and convince them to participate in an uprising that would overthrow Paul
Kruger’s government, which discriminated against uitlanders. Immediately following the raid, Kaiser
Wilhelm sent Kruger a telegram congratulating him on thwarting the uprising. The Jameson Raid and the
subsequent telegram exacerbated what was already significant tension between Kruger’s government and
Britain, and became significant factors in the buildup to the Second Boer War (1899-1902).
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mattered. The press embodied the principle of free speech—giving a voice to the masses,
and offering a channel through which even the lowliest citizen could step up in class and
speak truth to power. Throughout the nineteenth century, wherever the Empire annexed
new territories, the press staked its own claim—as British as the bible and the bayonet,
and often just as effective in winning over hearts and minds. With the advent of the
telegraph cable, those at home in the metropole could share in the expansion of the
Empire, vicariously taking up the white man’s burden, and taking pride in being a
member of a British race that could conquer and control—with such a seemingly light
touch.
It was, of course, part and parcel of British policy to extend many of the same
freedoms to the newly subjugated, ensuring that they understood the advantages of
exchanging their national identity in favor of donning the imperial mantle. Freedom of
speech and freedom of the press were olive branches—mitigating factors in the loss of
one’s land or religion. What did not seem to occur to the British emissaries in the first
flush of conquest is that those who were so easily dominated might one day wish to
appropriate the tradition of a free press to further their own nationalist ends. If the
Empire could use the press to infuse its citizens with a felicitous sense of British-ness,
what was to stop nationalist journalists in Ireland and India from instilling their readers
with a bold sense of Irish and Indian identity?
Of enormous significance to the Irish and Indian nationalist movements was the
fact that the most outspoken political leaders of the day also founded and edited a series
of widely circulated newspapers in India, Ireland, and America. As a result, nationalist
editors were in the unique and enviable position of being able not only to report the news,
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but also to make the news.

Under the guidance of editors such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak

(Mahrátta, Kesari), Surendranath Banerjea (Bengalee), and Shivram Mahadev Paranjape
(Kál) in India, and Arthur Griffith (United Irishman, Sinn Féin), James Connolly
(Workers’ Republic), and D.P. Moran (The Leader) in Ireland, as well as the exiled
Irishman John Devoy (Gaelic-American) in America, nationalists launched and sustained
an orchestrated campaign against the British Empire. The press became a primary tool for
spreading what the Government of India and many in the British Parliament characterized
as incendiary ideas.
By the period in question, the newspaper had become far more than a literary
organ; it was a respected social and cultural instrument capable of framing the
conversation and persuading public opinion. Whereas the Indian National Congress and
the Irish Parliamentary Party were actively pursuing constitutional means to achieve
some form of Home Rule, the fact that the two bodies were composed primarily of the
educated elite made it difficult to expand their appeal to the general public. Politicians
made pronouncements for the benefit of other politicians, but it was the press that spoke
to the masses, seeking to galvanize support for the nationalist cause.
The nationalist press both in Ireland and India moved into the ascendancy by
understanding and exploiting its ability, as well as the need, to reach both domestic and
global audiences. Not content to limit themselves to provincial news, the leading
nationalist organs of the Indian and Irish press were comprehensive in their coverage of
national and international trends and events. They regularly published articles and
editorials from foreign newspapers in the pages of these nationalist newspapers,
reminding readers that their struggle was shared by imperial subjects around the world
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and urging solidarity. The foremost editors of the Indian and Irish press, moreover, were
writing not merely for their domestic readership, but also for an international audience, in
an attempt to underscore the hypocrisy of British rule and thereby attract support for their
nationalist cause.
The fifteen-year period between 1899 and 1914 proved to be particularly fertile
ground for nationalist journalists, as the British Empire found itself embroiled in no fewer
than three significant wars. Britain deployed troops in the Boxer Rebellion in China
(1899-1901), the Second Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902), and the First World
War (1914-1918)—while the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) compelled an ostensibly
neutral Britain to form strategic international alliances. The Irish and Indian focus on
imperial wars not only highlighted flaws in military strategy, but also brought into sharp
relief the often heavy-handed, short-sighted tactics with which Britain attempted to
control its colonial subjects. Irish and Indian nationalist editors took advantage of these
unrivaled opportunities to unload a blistering critique of policies they deemed
incomprehensible, while simultaneously offering a resounding rejection of conditions to
which they would never become reconciled.
By covering the conflicts and commenting on the political marriages of
convenience that these conflicts generated, nationalist editors in India and Ireland could
provide instruction not only on how the Empire dealt with those who resisted its policies,
but also how it conducted its affairs with its allies. Nationalist journalists also exploited
every opportunity to highlight the methods of others engaged in the struggle for
independence. Thus, canny Irish editors directed the attention of their readership not
only to the plight of the Boxers and the Boers, but also to the Empire’s treatment of India.

5

For their part, resourceful Indian editors looked beyond their borders not only to China
and South Africa, but also to the shores of Ireland, where the quest for self-government
served as an example for their own readers to emulate.
That Ireland and India should find such common cause seems implausible, if not
improbable. By most measures, the Emerald Isle and the Indian subcontinent bore little
resemblance to each other, with India dwarfing Ireland both in terms of size and
population. When the British turned their gaze half way around the world to India, they
saw not the familiar, recognizable white-skinned, English-speaking Catholics and
Protestants of Ireland, but dark-skinned Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jains, speaking
more than fifteen different languages and 1650 dialects.3 Moreover, Britain’s historic
relationships with the two countries were materially different. The British had begun
intervening in Ireland in 1170 and in the following seven hundred years British
authorities had outlawed the Irish language, attempted to marginalize the Catholic
religion, banished the Irish to the rockiest and least hospitable outposts of the country,
disenfranchised all but the wealthiest property owners, charged exorbitant rents to
tenants, and done little or nothing to ameliorate abject poverty and hunger.
By contrast, Britain’s direct governing of India did not begin until after the Indian
Mutiny of 1857. The relatively brief period of governance presented a unique set of
challenges for which the long reign in Ireland did not remotely prepare the Empire. .
Confronted with myriad problems stemming from dissimilarities of language, religion,
and custom, Britain found itself perpetually stymied by the enigma that was India.
3

The number of languages and dialects spoken on the subcontinent in any given era is a source of
continuing debate, with some scholars placing the number of dialects closer to two thousand. The
Constitution of India currently recognizes twenty-two scheduled languages, as well as two hundred mother
tongues.
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Intrusive and insensitive legislation designed to control the plague, condescending
directives concerning native troops, and well-meaning but paternalistic attempts to
provide British education revealed the Empire at its most maladroit. As the new century
dawned, moreover, one of the most glaring contrasts between Ireland and the
subcontinent was the presence of a sizable number of Irish representatives in Parliament,
while the British Government barred India from representation.4
Despite the seeming disparities, Ireland and India underwent strikingly similar
national experiences during their contemporaneous progress toward independence.
Neither country was a stranger to land agitation, while famine brought devastation to
Irish and Indian peasants alike. The question of a national language preoccupied both
India and Ireland, just as the quest to regain a lost national heritage consumed their
leaders. Sectarian strife rent the fabric of both nations, ensuring that independence would
be won only at the cost of partition. Moreover, when enacting press legislation, British
authorities often elected to ignore the considerable differences between Ireland and India,
and view their inhabitants through a seemingly identical lens. No accident of history

4

Given the example Ireland would one day set in breaking free from the Empire’s bonds, it is notable that
Ireland played a substantial role in Britain’s governing of the subcontinent. Historian T.G. Fraser estimated
that forty percent of the British Army was recruited from Ireland during the nineteenth century. T.G.
Fraser, “Ireland and India,” in An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire, ed. Keith
Jeffery (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 77. At the height of the British Raj, in the
second half of the nineteenth century, Irish sons seeking promotion filled the ranks of the Indian army and
the Indian Civil Service, while Irish Protestant missionaries traveled the subcontinent, preaching and
proselytizing. Among those appointed viceroys of India, several were of Irish or Anglo-Irish ancestry,
including Lord Canning (1858-1862), Lord Mayo (1869-1872), Lord Dufferin (1884-1888), and Lord
Lansdowne (1888-1894) In the revolving door that was the British imperial administration, Viscount
Morley twice served as Chief Secretary of Ireland (1886, 1892-95) before his appointment as India’s
Secretary of State (1905-1910), while the Catholic Sir Antony MacDonnell of County Mayo spent thirtysix years in the Indian Civil Service, only to return in 1902 as Under Secretary for Ireland. Among
MacDonnell’s many posts in India were that of accountant general and revenue secretary for Bengal, and
Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Provinces (1895-1901). See M.L. Brillman, “A Crucial
Administrative Interlude: Sir Antony MacDonnell’s Return to Ireland, 1902-1904,” in New Hibernia
Review, Volume 9, Number 2 (Summer 2005), 65-83.
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compelled India and Ireland to consider each other brothers-in-arms; their very inclusion
in the monolith that was the British Empire forged a link between the two countries.5
They interacted in ways that were both subtle and dynamic, with Westminster acting as a
catalytic agent.
As India inched ever closer to independence, the measures enacted by its leaders
would increasingly mirror the Irish paradigm, finding in Ireland a framework for
nationalist thought and deed. The paths of Irish and Indian nationalists crossed directly
on three separate and distinct occasions. Marked by agrarian strife and parliamentary
skirmishes, the Irish Land War and Home Rule movement of the 1870s and 1880s clearly
influenced the evolution of the Indian National Congress, established in 1885. Fiery
rhetoric, direct action, and an appeal to national pride characterized the early years of the
twentieth century, during which the Sinn Féin and Swadeshi movements developed
simultaneously in 1904-05.6 Finally, the Easter Rebellion of 1916 heralded the most
combustible stage of contact between Irish and Indian nationalists. During this volatile
and violent era, key factions in Ireland and India shifted to a program of physical force
and terrorism.7
Given the contacts between Ireland and India that spanned more than a century, it
is remarkable that scholarship on this connection has been slow to develop. Pairing India

5

Fraser suggests that without the existence of the British Empire, “there would have been little, if anything,
to unite the fortunes of Ireland and India.” Fraser, 77.

6

To avoid confusion between the Sinn Féin political movement and Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin newspaper,
only the name of the newspaper is in italics.

7

For Indian police records documenting the importation of physical force tactics from Ireland, see Amiya
K Samanta,., Ed. Terrorism in Bengal: A Collection of Documents on Terrorist Activities from 1905-1939.
Six Volumes. (Calcutta: Government of West Bengal, 1995).
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and Ireland in historical studies has been a fairly recent phenomenon. The advent of
Indo-Irish scholarship dates back fewer than fifty years, to the work of John V. Crangle,
whose work charts the links between Irish Home Rulers and Indian nationalists, and
Mary Cumpston, who provides evidence that the connection was detrimental to India’s
cause, as the disruptive tactics of the Irish Parliamentary Party alienated other members
in the House.8 In the vanguard of those analyzing the press, Richard Davis notes how
Irish editors pointedly invoke India’s struggle as a source of inspiration for the Irish
rebels, and chronicles how the shifting of public opinion in India reflected Irish tactics of
obstruction, abstention, and escalating violence.9 Together with Davis, historian Howard
Brasted deserves the lion’s share of the credit for transforming Indo-Irish history into a
fruitful sub-field, identifying “British sensitivity,” “Irish initiative,” and “Indian
observation” as three dynamics that defined the complex relationship between India and
Ireland—tropes that fuel Indo-Irish research to this day.10

8

John V. Crangle, “Irish Nationalist Criticism of the Imperial Administration of India (1880-1884) in the
Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, No. 4 (1971/72), 189-94; Mary Cumpston, “Some Early Indian
Nationalists and Their Allies in the British Parliament, 1851-1906” in the English Historical Review, Vol.
76, No. 299 (Apr., 1961), 279-97.Chief among the Irish activists were Charles Stewart Parnell, Alfred
Webb, and Michael Davitt. These and other Irish parliamentarians frequently voted in a bloc to approve
such measures as famine relief and the rectifying of abuses in Indian administration.
9

Richard Davis, “India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda.” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.
Volume XXII, No. 1, April 1977, 66-89. Davis asserts that the Partition of Bengal, the passage of the
oppressive Rowlatt Acts, and particularly the massacre of three hundred seventy-nine Indians at Amritsar
proved even more valuable to the propagandists, particularly in the years following the 1916 Rebellion.
Davis also explores India’s native press, seeking to assess the impact of the Easter Rising on the Indian
nationalist movement. Though India’s leaders initially recoiled at the ruthlessness of the Easter Rebellion,
Davis suggests that the defeat of the Irish Parliamentary Party by the more militant Sinn Féin Party in 1918
lent legitimacy to the cause of the Extremist wing in the Indian National Congress. Richard Davis, “The
Influence of the Irish Revolution on Indian Nationalism: The Evidence of the Indian Press, “1916-22 in
South Asia, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1986), 55-68.
10

Howard Brasted, “Indian Nationalist Development and the Influence of Irish Home Rule, “in Modern
Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1980), 37-63 and “Irish Models and the Indian National Congress, 18701922.” South Asia, Vol. 8. No. 1-2 (1985). 24-45. Brasted contends that it was the reactionary policies of
the British Government, not merely imported ideas from Ireland, which propelled the vessel of Indian
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In the 1990s, the field of Indo-Irish studies deepened, becoming more complex
and more contentious. Historian S.B. Cook coined the term “intra-imperial analogies” to
explain not only the tendency of scholars to draw comparisons between India and Ireland,
but also the propensity of the British Government to effect a connection in matters of
policy—particularly legislation regarding the press.11 In matters of law and order, Britain
looked frequently to Ireland for a suitable template that could be adapted to India, a
practice that Cook notes often proved disastrous, as in the 1878 Vernacular Press Act and
the Rowlatt Acts of 1919.12
Regardless of the connections identified by previous scholars, T.G. Fraser warns
against the tendency of historians to read too much into the relationship. Fraser asserts
that Irish willingness to resort to violence and extremism served only to alienate India’s
leaders, convincing them that the Irish paradigm would ultimately prove impractical for
the Indian people.13 Whereas Fraser is correct in characterizing the more moderate
element in India as unwilling to follow the Irish example of physical force, police records
make clear that Indian revolutionaries employed what officials referred to as Irish Sinn
Féin methods. Given that the figure of Gandhi has long dominated the field of South

nationalism, and notes that Ireland’s course frequently served more as a cautionary tale to India than a
salutary example.
11

S.B. Cook, Imperial Affinities: Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges Between India and
Ireland.( New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993). Cook points to Sir Charles Napier’s use of an Irish model
to organize the Indian police in the 1840s, as well as Viceroy Lord Minto’s adaptation of existing Irish
criminal law into the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1908 as examples of more successful
adaptations. Cook further offers evidence that Irish land legislation, with its focus on the three F’s of Fair
rent, Fixity of tenure, and Freedom of sale, provided the pattern for the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.
12

See Chapter One “The Press and the British Empire” for more on the connection between the 1870 Peace
Preservation (Ireland) Act and the 1878 Vernacular Press Act, enacted in India.

13

T.G. Fraser, “Ireland and India,” in An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire, ed.
Keith Jeffery (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 77-93.
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Asian studies, it is perhaps not surprising that more studies have focused on Indian nonviolence and passive resistance than Indian extremism and terrorism. Michael Silvestri is
one of the few who explores the darker side of the Indo-Irish relationship, producing
scholarship on the pervasive influence of the Irish Revolutionary movement.14 Whereas
acts of terrorism had taken place at the time of the Partition of Bengal in 1905, Silvestri
asserts that a coordinated program of attacks was not in evidence in India until a parallel
shift transpired in Ireland.15
Despite historian T.G. Fraser’s charge that his peers are exaggerating the IrelandIndia connection, his warning has gone unheeded, as historical interest in Indo-Irish
scholarship heightens. Whether the Ireland-India affinity was real and tangible or
merely a matter of historical coincidence was a question debated by attendees of the
Fourth Annual Conference on Colonialism, hosted by the National University of Ireland
at Galway in June 2004. While some historians in attendance appeared loath to attribute
similarities between Ireland and India to anything other than complementarity,
others saw evidence of a viable relationship.16 Out of that conference emerged the next
wave of Indo-Irish scholarship, with several of the presenters publishing monographs.17

14

Michael Silvestri, “The ‘Sinn Féin of India’: Irish Nationalism and the Policing of Revolutionary
Terrorism in Bengal” in the Journal of British Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4. (October, 2000).

15

Silvestri’s thesis is supported by the Report on the Activities of Terrorists in Bengal, compiled by Special
Superintendent R.E.A. Ray. Ray noted that Bengali revolutionaries had originally looked on random
assassinations or bombings as the “limit of possible achievement.” In the 1920s, however, such
organizations as the New Violence party espoused an orchestrated program of simultaneous
demonstrations, as well as “jail outbreaks, the destruction of bridges, the wrecking of trains, and the murder
of spies and informers.” (602-603)

16

The conference featured papers on Indian and Irish literary figures, as well as research on papers
addressing issues of famine, land, legislation, use of force, and the native press, many of which were
assembled in Ireland and India: Colonies, Culture, and Empire, Tadgh Foley and Maureen O’Connor, eds.
(Irish Academic Press, Ltd., 2006). Among those presenting at the conference whose work is citied in this
dissertation are the aforementioned Michael Holmes and Michael Silvestri, as well as M.L. Brillman and
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With the exception of Richard Davis, there is a noticeable dearth of discussion
concerning the Irish and Indian press. Scholars have chronicled the rise of the British
press, examining the increase in literacy rates, advances in technology, and the oversized
personalities who pioneered the industry.18 There exists, however, only a slim catalogue
on Irish newspapers or the history of Indian journalism.19 Given the often fractious
relationship between Britain and Ireland, the Irish press provides ample evidence of
Jennifer M. Regan. Michael Holmes and Denis Holmes also assembled an eclectic collection of essays in
Ireland and India: Connections, Comparisons, Contrasts that revealed political, social, economic, military,
diplomatic, and literary analogies between the two countries. Holmes, Michael and Denis Holmes, Ireland
and India: Connections, Comparisons, Contrasts. (Dublin: Folens, 1997).
17

See Michael Silvestri, Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory. (Palgrave Macmillan,
2009); Jennifer M. Regan, Cosmopolitan Nationalism in the Victorian Empire: Ireland, India and the
Politics of Alfred Webb. (Palgrave MacMillan, August 2009); and Kate O’Malley, “Ireland, India and
Empire: Indo-Irish radical connections, 1919-64 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

18

See particularly Mark Hampton, Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950 (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2004) and Simon Potter, News and the British World: The Emergence of an
Imperial Press System, 1876-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). Whereas Hampton concentrates on
the evolution of the role of the press in Britain, Simon Potter tracks the political and technological growth
of the complex system which linked Britain with its imperial outposts. Potter further examines the
intersection of Empire with the press in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales in Newspapers and Empire in Ireland
and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004). In Media and
the Empire, Chandrika Kaul offers a compilation of essays that look not only at the role of the newspaper,
but also examine the impact of broadcasting on the Empire. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.) See also Julie Codell, Imperial Co-Histories: National Identities and the
British and Colonial Press (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 2003) and Keith Jeffery, ed., An
Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996),
77-93.

19

For studies on the Irish press, see Stephen J. Brown, The Press in Ireland: A Survey and a Guide
(Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, 1937); R.L. Munter, A Handlist of Irish Newspapers 1685-1750
(London: Bowes & Bowes, 1960); Brian Inglis, The Freedom of the Press in Ireland, 1784-1841 (London:
Faber and Faber Ltd., 1954); Hugh Oram, The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland,
1649-1983 (Dublin: MO Books, 1983). Virginia Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced-Nationalist
Press Ireland, 1900-1922 (New York: Peter Lang, 1985). John S. North. The Waterloo Directory of Irish
Newspapers and Periodicals, 1800-1900 Phase II (Waterloo: North Waterloo Academic Press, 1986); and
Marie-Louise Legg, Newspapers and Nationalism: The Irish Provincial Press, 1850-1892 (Dublin: Four
Courts Press, 1999). For works focusing on the Indian press, see Margarita Barns, The Indian Press: A
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ambivalent attitudes toward the imperial mission, as seen in the recent work of Jill C.
Bender, Jennifer M. Regan, and Michael de Nie.20 Few scholars, however, have stepped
forward to provide the necessary in-depth analysis of the Indian press that would offer
new insights into Indian attitudes toward the British Empire.21 More importantly, what
becomes apparent after a review of the existing literature is that scholars have made no
attempt to compare the native press in India with the press in Ireland.
The dissertation thus provides the first comparative analysis of the Indian and
Irish nationalist press.22 It situates the leading nationalist papers within a global context,
examining their simultaneous coverage of Europe’s imperial wars to establish common
philosophies, methods, and goals. My study fills a noticeable gap in speaking to shared
nationalist aspirations, documenting how Irish and Indian editors readily acknowledged
in print their mutual admiration for each other’s political and social strategies. The
dissertation argues that the leading editors of the Indian, Irish, and Irish-American press
not only promoted a nationalist agenda within their own countries, but also worked in
concert to construct a global anti-Imperialist platform. By highlighting the anti-imperial
20
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rhetoric of the nationalist press in Ireland and India and illuminating their mutual
strategies for attaining self-government, the study demonstrates the power of the media to
alter imperial dynamics and effect political change.
The project provides tangible evidence that Irish and Indian attitudes toward the
British Empire and its imperial wars were often at odds—identifying striking
dissimilarities, not only in terms of linguistic form and style, but also in matters of race
and religion. It argues that racial and religious prejudice frequently determined the Irish
and Indian journalists’ attitudes toward combatants in the imperial wars. Prevailing
racial theory was clearly a deciding factor in how white Irish editors elected to portray
the “yellow” Chinese Boxers and Japanese; the “dirty” Jews, and, more pointedly, the
Indians themselves, whereas pan-Asian sentiment spurred Indian sympathy for the
Boxers and the Japanese. The dissertation highlights growing Indian resentment toward
the Christian nations of the West and underscores Irish ambivalence—and even
animosity—toward non-Christian combatants.
The dissertation, moreover, is the first to offer a comparative focus on Irish and
Indian press coverage of the imperial wars fought between the years of 1899-1914—a
tumultuous period that included the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), the Second Boer War
(1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the opening salvos of the First
World War. The conflicts of this era thus become the prism through which the methods
and motives of nationalist journalists in Ireland and India are explored and analyzed.
Whereas other historians have focused on a single conflict during this era, they have
overlooked the value of comparative analysis. The study, therefore, provides the first
collective examination of Irish and Indian war coverage, revealing the subtle changes in
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rhetoric, shifts in attitude toward the Empire, and the emergence of a concrete nationalist
platform.
The historian wishing to analyze the vast output of the native press in India faces
not only the scarcity of surviving newspapers, but, more particularly, the challenge of its
myriad dialects and languages. Thus, current scholarship focuses primarily not on the
newspapers themselves, but on excerpts compiled weekly for the Government of India in
the Presidencies of Bombay, Bengal, Madras, Punjab and the Northwest Territories.
These Reports on the Native Newspapers encompassed native writings on topics ranging
from domestic concerns such as agriculture, religion, plague, and famine, to foreign
affairs and the Empire. Whereas these excerpts are a boon to the historian, their use is not
without a measure of controversy. Not only is there the question of whether the
translations were accurate, but also the fact that the choice of which papers and which
excerpts were included in the compilation was solely at the discretion of the translator.
Unless specifically stated by the translator, moreover, there is no way of ascertaining who
authored a specific excerpt, or even whether an editor or a staff member penned the
article. The mitigating factor with all these caveats is that the translator’s focus on
certain topics provides an indication that native opinion on those issues was a concern to
the Government of India, just as the choice of newspapers selected is proof that their
influence was acknowledged by officials.
These dual realities are borne out in the Annual Report on the Native Newspapers,
which provided analysis on the issues of most concern to natives, identified the most
obstreperous of the newspapers, and addressed the tone of the press, itself. Officials
quickly noted that the Presidencies of Bombay and Bengal featured the newspapers most
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antagonistic to the Empire. Thus, newspapers from both Presidencies figure prominently
in the dissertation. The Reports on the Native Newspapers from the Bombay Presidency
are no longer available, however, for the years 1899-1900. Thus, they will make their
first impact in Chapter Three, with coverage of the second half of the Boer War.
Chapter One explores the reasons for the rapid growth of the Irish and Indian
nationalist press within the British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, and
examines its ability not only to educate and influence, but also to serve as a representative
of the people. With literacy rates rising, the price of newspapers dropping, and no
shortage of sensational news to report, Indian and Irish nationalist editors discovered they
were able to construct a political platform and build support for their agendas by taking
their causes directly to the masses. The chapter also tracks the emergence of the editors
who became the key agents of change in Ireland and India, and charts the legislation
designed by the British Government to muzzle the increasingly discordant voices of
discontent within Ireland and the subcontinent.
Chapter Two analyzes coverage of the Boer War from the opening hostilities in
1899 through the capture of Pretoria in the summer of 1900, providing compelling
evidence that the crisis in the Transvaal was the catalyst for a renewed and impassioned
embrace of the nationalist agenda in Ireland and India. Irish advanced-nationalist
journalists simultaneously blasted British aggression, praised the courage of the Boers—
white, Christian, and victims of imperial expansion—and indelibly linked their quest for
independence to that of the Irish. Whereas Indian nationalist editors still maintained their
allegiance to the Empire, cracks in the veneer of that loyalty were beginning to appear,
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prompted by Britain’s neglect of affairs on the subcontinent and, in particular, its
racially-motivated refusal to deploy Indian troops to the Transvaal.
Chapter Three examines the coverage by the Indian nationalist press and Irish
advanced-nationalist press of the Boxer Rebellion, revealing differences in their
approaches to events in China. Having openly expressed animosity toward the British
Empire, Arthur Griffith and his colleagues sought to ascribe self-serving motives to
Britain’s conduct in the conflict. Yet, given that Britain was only one of eight European
nations involved in subduing the revolt, the Irish advanced-nationalist press could launch
only a limited attack, characterizing the British as callous aggressors trampling the
Chinese rebels in furtherance of a relentless expansionist policy. By contrast, the Indian
nationalist press was clearly ambivalent about the Rebellion—wishing to remain loyal to
the Empire, but profoundly troubled by what it perceived as an imperial policy debased
by racial and religious prejudice.
Chapter Four returns to South Africa to chronicle the renewal of hostilities in the
Boer War, followed by Britain’s resort to a scorched earth policy in order to subdue the
Boers. Coverage of these new developments marks the beginning of Irish and Indian
nationalist editors marching in lockstep, as journalists in both countries roundly
denounced the burning of farms and the internment of women and children. More than
any other imperial war to that date, the Boer War offered tangible evidence of the
Empire’s fallibility—not only enabling nationalist editors in Ireland and India to launch a
combined attack on British honor, but also giving their impassioned call for selfgovernment both weight and urgency.
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Chapter Five addresses the years between the close of the Boer War and the onset
of the First World War, analyzing coverage of the Russo-Japanese War, the Partition of
Bengal, and the birth of the self-reliance movements, Sinn Féin and Swadeshi.23
Whereas none of these events involved British troops in battle, each proved a significant
boon to the nationalist cause. While Indian nationalist editors trumpeted the victory of an
Asian power over the West, Irish advanced-nationalist editors treated the Partition of
Bengal as if it was, indeed, another British imperial war designed to subjugate an
oppressed Indian people. Significantly, the contemporaneous movements of Sinn Féin
and Swadeshi fed voraciously off each other, as editors in India and Ireland persistently
reminded their readers of the common bond between Ireland and the subcontinent.
The Epilogue returns, once more, to the coverage of an imperial conflict in which
participation by the British Empire is integral, with news of the First World War making
its initial appearance in the pages of the Indian and Irish nationalist press. The Epilogue
analyzes the complex tangle of issues and emotions that determined how journalists in
Ireland and India would report World War I, and where their loyalties resided at the onset
of the war. Finally, it looks forward to developments during the course of the next four
years to establish the status of the Irish and Indian nationalist press at the close of the
Great War.
A side by side examination of contemporaneous Irish and Indian press coverage
yields valuable information not only about the parallel tracks of nationalist aspirations,
but also about the tensions within the Empire. The simultaneous growth of the nationalist
press in India and Ireland, the similarity of editorial content, the reciprocity of ideas, the
23
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mutual embrace of each other’s struggles, and the uncanny correlation between
legislative efforts aimed at suppression of the papers make further investigation of this
complex relationship imperative.

19

“An Insurrection in Print”: The Press and The Empire

By the summer of 1897, Her Majesty Queen Victoria had reigned over the United
Kingdom for an unprecedented sixty years. Accordingly, in honor of her glorious
Diamond Jubilee, the British Government declared a public holiday “at all public places
where British subjects were resident”—including India, the imperial jewel in the crown
of the monarch.24 That the subcontinent was reeling from a devastating plague seemed
lost on authorities planning the festivities, although even a cursory reading of the native
press would have alerted them to the tension and unrest in the Bombay Presidency. “To
speak the truth,” chided the Kesari, Bombay’s most influential native paper, “none can
help thinking that this is surely not the proper time for celebrating the Jubilee, at least not
in India.”25 More pointedly, the editor questioned the rationale for celebrating Victoria’s
Jubilee at all, asserting that the occasion marked “the sixtieth anniversary not of our
prosperity, but of our decline.”26
On the evening of 22 June 1897, as the joyous celebrations in Poona were coming
to a close, shots rang out— transforming the festive evening into a night as historically
momentous for the Empire as it was gruesome for those on the spot. Lieutenant C.E.
Ayerst died instantly from his injuries, while the primary target of the bullets, W.C.
Rand, Plague Commissioner for the Bombay Presidency, would linger eleven days before
succumbing to his wounds. Within days, authorities arrested brothers Damodar and
24
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Balkrishna Chapekar. For their crimes, the assassins were charged with murder, tried,
and hanged. Officials, however, did not believe the brothers had acted alone, or without
provocation. Accordingly, under the terms of Section 124A of the Penal Code, Lord
Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, leveled charges of sedition against Bal
Gangadhar Tilak, editor of the Kesari.27
While at first glance Tilak’s arrest seems a case of imperial overreach, the move
was not without precedent in the British Empire. Not only had the Government of India
previously charged Indian editors with inciting discontent, but also Dublin Castle had
arrested and imprisoned United Irishman editor John Mitchel in 1848 and tried and
imprisoned United Ireland editor William O’Brien in 1887, among others.28 There was a
long-standing concern that Irish and Indian newspapers fomented discontent and
disaffection among the masses, whom officials characterized as far too impressionable to
be able to withstand the heated rhetoric emanating from the pages of the nationalist press.
In the case of Tilak and the Kesari, the editor’s disdain for the Government’s
plague regulations was no secret, as the editor had been publicly lambasting Rand and his
intrusive procedures for months.29 In an effort to curtail the spread of the terrifying
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disease, authorities had mandated searches of private dwellings—incursions that offended
the Hindu and Muslim populations, alike, and created deep feelings of resentment
throughout India. Giving voice to that shared sense of outrage, Tilak proclaimed, “My
heart is full of indignation at the injustice which is being perpetrated by the officials and
the words which come out are the natural outburst of the feelings inside me.”30
Convinced his criticism was protected by law, the editor reserved his most damning
accusation for Rand, declaring “the Bombay Government should not have entrusted the
execution of this order to a suspicious, sullen and tyrannical officer like Rand.”31
Authorities grew even more animated at Tilak’s assertion that “No blame attaches to any
person if he is doing his deeds without being actuated by a desire to reap the fruit of his
deeds”—seeming, as it did, to exonerate in advance the sibling assassins.32
If proof was needed that British authorities feared the profound influence the
native press exerted over its readers, it lay in the Government’s proceedings against Tilak
in the aftermath of the Rand assassination.33 Regardless of whether the public actually
concurred with Tilak, or whether they had even read his editorials, Tilak’s trial and

30

Cited in D.V. Tahmankar,, Lokamanya Tilak: Father of Unrest and Maker of Modern India (London:
John Murray, 1956), 78.

31

Kesari, May 1897, cited in Echenberg, 66.

32

Kesari, 15 June 1897, Cited in Richard I. Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics
in Maharashtra. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 114. Years later, Tilak would return to
the subject of the assassination, renewing his belief that the Chapekar brothers were, in fact, righteously
motivated. “These murders have assumed a different aspect from ordinary murders,” asserted the editor,
“owing to the supposition (on the part of the perpetrators) that they were doing a sort of beneficent act.”
Cited in Mohammad Shabbir Khan, Tilak and Gokhale: A Comparative Study of Their Socio-PoliticoEconomic Programmes of Reconstruction (Ashish Publishing House, 1992), 104.
33

Hearing of the tragedy, the New York Times sounded an alarm, informing its readers about the “Outburst
of Anti-British feeling in the native press of Bengal and Bombay.” The paper warned of a possible repeat of
the 1857 rebellion, and suggested that the British Empire might, once again, impose strict censorship on the
more intemperate journalists of India. “The Trouble in India,” New York Times, 3 July 1897.

22

subsequent imprisonment make clear that officials had convinced themselves that his
words were setting a dangerous precedent. Already dealing with the incendiary writings
of an Irish nationalist press that excoriated British policy on a daily basis and seemed
hell-bent on severing ties with the Empire, the British Government now found itself
confronting increasingly obstreperous voices in the Indian nationalist press. The
repressive measures adopted by the British Government against journalists in both
Ireland and the subcontinent provide compelling evidence that officials believed the
nationalist press capable not only of disrupting and obstructing official business, but also
of endangering the Empire.

The Role of the Press
It was the nationalist press that framed the debate about the British Empire,
constantly analyzing and evaluating imperial policy, and reminding readers that their
plight was shared by other imperial subjects. The Irish Parliamentary Party, founded in
1882 under the aegis of Charles Stewart Parnell, had attempted to draw attention to
Ireland’s agrarian plight, while the Indian National Congress, formed in 1885, sought to
give voice to the problems of the subcontinent. Largely composed of members of an
educated middle class steeped in British tradition, both bodies toiled in concert with the
British Government—believing that working constitutionally within the system was the
most efficient and democratic way to move their countries forward. Their failure to
effect change rapidly and demonstrably, however, led to frustration among their
supporters, compounded by an inability to reach the masses. Thus, in Ireland and India,
it was the press that labored to further the cause of nationalism.
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Benedict Anderson asserts that one of the reasons a nation remains only an
imagined community is because members “will never know most of their fellowmembers, meet them, or even hear of them.”34 Absent that face-to-face interaction, the
possibility of discovering commonality is remote. The nationalist press in India and
Ireland provided an antidote to this anonymity, forging a link based on common concerns
and anxieties, aspirations and desires. The “one-day best seller” that was the Irish or
Indian nationalist newspaper linked readers as they engaged in simultaneous consumption
of the latest anti-imperial rhetoric.35 In the process, the press helped give substance to an
illusion, a feeling of permanence to what had only been ephemeral, and strengthened the
bonds of the “horizontal comradeship,” to use Anderson’s term, that was slowly being
forged.36
A close reading of period newspapers reveals not only the major issues of the day
and the positions staked out by each party, but also the role of the press in setting the
parameters of the public debate. The late Eric Hobsbawm suggested that one of the
outcomes of the burgeoning world economy in the Age of Empire was the birth of mass
media, “which, for the first time, deserved the name.” 37 Hobsbawm observed that the
last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a marked increase in the circulation of
newspapers, with a British newspaper, Lloyds Weekly, achieving a million-copy sale for
the first time. Instinctively grasping the power of the press to reach this vast audience,
the British Government and its ardent proponents, such as publishing magnate Lord
34
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Northcliffe, seized on the press as a means of communicating, forwarding, and defending
the imperial agenda.38 Indeed, Niall Ferguson claims that “it was above all through the
popular press that the Empire reached a mass audience at home,” while Michael de Nie
asserts that this platform granted the press “considerable, perhaps unparalleled, authority
in shaping popular understandings of the empire and its peoples.”39 Whether an
Englishman in London believed the British Empire was engaged in a glorious civilizing
mission or a grasping territorial expansion depended largely on which paper he read that
morning.
The axiom was particularly true in time of war, when the newspaper was perhaps
the only source of information regarding events occurring in South Africa, China, Russia,
or Japan. 40 Whereas the British press was particularly effective in convincing the public
of the justice of the imperial cause, the Irish and Indian nationalist press learned to
counter the official version of events. These years chronologically belong not only to the
Age of Imperialism (1850-1914), but also to the Age of Nationalism. The availability of
newspapers as a conduit to convince the masses of the righteousness of a cause, therefore,
was not lost on those in Ireland and India who opposed the policies of the British
Government. They adopted the persuasive techniques of the British press, but
38
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ingeniously honed and refined them, speaking a language specifically designed for their
readers. Historian Jerry W. Knudson argues that what people believed was happening—
“as revealed to them through the means of mass communication”—is equally important
to the historian as what may have actually transpired. 41 “Thus,” Knudson concludes,
“the perception of events as filtered through the press may have changed the historical
outcome.”42 If the press possessed the power to portray the Empire as a magnificent
realm on which the sun would never set, it also had the capacity to paint a portrait of the
Empire as a devastated landscape on which the blood would never dry.
In attempting to discover how the press emerged as a formidable social and
political entity, scholarship has been driven by both quantitative and qualitative data. In
addition to charting the growth of the press and undertaking a critical assessment of its
impact, it is vital to examine the mission of the press, and to identify those editors who
functioned as the primary agents in forwarding a nationalist agenda. Analyzed in
concert, these factors provide valuable evidence of the power of the Irish and Indian
nationalist press during wartime to direct the conversation, mount resistance to the
Empire, and construct a national platform.

The Growth of the Press
Scholars agree that for the British press to have grown and prospered in the latter
half of the nineteenth century required the simultaneous presence of several felicitous
41
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circumstances: a rising level of literacy; advances in technology that made it possible to
produce newspapers at an affordable price; a driving issue that could seize the attention
of the public; and a pantheon of visionary editors who understood how to exploit the
power of the press. Many of the same factors that helped the British press rise to
prominence also ensured that the Irish and Indian press would take the lead in promoting
national discussion. Hugh Oram was among the first to examine the impact of higher
literacy rates on the popularity of the Irish press, noting that whereas once only the
Protestant gentry and middle class had access to newspapers, legislation directed at
improving education had the desired effect of increasing literacy among the lower
classes.43
Literacy in Ireland generally meant proficiency in English, as British legislation in
the 1830s mandated that English would be the language of education in all Ireland’s
national schools. For centuries, the British Government had viewed the speaking of Irish
with suspicion, characterizing as disloyal those who persisted in speaking their native
tongue.44 In Ireland, by the advent of the nationalist movement, English was the
predominant language, with the Irish-speaking public primarily confined to the
gaeltachts—small enclaves in the west and northwest. Until Arthur Griffith and his
fellow editors made a concerted effort to include the Irish language in their papers at the
43
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turn of the twentieth century, newspapers in Ireland were published almost exclusively in
English. Protestant ownership of the Irish press, however, had given way to a spate of
publications backed by the Catholic Church.45 The result was a proliferation of
nationalist-leaning newspapers in the Irish provinces and a subsequent increase in
circulation figures. The cost of newspapers in Ireland had also decreased appreciably,
making their purchase accessible to a large constituency.46
Conversely, in India, language initially constituted a significant barrier to
education, literacy, and the consumption of papers. On the subcontinent, although
English had been taught in schools since the passage of the Charter Act of 1813, India
was a country in which fifteen languages and more than sixteen hundred dialects were
regularly spoken. Thomas Babington Macaulay’s rather infamous 1835 “Minute on
Indian Education” had made it clear that Britain’s efforts to educate should make use
only of English and not of the vernaculars, and that such teaching should be confined to
“a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in
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morals, and in intellect.”47 Therefore, India’s English-language papers appealed
primarily to an audience of elites.
On the subcontinent, the Anglo-Indian press flourished particularly in the
Bombay and Bengal Presidencies, and remained demonstrably loyal to the British Empire
even through the rise of Indian nationalism and the most tempestuous of events. The
native-owned press, by contrast, functioned far more autonomously, attempting to
evaluate issues not merely on the basis of whether a given outcome benefited the Empire,
but also from the perspective of the community, the religious sect represented by the
paper, and India, at large. There was, moreover, a critical difference between those
moderate nationalist newspapers that hewed closely to the platform of the Indian National
Congress and those more radical publications, such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s Kesari and
Shivram Mahadev Paranjape’s Kál that pursued a more extremist agenda. There was,
therefore, rarely a monolithic native press response to issues of the day.
What enabled the Indian nationalist press to emerge ultimately as a force to be
reckoned with was the advent of vernacular newspapers, which provided an enormous
boon to readership, as news could finally be communicated in Bengali (Samachar
Darpan, 1816), Gujarati (Bombay Samachar, 1822), Marathi (Darpan, 1832), and Tamil
(Swadesamitran, 1882), among an impressive range of other languages. By 1885, there
were three hundred nineteen vernacular publications in print, far outnumbering the
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ninety-six English-language journals.48 With the literacy rate in India hovering at only
six per cent at the turn of the century, moreover, the practice of communal reading
proliferated.49 One educated Indian reading aloud to an assembled audience in a small
village ensured the timely communication of topical news.50 The Government of India
would come to view the vernacular press with suspicion and even fear, as the content of
the papers could be shared across the community before hired translators managed to
present their superiors with an English translation.
If literacy and the easy availability of newspapers were integral elements in the
growth of the press, the emergence of substantive and controversial issues around which
the press could coalesce would prove the decisive factor. In India, the vernacular press
drew its strength from a series of social and political fracases that attracted the attention
of a specific spectrum of the population. Among them, the debate over the practice of
suttee led to a rise in Bengali papers, while a heated discussion within the Parsi
population in Bombay over the calendar sparked an increase in Gujarati papers.51 More
generally, the grim reality of Indian agrarian strife, compounded by devastating plague
and famine—catastrophes common to all—helped to increase sales and circulation in the
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last decade of the nineteenth century.52 As was the case on the subcontinent, the years
which featured the birth of a spate of nationalist papers in Ireland coincided with the
period of the Irish Land War.53 Provincial papers latched onto the issue of land agitation
and criticized Britain’s mishandling of the crisis, in the process, transforming the Land
War into a national topic capable of firing the passions of its readership.54 The advent of
any imperial war—whether in Afghanistan, the Sudan, South Africa, or China—
prompted a dramatic increase in readership across the Empire. 55 For the Irish and Indian
nationalist press, coverage of war offered the prospect of a sizable readership and an
unrivaled opportunity to espouse their views.
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The Mission
Given the existence of such a popular platform, the question of how the press
chose to define its role assumed great magnitude. Simon Potter notes that historians have
tended to stress the cooperation of the press “in the broader attempt of the British media
to educate and edify the public,” claiming that there was a concerted effort “to give the
people what they should have rather than what they necessarily want.”56 Bal Gangadhar
Tilak specifically fixed on the vernacular newspaper to educate the peasant population of
India, arming them with the information necessary to stake a claim to the running of their
own country. Whereas this sense of public mission did, indeed, mark the formative years
of the press in Britain, Mark Hampton discerns a transition of the British press from its
initial dedication to an educational ideal—designed to influence and inform—to a
representative ideal, by which the people could speak truth to power. Whereas Hampton
asserts that the first tradition dominated the thinking of journalists from the 1850s to the
1880s, the latter representative ideal rose to prominence in the last two decades of the
nineteenth century. “In this view,” states Hampton, “the press did not influence readers
or public opinion but reflected them.”57
The relationship between the Empire and its subjects was constantly in flux,
buffeted by such unpredictable occurrences as drought, famine, and disease, and.by manmade issues that included social inequality, economic uncertainty, and, especially,
imperial wars. The press was not only the channel through which the Government could
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communicate its policies and the people could make their will known; it was also the
means of persuading its anonymous readers to challenge those policies. “The newspaper
press,” asserts Michael de Nie, “was understood to be the main vehicle for a conversation
among readers, journalists, and politicians in which the former two could most effectively
register their views and influence, for good or ill, the decisions of the imperial state.”58
Thus, according to de Nie, the study of press commentary affords the historian the unique
ability to “understand how imperial controversies unfolded in the public sphere.”59 As
disturbing to British officials as Irish and Indian criticism of any war effort must have
been, negative editorials and letters to the editor offered invaluable insights into the
public’s perception of that conflict.
As tempting as it is to make a clean delineation between the two primary
functions of the press, the evidence reveals that the educational and representative ideals
overlapped considerably in the Irish and Indian nationalist press.60 The Liberal
characterization of the press as the fourth estate meant that it would not only reflect
public opinion, but also simultaneously lead public opinion, in an effort “to control the
political actions of the masses.”61 Yet, as Potter points out, there was concern among
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many that the London Times and other British papers were perverting public opinion in
the service of imperial jingoism. Indeed, Jennifer Regan questions whether the reason
Irish nationalism so aggressively promoted in the pages of the Nation during the Indian
Mutiny was, perhaps, Ireland’s answer to the rampant jingoism present in the British
press.62 The question must, therefore, be asked whether in the attempt to promote Irish
nationalism, the Irish press was not, in fact, guilty of fashioning its own chauvinistic
culture. Indeed, editors worked assiduously to frame the political debate churning around
Britain’s imperial mission in terms that directly related to the Empire’s treatment of its
Irish and Indian subjects.

The Agents of Change
That these critical decisions regarding a newspaper’s mission lay in the hands of a
mere handful of visionaries raises one of the more fascinating aspects of the Indian and
Irish nationalist press. In Ireland and on the subcontinent, by the end of the nineteenth
century, the same individuals who were in the vanguard of the nationalist movement were
also the editors of, or leading contributors to, the most vocal and ardently nationalist
newspapers. These highly political journalists not only toiled to report the events of the
day, but were also in the enviable position of being able to create the news their papers so
studiously covered. They set the tone and, often, the agenda for their colleagues, making
their influence prodigious—a fact acknowledged by officials, who privately voiced
concerns about the impact of these powerful men. The issues Irish and Indian editors
chose to embrace were startlingly similar in many respects—particularly in their
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persistent call for self-reliance and home industry. In time, they would look across the
sea to each other for support and encouragement, holding up an example to their readers
of another country breaking away from the imperialist parade to march to its own
nationalist tune.
Among those in India who served in both political and journalistic capacities were
Surendranath Banerjea (Bengalee), Shivram Mahadev Paranjape (Kál), and Bal
Gangadhar Tilak (Kesari, Mahrátta). Banerjea was founder of the Indian National
Association, two-time President of the Indian National Congress, and editor of the
Bengali-language Bengalee. One of the premier nationalist journalists in the Bengal
Presidency, renowned for its anti-government agitation, Banerjea was one of the most
insistent voices speaking out against what he characterized as the Empire’s racial
discrimination. Arrested and charged with contempt of court in 1883 for remarks
published in the Bengalee, Banerjea served two months in jail and emerged to national
acclaim. A popular draw on the speaker circuit, Banerjea’s personal appearances served
the dual purpose of enabling him to bring his editorial message to a broad audience, while
simultaneously bolstering sales of the Bengalee. Alluding to the Government of India’s
refusal to allow natives entry to the officer ranks, Banerjea cautioned, “Racial
qualifications are not moral qualifications,” adding. “This ostracism of a whole people
. . . cannot add to the strength and the stability or the greatness of the Empire.” 63 The
editor’s warning was especially prescient given the controversy that would erupt over the
participation of the Indian sepoy in the wars in China and South Africa.
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In the Bombay Presidency, Shivram Mahadev Paranjape’s Kál held the distinction
of being the most reviled of all extremist nationalist newspapers—at least from the
perspective of the Government of India, which characterized Paranjape’s writings as
“impregnated with the venom of disaffection.”64 The Kál’s circulation was second only to
the Kesari, both in terms of circulation and influence. The Government of India closely
monitored Paranjape, fearing not only his nationalist bent, but also his affinity for
supporting the agenda of anarchists, nihilists, and revolutionaries.65 The Kál was
arguably the most pronounced anti-imperial publication on the subcontinent, earning it
the label of “virulent and treasonable.”66 Warned by officials in 1899, the editor refused
to moderate the tone of the paper, prompting authorities to consider prosecuting
Paranjape for seditious writings in 1900, 1904, 1905, and 1907.67 In reviewing the
history of seditious activity in India, Justice Rowlatt’s Sedition Committee of 1918
referred to Paranjape as one of the two most influential journalists in all of Poona.68 The
other was Bal Gangadhar Tilak.
If there was one editor whose influence was felt beyond the Bombay Presidency
and across the length and breadth of India, it was Bal Gangadhar Tilak. The eventual
leader of the extremist wing of the Indian National Congress, Tilak was the founder and
editor of the English-language Mahrátta and Marathi-language Kesari newspapers, both
founded in January 1881. Tilak believed that his uneducated readers “must be given the
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knowledge of such topics as concern their everyday life by writings on literary, social,
political, moral and economic subjects.”69 A soldier on the front lines of Indian
nationalism, Tilak’s preferred weapons ranged from the veiled metaphor and the pointed
barb to the open uncompromising editorial attack. Gazing out over the political
landscape, Tilak decried the British despotism that had transformed India’s would-be
activists into what he termed “an aggregate of disunited, dispirited, unenergetic,
unambitious, indifferent, unprincipled, selfish, cowardly fellows.”70 Incensed and
insistent, Tilak reserved special disdain for what he considered the arrogant policies of
the British Government on issues ranging from the army and agriculture to the plague and
famine relief. Although the Kál, another Bombay-based Marathi paper, was undoubtedly
more virulent than the Kesari in its anti-imperial commentary, Tilak’s paper enjoyed
more than double the Kál’s circulation and was acknowledged as the “most influential of
vernacular papers” in the Bombay Presidency.71
Both Paranjape and Tilak were Chitpavan Brahmins, the elite of Bombay. As
such, their immediate audience was comprised of the educated, literate members of their
own class. Yet, the strong anti-imperialist message they promoted enabled the Kál, the
Kesari, and other nationalist papers to broaden their appeal—extending their influence to
wherever Indians were restless for change. The papers proved particularly appealing to
India’s youth, who welcomed the chance to make their voices heard in a united challenge
to the Raj.72 Moreover, given India’s tradition of communal reading, it only required the
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presence in a village of one literate person reading aloud to ensure the papers and their
nationalist message would reach a new and ever growing audience.
What was becoming of particular concern to the Government during the last
decades of the nineteenth century and at the dawn of the twentieth century was the
emergence in India of tactics heretofore employed only by the Irish, such as the No-Rent
strategy adopted by Indian peasants. In later years, Lord Hamilton—who had ordered the
arrest of Tilak in 1897—lamented the growing influence of Ireland on Tilak and his
fellow nationalists, stating, “I sometimes used to think that Tilak and Co. had got the idea
into their heads. The Irish methods and the organization of the Land League have been
closely studied by certain irreconcilables in Poona; and their proceedings were not
dissimilar from those practiced by the Parnellites.”73 Hamilton was no doubt referring to
Poona’s Chitpavan Brahmins, a highly-educated class of Hindus—among whom Tilak
and Kál editor Paranjape were certainly the most vocal. As excerpts from the Mahrátta,
Kesari, and Kál indicate, both men repeatedly cast their eyes toward Ireland, evincing an
appreciation for Parnell’s strategy of boycott and obstruction that would flourish in India
after the Partition of Bengal.
That officials detected an Irish influence on the Indian populace was a direct
result of the Indian native press disseminating Irish ideas among its readership. This
imitation should not have come as a surprise to British officials, given the propensity of
Brahmins to send their offspring to England for a proper British education. In the waning
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decades of the nineteenth century, Britain’s most prestigious public schools, universities,
and institutions—including Harrow, Cambridge, and the Inns of Court—had played host
to the progeny of India’s more affluent families. In what would ultimately be an irony of
historical timing, their residence in the United Kingdom coincided with Ireland’s bitter
struggle to achieve what would come to be known as the three F’s: Fair rent, Fixity of
tenure, and Free sale. The Indian students thus observed the effectiveness of the twin
strategies of boycott and obstructionism—perhaps the most beneficial lessons from a
nationalist perspective they took with them back to India.74 Indeed, Sri Aurobindo
Ghose, who together with Bipin Chandra Pal would found Bande Mataram in the wake
of the partition of Bengal in 1905, was one of the students studying in England in 1870
when Parnell rose to power.75 Having observed the Irish protests against Captain
Boycott, Ghose would later define the tactic as “an act of self-defence, of aggression for
the sake of self-preservation. To call it an act of hate is to say that a man who is being
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slowly murdered, is not justified in striking at his murderer.”76 Ghose’s position sought to
deflect the criticism of those who accused nationalists in Ireland and in India of adopting
tactics fueled solely by animosity toward the Empire. Instead, Ghose suggested that
Irish—and, by extension, Indian resistance—was simply a matter of self-preservation.
Nationalist journalists in both countries shielded themselves behind this argument,
avowing that their often merciless critiques of British conduct in the Boer War and Boxer
Rebellion were driven not by enmity, but arose only out of profound concern for the fate
of their respective countries.
If the most outspoken Indian critics of the Empire emerged in the 1880s, a volatile
blend of journalism and politics was established in Ireland as early as the mid-eighteenth
century, with the founding of the Freeman’s Journal by Charles Lucas in 1763.
Considered the oldest nationalist paper in Ireland, the Freeman’s Journal was a
proponent of legislative independence for Ireland. As such, the paper adhered to the
Protestant politics of Henry Grattan and Charles Flood, who advocated the creation of an
Irish parliament distinct from Westminster. With the founding of Charles Stewart
Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party in 1882, the Freeman’s Journal became even more
ardently nationalist in its role as the Party’s mouthpiece, until the Katherine O’Shea
divorce scandal caused a schism among Irish Parliamentarians and the readership of the
Journal.77
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Notably, the majority of early nineteenth-century papers in Ireland not only
adhered to a specific political agenda, but also aligned themselves with a religious
affiliation. Whereas in 1810, every one of the dozen newspapers published in Dublin
were owned by Protestants, the emergence on the political scene of Daniel O’Connell
would soon begin to shift the balance.78 If there was a paper that superseded the Journal
in its unabashedly unapologetic championing of the nationalist cause, it was the Nation,
founded in 1842 by Charles Gavan Duffy, Thomas Davis, and John Blake Dillon,
members of the movement known as Young Ireland. M.L. Brillman has challenged the
accepted characterization of Young Ireland as a revolutionary undertaking, however,
arguing that “the weapons of the Young Irelanders in the 1840s were not the pike or the
rifle, but rather the words and ideas they formulated in their remarkable newspaper, the
Nation.”79 Just as the Freeman’s Journal had railed against the passage of the Act of
Union in 1801, so did the Nation exist almost solely to promote the agenda of the Repeal
Association, founded by the fiery orator Daniel O’Connell, in 1840. Brillman suggests
that the Nation “was a crucial instrument in linking Repeal to the Irish people,” and left
as its legacy a tradition of “moral force, constitutional politics, and unequivocal loyalty to
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O’Connell.”80 The Nation was the first newspaper in Ireland to formally function as a
mouthpiece for a nationalist political agenda—a role later assumed by the Freeman’s
Journal, in its staunch advocacy of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
Perhaps the most incendiary writer for the Nation was John Mitchel, another
Young Irelander. Although Mitchel would only contribute to the paper from 1845 to
1847, he managed in that short time to embroil the Nation in a charge of seditious libel.
In 1848, John Mitchel founded his own nationalist journal, the United Irishman, whose
rabid anti-British views speedily earned it the enmity of the British Government.81 In
May of 1848, a mere three months after the inaugural publication of the paper, Mitchel
found himself tried and convicted of treason-felony and sentenced to deportation.82
Long after his exile from Ireland, Mitchel continued to be a thorn in the side of the
British and a formidable presence in the press. Writing about Britain in the New York
Times at the onset of the Crimean War, Mitchel proclaimed, “The Enemy’s difficulty,
though they try to disguise and make light of it, is come. Shall it be to Ireland an
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opportunity?—and how?”83 Thus did Mitchel set the agenda for all current and future
Irish nationalists who proudly bore that name, whether in the press or in politics.
In the 1870s, William O’Brien surged to the forefront of Irish nationalist editors,
embracing the Irish Land War as the perfect conflict to rouse his readership. A Member
of Parliament whose proudly contentious newspaper United Ireland (1881) boasted that it
was an “insurrection in print,” O’Brien co-authored with fellow nationalist John Dillon
the notorious 1886 Plan of Campaign, which sought to convince struggling Irish tenant
farmers to withhold rent from their absentee landlords until the landlords agreed to
reduced rents. Eschewing the “cringing servility” adopted by those who shepherded rival
Dublin newspapers, O’Brien did not hesitate to skewer British policy at every
conceivable turn. When Dublin Castle attempted to suppress the paper, O’Brien cheekily
responded by inserting a tombstone in every issue of the paper, with an epitaph which
read “Freedom of the Press in Ireland in 1881.”84 In addition to gaining the attention of
Dublin Castle, this impudent act served to remind United Ireland’s readers that Britain
was denying to the Irish rights guaranteed to every citizen of the Empire.
In the 1870s and 1880s, the Freeman’s Journal, the Nation, and the United
Ireland kept their readers fully apprised of debates in Westminster; international events in
India, Africa, and the Middle East; and the intricate chess moves by Parnell and his party
as they tried to wrest control of Irish property from the British. The strategy was not
exclusively altruistic; in their reportage, they clearly sought to align their readers’
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attitudes toward the British Government with their own. Irish nationalist journalists
sought to influence public opinion and also reflect public opinion, thereby giving a voice
to thousands of middle and lower-class citizens who otherwise would have lacked an
advocate.
The most striking Irish exemplar of a politician-journalist, however, was Arthur
Griffith, co-owner and editor of the United Irishman, and future founder of the Sinn Féin
movement. Griffith had toiled as a compositor on the Nation, before enlisting on the
Irish Independent as a copyreader. In 1899, freshly returned from South Africa—where
he managed to found, publish, and dismantle a newspaper in a swift thirteen issues—
Griffith joined with his friend, William Rooney, to publish the United Irishman. The
journal was the second Irish publication to boast that particular name, having borrowed
its moniker and its manifesto—“Ireland for the Irish”—from John Mitchel’s journalistic
experiment in the 1840s.85
With the advent of the Irish Parliamentary Party, most nationalist newspapers
supported the Party’s constitutional efforts. Just as the Nation had been the official organ
of Daniel O’Connell’s Repeal movement, the Freeman’s Journal became the mouthpiece
of the Irish Parliamentary Party, working toward the goal of Home Rule through British
legislative channels. Griffith summarily rejected that position, proposing instead a bold
new Irish Nationalism. Just as Tilak and Paranjape pursued a more extreme nationalism
in India, Griffith’s brand of “advanced-nationalism” distanced itself from the more
traditional Irish nationalist papers, in that it believed the constitutional methods of the
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Irish Parliamentary Party would prove futile in winning Ireland its independence.86
Advanced-nationalist journalists, who included James Connolly and D.P. Moran among
their ranks, were unwilling to settle for Home Rule, and vociferously espoused the cause
of full Irish independence. Dismissing the Home Rulers claim to patriotism, Connolly
charged, “future history will more correctly stigmatise them as the most unscrupulous
political charlatans who ever imposed upon a confiding race.”87 Connolly was
particularly irritated by the news that an assembly of nationalist journalists gathered at
the Irish Institute of Journalists had drunk a toast to the Queen, rather than to freedom for
Ireland. For his part, Griffith declared, “Though I am a believer in the republican system
of government, I am ready—as I believe is every other Irish Nationalist—to accept any
form of native government in preference to alien rule.”88 Griffith expended an inordinate
amount of energy alternately trying to win over—or fend off—the parliamentarians
gathered to his right, and the physical force men aligned on his left.
Like Tilak, Griffith pressed for self-government, and insisted on a program of
national education that focused on native history and culture. In the inaugural issues of
the United Irishman, Griffith and Rooney set the tone for the years to come, aggressively
pursuing a nationalist agenda, calling for a “plague on the slaves who preach that
Irishmen should be influenced in their actions or conduct by English opinion.”89 Just as
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Tilak had lampooned the members of the Indian National Congress as dispirited,
unambitious, and cowardly, so too the United Irishman launched an attack on the
complacency of the Irish in the face of their subjugation by the British, denouncing the
“vile, skulking, servile spirit abroad—a lying, dastardly spirit—sometimes disguising
itself as a patriotic spirit.”90 To underscore the need for a revival of Irish industry,
Griffith reminded his readers of Jonathan Swift’s admonition to “Burn everything
English except their coals.”91 Although the United Irishman was only in print for six
years, during that time Griffith managed to set before the public what would soon be
embraced as the basic tenets of Irish nationalism, including the all-important goal of
depending on “ourselves alone:” Sinn Féin.

Assessing the Impact
Whereas the nationalist press in both India and Ireland was undeniably aggressive
in promoting an agenda, there exists the lingering question of whether that outspokenness
translated into increasing support for the cause. In her study of Irish coverage of the
Indian Mutiny, Jennifer Regan argues that although newspapers cannot reveal the
thoughts of readers, “they should reveal what kind of information was available to the
literate public who did not have imperial knowledge through first-hand accounts.”92 In
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the case of imperial conflicts waged in foreign countries, the majority of the public
received news of the wars almost exclusively through the press, which took advantage of
the opportunity to filter the news through its own political sensibilities. Papers loyal to
the British Government relayed the Government’s press releases intact, whereas those
extremist or advanced-nationalist papers in opposition openly questioned the veracity of
the updates, and sought to spin an alternate reality for their readers. “By sheer virtue of
what it chose to report on, what it chose to ignore, and topics it chose to privilege,”
asserts Michael de Nie, “the press shaped the public conversation and helped set the
political agenda.”93 During an age in which the newspaper functioned as the primary
form of mass media, nationalist editors understood that they possessed an extraordinary
public forum from which to direct the public debate. The artful cherry-picking of war
news enabled Irish and Indian editors to determine the contours of the discussion,
ensuring that the Empire’s conduct was always under scrutiny.
The question remains as to whether Arthur Griffith and Bal Gangadhar Tilak and
their colleagues managed to make substantive inroads in directing the national
conversation. While no single criterion can reliably reveal the full dynamics of the era,
analysis of four critical factors— circulation figures, editorial content, government
correspondence, and government legislation—can illuminate the growth of the nationalist
press, as well as Britain’s increasingly futile attempt to suppress its influence.
Circulation figures for the Irish papers tell a story of remarkable expansion, with the Gray
family growing the Freeman’s Journal from a mere 2000-3000 copies in the 1840s to a
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staggering 30,000 copies a day—an estimated forty percent of the market—by the
1880s.94 Just as significant was the dramatic rise in the number of Irish papers that took
on the nationalist label. Whereas only two newspapers donned the mantle of nationalism
in the 1840s, twenty-eight were waving the nationalist banner by the end of the
nineteenth century.95
Although circulation figures provide a factual foundation for analyzing the reach
of the Irish nationalist press, in India they reveal only a fraction of the story. Inasmuch as
the Government of India regularly kept the circulation figures on the leading papers of
the day, these figures undoubtedly underestimated a paper’s readership. The pattern was
a peculiarity of Indian life that Sir John Edgar, Chief Secretary to the Government of
Bengal, deemed necessary to explain at great length to his superiors. In a revealing
memo to the Secretary of the Government of India, Edgar advised, “It is not to be
supposed that the influence of the papers can be measured solely by the number of their
subscribers . . . Statistics apart, these newspapers are widely circulated from hand to
hand; they are read aloud to circles of listeners; the statements made in them are repeated
by readers or listeners to others.”96 Advising the Government that a paper with 300,000
copies in circulation could ultimately reach an audience of two million, Edgar also
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warned that the number multiplied dramatically whenever the native press broached a
subject steeped in controversy.97
As Edgar’s memorandum indicates, an analysis of official records and
correspondence sheds revealing light on the impact of the Irish and Indian press,
demonstrating the Government’s perception of how efficient and effective editors were in
reaching their targeted audience. Secret correspondence emanating from Dublin Castle
and the offices of the Government of India indicate that as much as officials would have
liked to dismiss out of hand the efforts of nationalists, the journalists’ output was causing
considerable anxiety and nervousness. Dublin Castle records showcase Britain’s grave
concern about the Irish nationalist press, with the question of what constituted sedition
clearly preoccupying officials, who were quick to order the suppression of Irish papers at
the slightest provocation. On the subcontinent, officials serving in the Government of
India felt compelled to put into writing every thought and opinion—however biased or
ill-developed—regarding the native press. In and of themselves, the flurry of minutes,
memoranda, letters, and cables detail the palpable concerns and fears of the government.
The prolific correspondence, coupled with the resulting legislation aimed at suppressing
Indian journalists, are essential tools in analyzing the Government’s perception of public
opinion.
That officials were growing increasingly concerned about the potential danger
posed by the nationalist press can be borne out by the legislation designed by the British
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Government to rein in inflammatory rhetoric in the newspapers. If there is a credible
case to be made for the power of the nationalist press in this era, among the most
convincing evidence remains the tortuous legal maneuvers undertaken to suppress the
Empire’s vocal critics.98 The Council of India was convinced that India’s native press
was guilty of “breathing disaffection and sedition among the ignorant masses,” while Sir
Frederick W. Heygate alerted his confreres in Westminster that Irish journalists were
guilty of “incalculable mischief.” 99 By the 1870s, government officials in both Ireland
and India were confronting an increasingly bold and vocal press that was testing the
limits of Britain’s liberalism. The miasma of uncertainty and unease pervading the
corridors of power ultimately persuaded the Government to produce the Peace
Preservation (Ireland) Act of 1870 and the Vernacular Press Act of 1878—a potent pair
of predictably reactionary bills, more illustrative of mounting British paranoia than of any
real peril from Irish and Indian printing presses. Ostensibly concocted in an attempt to
stop the outpouring of nationalistic fervor, the legislation not only failed to silence critics
of imperial policy, but rather it served as a spur, urging newly invigorated journalists in
Ireland and India to accelerate their protests.
In Ireland, just as the nationalist press had exploited the issue of land agitation to
promote sales of its newspapers, so did the British Government seize on what it deemed
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the recklessness of Irish journalists as it rationalized the necessity of legislating the press.
Upon hearing of the Government’s plans, Philip Callan, Member of Parliament for
Dundalk, leveled a bitter charge at the Government, indicting officials for promulgating a
“fictitious panic from agrarian outrage,” merely for the purpose of enacting repressive
legislation designed to rein in the press.100 In fact, the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act
of 1870 featured legislation that would come to be known as the Irish Press Act, which
called for Dublin Castle to confiscate the print equipment of any Irish journal suspected
of publishing articles promoting sedition. During the lengthy debate over the bill, Chief
Secretary for Ireland Chichester Fortescue rose to denounce forcefully the writings of the
Irish press, declaring, “It is well known how it teaches and preaches in every form, with
an amount of boldness and audacity varying from week to week and from month to
month, hatred of the institutions and Government of the United Kingdom.”101 The Irish
Land War had spawned a new and decidedly more entrenched generation of nationalists,
who resented and rejected British domination and saw no reason to disguise their animus
toward Britain.
In a ringing dismissal of the intellectual powers of the naïve Irish peasant, who
presumably read and swallowed whole the meaty output of the nationalist papers,
Fortescue drove home the need to muzzle the troublesome Irish press. The Secretary
declared, “It is known how that weekly literature poisons the minds of the people in
Ireland who read it against all law and against the Constitution of the country . . . how it
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inflames the passions of the people by the rhetorical descriptions of the wrongs of other
days . . . how it makes it impossible for those who read that literature, and read none
other, to know the truth with respect to public affairs and the real conduct and intentions
of the Government of the country.”102 Fortescue’s tirade was indicative of the
Government’s anxiety about the power of the press to “educate.” Whereas educating the
public was certainly a noble journalistic calling, the British Government was leery of the
lessons gleefully taught by a nationalist press all too capable of schooling their readers in
the subject of discontent.
Asserting that “our object is not so much to punish the individuals as to stop the
evil itself,” the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act of 1870 granted officials not only the
authority to prosecute an editor for seditious libel or treason-felony, but also gave the
Lord Lieutenant power to seize all copies of any paper deemed offensive.103 Such
sanctions met with fierce disapproval from several of those sitting in Westminster, with
Sir John Gray characterizing the legislation as a series of “unreasonable proposals” that
“had never been heard of in the most repressive bill ever devised.”104 The Solicitor
General, Mr. Dowse, countered such arguments with his rather stunning assertion that the
proposed bill was “a measure of real kindness, for the sooner the Irish people were made
to understand that they must obey the law, and that it would protect right and punish
wrong, the better it would be for Ireland and the Empire at large.”105 Such myopic vision
of an Irish people so docile as to submit willingly to the legislative whims of the Empire
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reveals a British Government increasingly removed from political reality. British failure
to comprehend the Irish character is all the more surprising given the geographical
proximity and long history of governance.
The debate was both heated and prolonged, with those who backed the legislation
reading aloud passages from offending papers, while those who opposed the measure
accused the Government of arming itself with repressive and “unconstitutional powers,
for the purpose of striking at the liberty of the press.”106 Going further, Mr. Moore
denounced the legislation for striking not only at the liberty of the press, “but at the very
life of a nation.”107 There were many in Westminster who feared that the proposed Press
Act would fly in the face of Britain’s vaunted liberalism, whittling away at a freedom
long cherished by its people. “While other nations, comparatively new to liberty,” were
learning, by courageous experiment, that order and law might be maintained without a
censorship of the Press,” charged Mr. W.M. Torrens, “it was painful to think that a
British Parliament should be invited to revert to arbitrary devices and oppression
powers.”108
In an attempt to deny the necessity of such legislation, Mr. John Gray pointed to
the successful prosecutions under the Treason-Felony Act of John Mitchel and the United
Irishman, as well as the shutting down of the Felon and the Tribune. Gray decried the
proposal to grant unlimited power to the Government—“which in Ireland meant three or
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four legal gentlemen ensconced in a dark room in Dublin Castle.”109 In his estimation,
the legislation gave such men leave “to constitute themselves a worse than Star Chamber,
and to control the entire Press of the country.”110 Gray’s reference to the notorious Star
Chamber—as secretive and arbitrary as it was speedy in its pronouncements—was an
attempt to remind Parliament that such monarchical highhandedness had long been
rejected by the British people.111
Such words sent an unmistakable signal to the Irish nationalist press that the
Government had ceased to obey its constitutional mandate and would prosecute its critics
with a heretofore unknown ferocity. That same prescience warned that the inevitable
outcome of such repression would be renewed—and even more violent—protests by
those in the nationalist press clinging desperately to their rights as subjects of the Empire.
Yet, the words of Moore and Torrens and Gray would fall on deaf ears, and the Peace
Preservation (Ireland) Act with its repressive Irish Press Act, would be enacted into law
in the spring of 1870.
Ireland served as a legislative laboratory for the Empire, a backyard Bunsen
burner in which to empirically test the potency of the newest law governing the land, the
schoolroom, or the newspaper. Having dutifully enacted repressive legislation to respond
to Irish agitation in the press, Westminster proactively resorted to the same harsh
measures in an effort to smother what they perceived as incipient Indian defiance.
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Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the introduction of the 1878 Indian legislation was
as much an instinctive reaction to past agitation in Ireland as it was to present sedition in
India. What the British Government failed to recognize was that the Indian native press
was, by and large, demonstrably loyal. Since the 1857 Mutiny, there had been no overt
attempt at agitation, let alone any massive uprising. Even the editorials in the native press
generally hewed to a tone of gentlemanly remonstrance, learned and practiced since
infancy at the knee of that most civilized of Empires. In 1870, the Irishman had poised
the sword of Damocles over the head of the British Government, threatening ominously,
“There are 100,000 men in the country to-day [sic] who are ready, if necessary, to go to
the fullest extent for its liberty.” By contrast, the Indian native press spoke of “discontent
in the minds of the people.”112 Exceptions to this editorial etiquette did, indeed, exist,
prompting the Government to launch sedition proceedings.113 The majority of the native
press, however, couched their criticisms in the most elegant and eloquent of prose,
seeking to chide and chastise, rather than excoriate.
The absence of violent language did not the stop the Government of India from
rigorously monitoring the Indian native press. In 1874, intelligence officials instituted a
new practice of employing native speakers to pore over each issue, and excerpt what they
deemed were the most inflammatory of articles.114 No area of Indian life was omitted,
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with summaries of articles on agriculture, famine, education, and railways dutifully
compiled. In a telling sign of their growing anxiety, officials would soon request that the
heading of Ireland be added to the list of excerpted articles, in a bid to keep track of the
developing brotherhood between Irish and Indian nationalists. Richard Davis has
suggested that the sheer numbers of articles translated by intelligence officials is a potent
indicator of “the seriousness with which the British authorities regarded Irish-Indian
relations in this period.”115 Certainly, the evidence supports his conclusions, with Irish
and Indian nationalist editors repeatedly bolstering their own agendas by alluding to each
other’s nationalist strategy.116 The Government of India could not have been pleased to
read excerpts detailing “Alleged necessity of a combination between India, Ireland, and
South Africa in the struggle against British oppression” or “Exhortation to the people of
India to imitate Russian and Irish methods of political agitation.”117
In addition to these weekly Reports on the Native Press, the Political Department
of the Bombay Presidency also commissioned an Annual Report on the Native Press,
which documented the “attitudes and activities” of the leading news organs. The
detailed report meticulously catalogued the number of papers, circulation figures, and, in
particular, the tone of the native press in its treatment of both domestic and foreign
policy. Officials in the Bombay Presidency classified the newspapers according to the

English language speaker, however, they remain one of the only windows into the journalism of the Indian
native press in this era.
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loyalty expressed within their pages, devising four categories into which the papers could
be carefully slotted. The safe, “innocuous” papers were those that eschewed any talk of
politics, while a second category remained loyal at all times to the Empire.118 The
remaining two categories were much more problematic, representing those nationalist
papers who hewed closely to the agenda of the Indian National Congress, and those
Marathi papers—of which the Kesari and the Kál were the most prominent—that adopted
a more radical tone and were “animated by a spirit of hostility to British rule.”119 Indeed,
these last two categories were analogous to Ireland’s always disagreeable advancednationalist press—a troubling similarity that may have induced officials in India to be
proactive in stifling the native press.
Britain’s distrust of the Indian press dated back to well before the Indian Mutiny,
with a succession of laws mandating licensing of newspapers or threatening suppression,
including Press Acts in 1835 and 1867. The issue of whether the revered British tradition
of freedom of the press should be extended to Indian journalists had long been a subject
of debate, arising on any occasion of native protest.120 Many in authority refused to
believe that criticism of the government was harmless or could even be beneficial in
identifying legitimate native grievances, and accused the government of being far too
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tolerant of the incessant vituperative volleys launched by journalists. Only Supreme
Council member Sir Charles Metcalfe consistently spoke out against any interference
with the native press, believing it preferable to let subjects vent their anger, rather than
“forcing them to smother it within their own breasts, ever ready to burst out.”121
Metcalfe’s liberal stance on the native press earned him the enmity of his fellow officials
in the East India Company, and he resigned from service in 1838.
In the wake of the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the Government of India instituted the
“Gagging Act,” (Act No. XV of 1857), which mandated licensing of all printing presses.
Indeed, Lord Canning, India’s first Viceroy (1858-1861), made no secret of his disdain
for the native press, openly sharing his scorn with the Legislative Council: “I doubt
whether it is fully understood or known to what an audacious extent sedition has been
poured into the hearts of the native population of India within the last few weeks under
the guise of intelligence supplied to them by the native newspapers.”122 Yet, “Clemency
Canning” scrupulously avoided permitting his bias to seep into new legislation, stating: “I
do not see any reason, nor do I consider it possible in justice to draw a line of
demarcation between European and Native Publications.”123 Canning was among the last
of the Viceroys to take such an evenhanded approach toward the vernacular press.
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Viceroy Lord Lytton (1878-1880) was not as accommodating—presiding over the
Passage of Act IX of 1878, the Vernacular Press Act (India), designed to rein in India’s
most vocal critics of the Empire.124 Significantly, the Legislative Council of the
Governor General drew liberally from the press provisions of the Peace Preservation
(Ireland) Act of 1870 when devising their own legislation in India.125 Lytton, himself,
characterized the 1870 Irish law as “very applicable to the circumstances of this country,”
an opinion shared by much of the Council.126 That the Council deemed the “Irish Press
Law” a suitable remedy for India’s vernacular press was an indication of how
dangerously officials were misreading the position of the press in India. Fired up by
agrarian strife, the nationalist press in Ireland was irate and irascible, uncompromising
and uncooperative, combative and confrontational, whereas the Indian native press still
comprised a relatively polite body of journalists. However much the nationalist fire
burned within their breasts, with rare exceptions they comported themselves with the
utmost civility, and carefully phrased their criticisms in the most gentlemanly of fashions.
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In providing a rationale for the repressive bill, Council member Alexander
Arbuthnot revealed the contempt officials felt for the masses, characterizing those who
read the vernacular press as “far more ignorant than those classes which are reached by
the English Papers.” 127 Therefore, Arbuthnot continued, the writings were “calculated to
be much more mischievous in their effects. . . They influence and pervert the minds of
the young, and go far to counteract the benefits of the education we are endeavoring to
impart to them.”128 The startling similarity between Arbuthnot’s dismissal of the Indian
peasant and Chichester Fortescue’s discussion of the gullibility of the Irish peasant
provides more evidence that the British Government was attempting to apply the lessons
of Ireland to India. For his part, Lytton feared that the vernacular press—“at all times
mischievous”—would not long be satisfied with its attacks on Government policy, but
would spearhead a movement to sever ties with the Empire.129 Confiding in the
Secretary of State, the Viceroy shared his concern that the press was “especially
dangerous now, when Native community believes our power seriously weakened by
events elsewhere.”130 Lytton was referring not only to the growing tension between
Britain and Russia, but also to the start of a litany of thorny conflicts in which the Empire
would soon find itself mired, including the Second Afghan War (1878-80), the Zulu War
(1879), and the First Boer War (1880-81).

127
128

Correspondence, 13.
Ibid.

129

Telegram from the Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State, Calcutta, 13 March 1878, in
Correspondence.
130

Ibid.

60

In what was to prove a catastrophic moment of miscalculation, the Viceroy thus
convinced himself that the Vernacular Press Act would prove “quite unobjectionable.”131
Solely on the basis of public reaction in Ireland to the 1870 Irish Press Law, this
judgment would have been considered highly suspect. The law enacted by the Council,
however, also differed from the Irish bill in a trio of very telling aspects. Whereas the
Irish law was applicable to all newspapers, the 1878 Indian bill targeted only the
vernacular press. In addition, the Irish bill was a temporary measure, enacted in a time of
heightened agrarian agitation, while the Vernacular Press Act was proposed during a time
of peace in India, and the law was designed to be permanent. The marked contrast in
circumstances was not lost on Sir Thomas Erskine Perry (Council of India member 18591881), who felt the need to point out to the Council that the Irish law “was a temporary
measure, passed to meet a temporary evil, and dropped by the present Government in
1874.”132 William Gladstone also objected to the use of the Irish Press Law as a
precedent, reminding his fellow Parliamentarians that the Irish legislation “was never
intended to bring about a permanent change in the status of the Irish Press; and, in the
next place, and what is more important and vital in this case, we did not restrain the Irish
Press for mere disaffection, but for the security of human life.”133 It would seem that
time and distance were the deciding factors in determining the attitude of liberal
Parliamentarians to the Vernacular Press Act. Many of the same individuals who had
been so exercised about the writings of the Irish press only eight years previously now
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called for patience and understanding in the Government of India’s relations with the
Indian native press. Moreover, the journalistic unrest in Ireland had been in England’s
backyard. Perhaps, it was easier to preach tolerance when the incendiary writings were
thousands of miles away from Westminster.
Predictably, the response from the Indian native press was indignant, incensed,
and instantaneous, with the new bill eliciting a furious charge that the British
Government was guilty of “smothering to death the infant institution of the Native
press.”134 Nor were the critics confined to the subcontinent. Even at Westminster, there
were those who found the bill discriminatory and distasteful. Rising to his feet on the
floor of Westminster, William Gladstone questioned the fairness of the controversial bill,
charging, ““Do you wish it to be understood that the Vernacular Press is addressed to a
public which is not intelligent; that those who read the English tongue are safe and to be
trusted, while those who only read the Native tongue are not?”135 Given that the Irish
Press Law served as the template for the Vernacular Press Act, it is rather surprising that
the Government had learned nothing from its earlier experience with political fallout
from such legislation. Not only was the Act even more wildly unpopular than the
comparatively tame Irish Press Law, but also it proved logistically difficult to enforce—
and thus was of little help in acting as a deterrent to incendiary commentary. Indeed, the
legislation acted as a spur to nationalist aspirations, uniting popular opinion against such
repressive imperial policy. If the intent of the bill had been to quell an incipient uprising
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among the native press, the sobering reality was that the Government had only succeeded
in strengthening the hand of its critics. Three futile and frustrating years later, the
Government was forced to admit the folly of its ways, repealing the Act in even less time
than it had taken to withdraw the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act in 1870.
Whereas Tilak and Griffith and their colleagues ostensibly filled the same
editorial roles, legislative measures adopted to monitor the native press in India were far
more oppressive than those aimed at any newspapers in Ireland, despite the fact that the
Irish press was demonstrably more nationalistic and rebellious. The Government of India
would continue to regard the vernacular press as occupying a wholly separate category
from the Anglo-Indian press—scrutinizing the former with greater suspicion, saddling
them with more restrictions, and permitting them much less latitude than the AngloIndian press (or even the Irish nationalist press). The disparity was one which
continually aroused the ire of journalists in the native press, who frequently complained
that the Irish press was permitted without penalty to fill its papers with incendiary antiGovernment criticisms for which writers in the Indian native press would be charged with
sedition.
More than circulation figures or editorials or Government correspondence, the
British Empire’s resort to repressive legislation is among the most telling indications of
the impact of the nationalist press in Ireland and India. Regardless of the disparity in
attitude toward the Indian and Irish press, the larger issue was the irreparable damage
done to relations between the press and the Empire by both the Peace Preservation
(Ireland) Act of 1870 and the Vernacular Press Act of 1878. Despite their repeal within a
few short years, the Government’s handling of criticism peeled away the veneer of
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liberalism and engendered a mutual distrust between the parties. That officials were so
willing to abolish freedoms did, indeed, send a signal to those in the nationalist press that
the time would come once again when the Government would seek to stifle all protest.
By contrast with the tempestuous 1870s, the following decade produced an era of relative
peace, with the Government reverting to its pattern of monitoring, but not interfering with
the nationalist press, while the press, itself, continued to push, but not cross over the
boundaries of journalistic propriety. The seeming accord was, however, only a
temporary rapprochement. The nationalist press was growing in stature and influence,
with visionary new Irish and Indian editors stepping into the spotlight. These were men
with a profound love of country, the zeal to change the world, and, most importantly, a
fervent belief in the freedom of the press.

The Tone of the Press
For as much as the members of the Indian and Irish nationalist press shared a
common mission, there were decided differences in the tone adopted by journalists to
reach their respective audiences. The writing of Irish nationalist journalists tended to be
punchy, emphatic, and idiomatic—leaving nothing open to interpretation—ensuring that
the reader plainly understood the argument and that the British Government clearly got
the message. The linguistic style of the press in India, however, was awash in metaphor
and allusion, displaying a passion for both language and storytelling. Whereas the Irish
journalist went straight for the British jugular, the argument of the Indian journalist was
circuitous and often discursive—a result of Indian schooling in the English language.
Commenting on the rich prose of native journalists, Australia’s Launceston Examiner
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attributed the florid language—complete with imperfect English and “grotesquely mixed”
metaphor—to national character.136 “The oriental is fond of parade, even in language,”
claimed the paper, “and the longer the words the more attractive, in his eyes and to his
ears, is the style.”137 The Irish editorials were visceral, appealing to emotion and desirous
of obtaining a gut response. The Indian editorials—ornate and grandiloquent—seemed
designed to appeal to the intellect.
Yet the language employed by the Indian nationalist press provoked profound
concern among Government officials, who worried that those who heard the message
were not equipped to react with calm equanimity. Nor was it only government officials
who feared the increasing power and influence of the native press. In a lengthy polemic
arguing for licensing of the native press, an anonymous author known only as TRUTH
described the writings of the vernacular press as “malignant calumnies of lying
agitators.” Referring to “this huge body of crude and inflammable native opinion,”
TRUTH characterized the readership as “uninstructed, restless, ignorant, often fanatical,”
and, in his opinion, all too liable to swallow whole the screeds of editors “who are almost
the avowed enemies of the Government.”138 Accusing the native press of misusing its
educative function, TRUTH avowed that the editors taught only hatred of the
Government, rather than attempting to form “sound and loyal public opinion.”139 He
described any good done by the press as “infinitesimal,” while “the evil is enormous and
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daily on the increase.”140 Despite such underlying and often overt disdain for the native
press, officials understood the backlash that full suppression or gagging would have
provoked. Such measures were anathema not only to those in India, but also to those at
home in the metropole, where freedom of the press was seen as sacrosanct.

The Stage is Set
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, there was the pervasive feeling that the
press had an obligation to provide a mouthpiece for the voiceless, to air their grievances,
and become their advocate. In effect, the newspapers granted agency to their readers—
providing a public forum in which to confront the government with grievances and
petition for redress. By the end of the nineteenth century, the nationalist press had
assumed a preeminent place in Ireland and in India as the disseminator of critical
information to the public at large. The newspaper was now an accepted social instrument
capable of framing conversation and persuading public opinion. With increased literacy
rates and easy availability of newspapers, it only remained for the nationalist press to
seize on an issue that could hold the reading public in thrall, while editors murmured their
honey-tongued anti-imperial rhetoric.
The British Empire proved surprisingly obliging in this regard, simultaneously
lurching into a multi-national conflagration in Asia and stumbling into a martial morass
in South Africa. Just as Britain had confronted the daunting prospect of the Second
Afghan War, the Zulu War, and the First Boer War during the passage of the Vernacular
Press Act in 1878, so now the country was about to become embroiled in a series of
140
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conflicts that would distract it from the more mundane, but nonetheless essential,
business of efficiently running the Empire. Whereas domestic issues might affect a select
group of people or one geographical segment of the country, the outcome of the Boxer
Rebellion and the Boer War would have a lasting impact on the Empire at large. The
rising tide of a swift British victory would lift all of Britain’s subjects, not only letting
them bask in the reflected imperial glory, but also ensuring that the burden on the
taxpayer would not be onerous, and that the Government would return to domestic
concerns.
Conversely, should Britain become bogged down in a protracted war overseas,
domestic issues would become marginalized, and the sole reason the Government would
savor its Indian and Irish subjects would be to extract from them money, men, and natural
resources. Should such a dismaying scenario transpire, there was always a chance the
people of India and Ireland would begin to resent the imperial exploitation, bristle at the
paternalistic attitude, and even question the basis for their allegiance. To Britons,
however, there was little likelihood that the British Empire would struggle on the field of
battle against a ragtag assembly of Chinese peasants and Boer farmers. Such an outcome
was simply unthinkable.
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“A Small Gust of Wind”: The Boer War

The news from South Africa was grave and unsettling. Ultimatums had been
offered and rejected, war between the Boer Republic and Britain was imminent, and
troops were massing on the frontier. From the outset, the impending battle seemed a
decidedly unfair fight, conjuring up an indelible image of a ragtag band of rustic farmers,
vastly outnumbered and armed only with antiquated weaponry and a zeal for
independence. Desperate to protect their homeland, they bravely prepared to confront
the formidable fighting forces of the British Empire. Against all odds, the plucky Boers
miraculously delivered a series of stunning reverses that threatened to topple the imperial
Goliath—in the process earning the Boers the admiration of the world and plunging the
British into a morass of martial misery.
The fact that this widely-circulated version of the story coming out of South
Africa was composed of equal parts breathless hyperbole, embroidered truth, and outright
falsehood did not deter the Irish and Indian nationalist press from exploiting every facet
of the Transvaal conflict to their advantage. Journalists scrutinized Britain’s motives and
rationale for the war, analyzed the conduct of its officers and troops, and pontificated on
the impact of the conflict on Britain’s prestige. Thus, the crisis in South Africa permitted
the editors to use their columns not only to provide information about the progress of the
war, but also to wax eloquent and often indignant on the moral compass of the British
Empire, itself. Given the protracted nature of the conflict, Irish and Indian reporting of
the Boer War provides compelling evidence of the constantly shifting attitudes toward
Empire, and the myriad ways in which the press attempted to shape public opinion.
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An examination of the origins of what came to be known variously as the South
African War, the Second Boer War, the Anglo-Boer War, and the Boer War of
Independence provides insight into why the conflict aroused such deep passions in the
Irish and Indian press. Britain had established its presence in South Africa as early as the
Napoleonic Wars, when a British military expedition triumphed over Dutch forces at the
Battle of Blaauwberg in the Cape Colony in 1806. After officially acquiring the colony
in 1814, the British Government and its growing contingent of immigrants alienated the
local Dutch settlers, particularly after the passage of the Emancipation Act of 1834.
Eager to escape British rule, the Boers embarked upon the Great Trek in 1836, which
took them first to Natal, but ultimately to the interior of South Africa, where they
established the Transvaal Republic in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854. Alive
with expansionist zeal, the British Government annexed the Transvaal in 1877—a move
that triggered the First Boer War, and ended in embarrassment for the British following a
resounding victory for the Boers at the Battle of Majuba Hill.141
Although in the aftermath of the First Boer War the Boer Republics reestablished
their independence, the 1866 discovery of diamonds at Kimberley sparked a marked
increase in immigrants arriving in South Africa, eager to make their fortunes. It was the
discovery of gold in Witwatersrand twenty years later, however, that proved to be the
catalyst for an unprecedented surge in the foreign—and particularly British—population,
as uitlanders flocked to the Transvaal. With only a scant supply of local workers, the
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Transvaal government was unable to mine fully its newfound resources and was therefore
compelled to admit British fortune-hunters inside its borders, setting the stage for the
heightened political tension of the 1890s. In September of 1899, Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain demanded that the Boers extend full voting rights to the British
uitlanders. Although the territory was ostensibly in the hands of the Boers, the British
uitlanders were decidedly in the majority, a reality which President Kruger and his
government understood would signal the end of Boer control of the Republic, if they
acquiesced in the demand to extend suffrage. Picking up the gauntlet, Kruger responded
to the British demand with his own ultimatum on 9 October 1899, ordering the removal
of all British troops from the borders of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State within
forty-eight hours, or the Government would “with great regret be compelled to regard the
action as a formal declaration of war.”142 When Britain failed to comply, Kruger issued a
declaration of war.
Given Britain’s vaunted military reputation, a gross inequity in the size and nature
of the Boer and British forces was expected, with the balance tilting overwhelmingly in
Britain’s favor. Yet, closer examination reveals that initial advantages in military
preparedness were held not by the British, but by the Boers. Whereas the British would
eventually deploy nearly 450,000 troops, until those reinforcements arrived—newly
green—from Britain and other imperial postings, British forces were greatly
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outnumbered at the outset of the war.143 Although it was true that the Boer troops were
primarily farmers, they were farmers who were remarkably comfortable on horseback
and intimate with every inch of the interior’s terrain.
Moreover, they were armed not with antiquated weaponry, but with the latest
repeating Mauser rifles, newly acquired in bulk from Germany, as well as German 75mm
field guns, and the “Pom Pom,” a converted Maxim machine gun capable of continuous
fire. Aware that the Krupp factory was shipping field guns to the Boers, the nationalist
Southern Star of West Cork excitedly informed its readers of the efficiency of the new
weapons, stating, “The Krupp batteries are said to excel anything of the kind ever before
supplied for foreign services.”144 The paper further noted that the Boers were “good
fighters,” sharp shooters, and—in what would prove a somewhat prescient statement—
“inclined to guerilla warfare.”145 “For the first time in a good many years,” pronounced
the Tipperary-based Nenagh News, “British soldiers have had to face opponents who
have some understanding of civilised warfare.”146 Indeed, it was the British who
struggled to field effective weaponry at the outset of the conflict. Beyond purely military
considerations, the Boers also decidedly held the edge regarding such intangible factors
as urgency and will. The Dutch settlers were fighting for their independence, and had the
support of the entire countryside, which dutifully pledged allegiance to the cause.
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It was not merely Boer farmers and peasants who rallied to the cause. Both
Ireland and the Indian subcontinent had long dealt with issues of British expansionism
and imperialism, granting them what they believed were unique insights into events
transpiring thousands of miles away in South Africa. Whereas both Indian and Irish
nationalists evinced a marked interest in the progress of the war, the two camps sought to
use the conflict in disparate ways. Given their natural antipathy to the British Empire,
Irish nationalists—particularly Arthur Griffith and his fellow advanced-nationalists—
were predisposed to support the Boer cause. Citing an indissoluble connection with the
independence-loving Boers, Irish nationalist journalists lambasted British conduct of the
war, protested recruitment of Irish soldiers, and cheered news of British reverses. By
contrast, Indian nationalists initially espoused their loyalty and backed the British
forces—desperately urging the British Army to send Indian troops into battle.
Britain’s refusal to deploy Indian soldiers, however, marked a turning point for Indian
nationalists, who perceived in the refusal the ugly underpinnings of racial and religious
bias. The presence of a sizeable community of several thousand Indian immigrants in
South Africa, moreover, made the outcome of the war of vital interest to the
subcontinent. If Ireland’s criticism was proactive and born of a long and tempestuous
history with Britain, India’s critique was reactive and generated by the Empire’s present
conduct and condescension.
Armed with the motivating conviction that England’s difficulty was Ireland’s
opportunity, the advanced-nationalist press in Ireland—including the United Irishman,
Workers’ Republic, and The Leader—seized upon what it considered the ideal moment to
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provoke the British, and immediately aligned itself with the Boer cause. 147 The far from
spontaneous decision of the moment was a political platform painstakingly erected over
the course of two decades. In fact, the Irish affinity for the Boers actually had begun in
1877, during the era of annexation in the Transvaal, when a contingent of the Irish
Parliamentary Party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell, had employed a series of
increasingly obstructionist measures to disrupt proceedings at Westminster.148
The nationalist press instinctively understood that the war for Boer independence
constituted a critical moment in forwarding Ireland’s own nationalist agenda, and could
best be served not only by emphasizing the similarities between Boer and Irish
aspirations, but also by hammering home Britain’s role in willfully thwarting those same
hopes and desires. That the Irish adopted the Boers as comrades-in arms, united against
Britain’s expansionist zeal, constituted a significant moment in the history of the
Empire.149 Irish nationalists—particularly those in the advanced-nationalist campaign,
who would settle for nothing less than full independence for Ireland—identified with the
Boers not only as fellow victims of imperial expansion, but also for their language
movement, their folk tradition, and their religious ardor.150 Moreover, Boer nationalists,
like their Irish counterparts, also harbored competing factions, including those who
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embraced non-violent methods and those who were increasingly ready, willing, and able
to resort to physical force.151
Alive to the possibilities of exploiting the Boer War for the purposes of furthering
Irish nationalism, the Irish advanced-nationalist press employed a three-pronged strategy
to cover the crisis in the Transvaal: lauding the heroism of the Boers; reminding the
reader of the links between the Boers and the Irish; and excoriating the British for their
handling of the crisis. Thus, it was not enough to extol the bravery of the Boers and
express solidarity; rather, the Irish nationalist press understood the necessity of
demonizing the British. By undermining British capability and credibility in their
coverage of the Boer War, Irish nationalist editors set out to convince their readers not
only of the validity of the Irish cause, but also of the sweet possibility of bringing it to
fruition.
Despite their implacable support of the Boer cause, the majority of the Irish press
was convinced that the political animosity between the British and the Boers would not,
in fact, result in war. “The British Government are not ready to go to war,” pronounced
the Freeman’s Journal, the organ of the Irish Parliamentary Party, continuing, “The War
Office has broken down hopelessly, and it will be nearly six weeks before the army corps
so long spoken of can be landed in South Africa.”152 Once war actually erupted,
however, the Irish nationalist engines steamed efficiently and effectively into action. The
United Irishman, newly founded in 1899, announced the formation of the Irish Transvaal
Committee and rigorously documented the progress of the Irish Transvaal Brigade,
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dutifully reporting minutes from each Johannesburg meeting.153 Composed of pro-Boer
Irish soldiers from Ireland, South Africa, and even the United States, the Irish Transvaal
Brigade was under the command of Major John McBride, and would constitute a
powerful patriotic rallying point for Irish nationalists.154 Given the concerted push by
the British army to enlist Irishmen, tales of the Irish Brigade functioned as the punchy
Irish retort to British jingoism.
Outside of Dublin, attitudes among the members of the provincial press regarding
the impending war were varied and somewhat unpredictable. In Tipperary, the Nenagh
News lauded the much-circulated “Limerick Resolution,” which proclaimed unwavering
support for the Boers. The paper summarized the agenda of the recent Board of
Guardians meeting, and reprinted details of the resolution, which attributed the lack of
support for the “plucky Boer farmers” as “a great sign of National weakness and
decay.”155 Yet, on the same day, the Kildare Observer decried what it referred to as the
“misplaced sentiment” of those Irishmen throwing in their lot with the Boers. Reminding
its readers that Irish soldiers stationed with British forces in the Transvaal, were, at that
very moment, waiting to engage the Boers, the paper avowed, “there is not the remotest
affinity, sympathy in County Kildare or in any other part of the country with the
foreigners in the present crisis.”156 By contrast, the nationalist-leaning Southern Star in
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Cork woefully expressed its opinion that war was imminent, and that “in our next issue
we shall have to chronicle bloody engagements in South Africa, all owing to the greed for
new territory and lust of gold of the Britishers.”157 At least at this juncture, there was
nothing approaching unanimity among editors outside of Dublin.
Gleefully leading the Irish pro-Boer charge within Dublin was none other than
Arthur Griffith, editor of the advanced-nationalist United Irishman. Having spent time in
the Transvaal, Griffith not only counted many Boers among his friends, but also had long
identified the Boers as fellow travelers in the struggle for independence against the
British Empire. As a young man in South Africa, Griffith had alienated the readers of the
weekly Courant in Middleburg by proclaiming in print, “the Boer and no one but the
Boer owned the Transvaal.”158 Such willful and deliberate antagonizing of his readership
could bring only one result. “I eventually managed to kill the paper,” recalled Griffith, a
death which was anything but prolonged, given the fact that his backers immediately
withdrew their support and the Courant shuttered after a run of only thirteen issues.159
By the time Griffith returned to Dublin and founded the United Irishman in 1899,
the editor’s devotion to the Boer cause was second only to his dedication to Irish
nationalism. Indeed, this potent pair of political passions fused to produce what can only
be characterized as an unremitting anti-British bias in the United Irishman. The prejudice
towards all things British colored his editorials throughout the duration of the Transvaal
conflict and long after. Thus, whereas the British press quite naturally sought to
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demonize the Boer—in an effort to stir up the requisite patriotic fervor—Griffith refused
to be drawn in. Writing under one of his many pseudonyms, Griffith editorialized, “To
lie about our enemies is, Britishly speaking, human—to systematically defame and
slander them is Satanic.”160 He added waggishly, “There is nothing to equal the
Englishman’s ability for telling lies save the Irishman’s capacity for swallowing them.”161
In addition to denigrating all things British, advanced-nationalists Griffith, Connolly, and
D.P. Moran waged a relentless war of words against Irish gullibility, reserving their
deepest scorn for those Irish nationalists who believed that cooperation with the British
would one day earn Home Rule for Ireland.
Griffith believed it was his responsibility to provide his countrymen with the
antidote to what he perceived as poison dripping from the pens of the British press, as
well as those in the Irish press who gullibly followed their lead. Moreover, the United
Irishman decried what it saw as the influence of the “Jew Jingo Press” in shaping a more
negative public opinion toward the Boers. “Throughout Europe and America, wherever
the Jew capitalist has got a grip on the 'lying "Press of Civilisation," from Vienna to New
York and further,” charged the paper, “the pen of the Jew Scribe is uplifted to serve the
cause of Sister England.”162 Referring to an article in the Austrian New Free Press that
criticized what the United Irishman called the “gallant Boers,” the publication described
the Austrian paper as “the circumcised rag.”163 Not an isolated case, Griffith’s anti-
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Semitic screed was emblematic of racial theories circulating at the end of the nineteenth
century. Social Darwinists advanced the belief that the white race was biologically
superior—engaged in an eternal struggle for survival with the planet’s inferior races. The
theory encouraged the characterization of Jews as a base and malignant race, bent on
domination. Despite, the fact, or, perhaps, because many in the British press had often
characterized the Irish race as inferior, Griffith and many other Irish nationalists engaged
in virulent anti-Semitism.
In addition to its weekly updates on the Irish Transvaal Committee—of which
Griffith, himself, was a member—and the Irish Transvaal Brigade, the United Irishman
most notably launched an aggressive anti-enlistment drive, warning its readers to shun
the British recruiters and “Remember 98! Remember the Penal Laws! Remember the
Famine!”164 As the year 1899 drew to a close, The United Irishman ramped up its antiBritish rhetoric, publishing for several consecutive weeks the Irish Transvaal Brigade’s
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proclamation: “Enlisting in the English Army is Treason to Ireland!”165 The insert
reminded readers that “the Irishmen in England’s service who are sent to South Africa
will have to fight against Irish nationalists who have raised Ireland’s flag in the
Transvaal, and have formed an Irish Brigade to fight for the Boers against the oppressor
of Ireland.”166 Borrowing a patriotic piece of doggerel from the Irish Transvaal
Committee, Griffith’s paper greeted the New Year with this admonition to any who
would enlist in the British army:
Go, to crush the just and brave
Whose wrongs with wrath the world is filling!
Go, to slay each brother-slave
Or spurn the blood-stained Saxon Shilling!167
That any self-respecting Irishman would willingly enlist in the British cause was not a
reality Griffith cared to acknowledge. The editor was relentless in his attack on those
fellow countrymen who chose to fight for the British in the Transvaal, proclaiming, “The
Irish Militiamen are being drugged, deceived, and kidnapped away to South Africa to
fight the battles of the crumbling Empire.”168 Clearly, Griffith viewed his newspaper as
the launching pad for Irish nationalist aspirations, and the Boer War as the fuel necessary
to propel his radical ideology toward its destination.
Griffith’s paper was not the only Irish journal to print pro-Boer poems, songs, and
ballads. Dublin’s Evening Herald printed a decidedly anti-British set of lyrics, which
included the lines:
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God save the Boers!
May their high battle-tide,
Still swelling far and wide,
Crush British greed and pride.169
Nor was the United Irishman alone in its unyielding support for Boer independence, or in
seeing in the war a golden opportunity to sow the seeds of Irish nationalism among
readers. The voice of Irish labor repeatedly weighed in on British conduct of the war.
Blaming “an unscrupulous gang of capitalists” for what he predicted would be “one of
the most iniquitous wars of the century,” socialist James Connolly warned the readers of
the Marxist Workers’ Republic that Ireland was only a “negligible factor in the
calculations of the Imperial Government,” which thought nothing of shipping Irish troops
to South Africa.170 Connolly suggested that if only Irish workers would unite, they could
sap the British army of its strength in the Transvaal.171 One of Ireland’s more vocal
provincial papers, the nationalist Sligo Champion, intoned, “History does not record a
more diabolical or more audacious scheme of plunder than that in which England is now
engaged in South Africa.”172 The paper added, “The sympathy of every just and upright
man in the world will go forth to the brave Boers in their many struggles for the
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preservation of their independence as a Nation.”173 The nationalist press harped on the
twin themes of Boer nobility and imperial avarice, urging readers to emulate the former
and repudiate the latter.
The Freeman’s Journal insisted that Chamberlain’s ultimatum to Kruger had been
“modeled on the methods of the blackmailer,” and alleged that the British Cabinet “want
war to satisfy revenge and the greed for gold.”174 The paper professed amazement at the
British ability to rationalize the country’s motives and conduct in the Transvaal, scoffing,
“They are a wonderful people the English. There is a magnificent unconscious selfsufficiency about them which enables them to do the most unjust and the meanest things
without the least loss of self-respect.”175 The stinging rebuke coming from the normally
moderate Freeman’s Journal, the voice of the Irish Parliamentary Party, are indicative of
the bitter toll the war was taking on relations between Britain and Ireland’s nationalists.
A frequent contributor to the Freeman’s Journal, agrarian Fenian firebrand and
member of Parliament Michael Davitt submitted a lengthy anti-British polemic to the
paper on the advent of the war, decreeing that the crisis in the Transvaal should not be
referred to as Chamberlain’s war or Rhodes’s war or even the Rand Capitalist war, but
was “more likely to live in people’s memories as ‘the liars’ war.’”176 Casting doubt on
the veracity of war dispatches, which hailed English heroism and “the slaughter of
Boers,” Davitt catalogued the questionable coverage of events in the Transvaal. “There
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is, in fact, no parallel in history for the systematic, wholesale lying by which the
Rhodes’s gang in South Africa and their abettors in the British Jingo Press have tried to
justify this most infamous war.”177 Indeed, Michael Davitt, who had represented South
Mayo in Westminster since 1895, resigned his seat on 26 October 1899, as a protest
against the war. The bold move was characterized by the Irish People as one of the most
stirring events in Ireland “since the death of Mr. Parnell.”178 Although the paper was
undoubtedly engaging in a bit of patriotic hyperbole, the invoking of Charles Stewart
Parnell’s name was an indication of the seismic shock caused by Davitt’s resignation
from Parliament.
Certainly, it was no secret to the British Government that the Irish were
predisposed to desire the defeat of the Empire. In truth, however, although the British
perceived that Irish pro-Boer sentiment was ubiquitous, unanimity among Irish
nationalists regarding the war was hard to find. Whereas Griffith and his fellow
advanced-nationalists were certainly vocal in their opposition, some members of the Irish
Parliamentary Party were loath to align themselves with such rampant and open
Anglophobia. Inasmuch as they saw no problem with obstructing parliamentary
proceedings in Westminster, they did not equate their disruption of government with the
wholesale antagonism on display in the United Irishman, Freeman’s Journal, and
Workers’ Republic. Indeed, there were many in the Irish Parliamentary Party who
harbored the hope that if they supported the imperial cause in the war, British post-war
gratitude would take the form of granting Ireland Home Rule. They feared that the
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tactics of the advanced-nationalists would jeopardize any hope of an autonomous Ireland
in the near future.
John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party—now reunited after
nine years in the political wilderness—made clear the Irish nationalist position when he
rose in Westminster to remind listeners of the words of the Englishman John Henry
Newman, who stated that in Ireland, “the wrongs which England has inflicted are
faithfully remembered, her name and fellowship are abominated, the news of her
prosperity heard with disgust, the anticipation of her possible reverses nursed and
cherished as the best of consolations.”179 Redmond avowed, “We abhor this war; we call
for its stoppage, and we declare our intention to do all that in us lies to maintain the
independence of these two little Republics.”180 Yet, Redmond staunchly repudiated any
accusation that Ireland was supporting the Boer cause purely out of animus to Britain. “It
is true that wherever the Empire is involved in a difficulty or complication which
diminishes its great strength, a feeling of hope and satisfaction stirs through the veins of
men of the Irish race both at home and abroad,” asserted Redmond.181
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The speaker, however, quickly provided what he characterized as the fundamental
reason behind Ireland’s position: Britain’s flawed policy toward the Transvaal and what
he perceived as an utter lack of merit regarding the conduct of the war. Moreover,
Redmond assailed the role that Britain expected Ireland to play in the conflict, given that
“an impoverished and over-taxed country is called upon to pay so heavy a proportion of
the cost, and when so many thousands of Irish families, rich and poor alike, are called
upon to pour forth the still more precious treasure of their children’s blood.”182
Redmond’s rhetoric reminded the British Government that the Irish people continued to
enlist in the British Army, in full expectation of a quid pro quo. The Irish offered their
loyal service, but the price must be Home Rule at the war’s end.
Despite Redmond’s protestation, many in the Irish nationalist press did, indeed,
appear to relish each new revelation of Britain’s vulnerability—pouncing on evidence
from the Transvaal of British strategic ineptitude and military incompetence. The
unexpected Boer successes in the Battles of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso
during the infamous “Black Week” in the first autumn of the war, not only took British
generals by surprise, but also stunned the world. As for advanced-nationalist journalists
following the war from Dublin, the fact that the supposedly outnumbered Boers—largely
unschooled and untrained—were besting the vaunted military might of the British Empire
was cause for celebration.183 Writing in the Workers Republic, James Connolly
proclaimed, “Whether they ultimately win or lose, the Boers have pricked the bubble of
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England’s fighting reputation. The world knows her weakness now.”184 Alive with a
vision of an Ireland unfettered from Britain, Connolly egged on his readers, urging:
“Have at her, then everywhere and always and in every manner. And before the first
decade of the coming century will close, you and I, if we survive, will be able to repeat to
our children the tale of how this monstrous tyranny sank in dishonour and disaster.”185
Writing in the United Irishman under one of his favorite aliases, Arthur Griffith
regaled his readers by reporting that British officials attributed losses at Ladysmith to a
runaway mule that “stampeded” with the guns and ammunition.186 Michael Davitt also
noted the occasion, offering “an expression of our approval of the conduct of some
thousand of the British mules in the neighbourhood of Ladysmith in Natal,” and
suggesting that “some fitting testimonial will be made to the common sense of these
intelligent animals in following the example of British soldiers in running into the camp
of the victorious Boers.”187 Griffith sang the praises of the Irish Brigade, which was
present at Ladysmith, and noted gleefully that the entirety of the European press “save
only the Jew organs,” had acclaimed the British defeat.188 “The Christians of a hundred
creeds everywhere exult at the staggering blow the splendid Dutchmen have dealt the
Thief and Tyrant of the world,” cheered Griffith, before providing a single caveat, “but
she has still—praised by Yahweh!—the sympathy of the Jew.”189 Griffith continued to
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hold the Jews responsible for the conflict, setting them in opposition to the world’s
Christians, and singling them out as the only remaining ally of the British.
Indeed, as the war progressed, the United Irishman continued to indict the Jews as
conspirators with the British Government, as well as finding them complicit in
disseminating falsehoods about the Boer. “Stories of Boer atrocities” claimed the paper,
“are daily invented by the infamous Jew-Jingo Press of England for the purpose of
arousing murderous passions.”190 Griffith perennially characterized Jews as the Other, a
group he intimated was at odds not only with Irish religious values, but also with Irish
morality. Moreover, his persistent pairing of the Jews with the British was undoubtedly
an attempt to persuade his readership that the British character was equally as foreign—
and thus anathema—to the Irish. The fact that Griffith highlighted in print this supposed
conspiracy between the British and the Jews is more evidence that the editor sought to
use every facet of the war as ammunition for his cause.
The question of religion would play a prominent role in opinion swirling around
the war, but the Irish and Indian press would approach the issue from significantly
different vantage points. Whereas the Indian press assailed the violent behavior of a
British nation that daily boasted of its Christian ideals, the Irish press were appalled at
what they saw as the self-destructive nature of the conflict, with the Christians of Britain
and the Christians of the Transvaal laying siege to each other. The Freeman’s Journal
cited the speech of Member of Parliament Leonard Courtney, who hoped that the world
“might be spared the dreadful spectacle of a nation going to war with a kindred nation, a
189
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Christian nation.”191 The United Irishman not only printed, but also re-printed two
months later, a scorching letter from Father P.F. Kavanagh, who proclaimed that the time
had come for “every Irishman, priest, and layman to raise his voice in strenuous and
solemn protest against the participation of Irishmen in the colossal crimes being
perpetrated by Britain against Human Right and Christian Creed in South Africa.”192 In
addition to decrying a war launched by one Christian nation at another, the Irish
nationalist press seemingly sought to underscore the distinction between the Catholic
morals of nationalist Ireland, and those of British Protestants.
As the war progressed, each week the Irish advanced-nationalist press—
particularly the always opinionated United Irishman and Workers’ Republic—filled their
columns with detailed accounts of troop movements, numbers of casualties, and
predictions of upcoming engagements. Griffith’s paper missed no opportunity to print yet
another anti-British recruiting song, or list recent contributions to the Boer Wounded
Fund, as well as donations to the newly founded Irish Ambulance Corps, created “to
render aid to the wounded soldiers of the Irish Brigade and their Boer comrades.”193
Indeed, Griffith never failed to provide an update on the exploits of the Irish Transvaal
Brigade, and what the editors considered the Brigade’s noble mission: “They have chosen
the weak—the side of right and liberty—in the present war!, but primarily they have gone
out to battle for Ireland.”194 As Griffith’s sentiment makes clear, whereas the advanced-
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nationalist press was assiduously on the side of the Boers, its support was prompted by a
larger mission: the independence of Ireland.
Submitting yet another lengthy letter to the usually more sober Freeman’s
Journal, Michael Davitt chastised those Irishmen who sought to demonstrate their loyalty
to the Empire, “in pledging other people’s sacrifices to the war and its consequences,
instead of offering their own.” 195 Davitt characterized the conflict as “this mean and
ignoble war,” in which “capitalist schemers” sent Irish troops to their death.196 Griffith
and his Irish colleagues used the power of the press not only to report the news from
South Africa, but also to affix a specific anti-British, anti-imperial, pro-Irish slant on war
reportage. The Irish press—both nationalist and advanced-nationalist— variously
characterized Britain as pirate, thief, and tyrant; the British soldier’s actions were
depicted as savage, brutish, and inhumane. These accusations, moreover, were leveled at
the Empire not, as might be expected, after the British embarked on a scorched earth
policy of burning farms, destroying resources, and interning women and children in the
fall of 1900; rather, the Irish nationalist press was pre-disposed to believe the worst of its
sworn enemy from the outset of the war.
The papers accused the British of avarice in their motives for the war, savagery in
their conduct of the war, and deceit in their reporting of the war. Referring to rumors that
the British had ordered their soldiers to gun down Boers, regardless of whether or not
they attempted to surrender, the United Irishman wrote scathingly, “The prohibition of
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telegraphic communication, the suppression of independent testimony, the rigid
censorship of despatches are intelligible in the light of these horrible words.”197 Apprised
that Irish regiments were “once again in the front firing line,” The Freeman’s Journal
expressed its fear that “another Irish holocaust has been paid at the shrine of British
Jingoism.”198 When Boer General Viljoen perished after the Battle of the Elands Valley,
the United Irishman refused to be convinced that Viljoen was simply another casualty of
war, as the British press had reported. Griffith insisted that the wounded general had
been “despatched” by a British surgeon or officer while in custody.199 Griffith recalled
Viljoen’s horror when informed of the restriction imposed on the Irish by the Jubilee
Coercion Act.200 “The story of England’s treatment of her Irish political prisoners,”
stated the editor, “always made him sad to think that Jameson and his cutthroats had not
been shot by the Boers, as they should have been.”201 Thus, the United Irishman, the
Freeman’s Journal, and other members of the Irish nationalist press exploited every
opportunity to castigate, abuse, and shame the British, and to inform their readers that
much of Europe held the same opinion.
Even in these early phases of the war, the Irish nationalist press repeatedly limned
their British foes in terms both vile and vindictive. “Scratch an Englishman and you find
a savage,” asserted the United Irishman, in a January article reprinting charges leveled by
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De Rand Post in South Africa.202 Griffith proceeded to catalogue the litany of war crimes
allegedly perpetrated by British soldiers, including “murder under cover of the white flag,
violation of the Red Cross, slaughter of the wounded, ill-treatment and assassination of
prisoners, robbery of the dying.” 203 As the official organ of the Irish Parliamentary
Party, the Freeman’s Journal was not as vituperative in its accusations at this stage of the
war. It was not, however, above stooping to questionable analysis of history, in order to
press home its point about perfidious Albion. Asserting that the British treated African
natives far more harshly than did the Boers, the paper avowed that the “Kaffirs” in
Kimberley “are in a much worse position than the negroes ever were in the Southern
States of America before the war.”204 In a statement which must have left more knowing
readers open-mouthed and incredulous, the Freeman’s Journal proceeded to describe the
ostensibly pastoral life of American slaves, stating, “The negroes had a pleasant life on
the cotton plantations, and they were an elemental part of the estate and of the house that
owned it.”205 Regardless of this remarkably unenlightened vision of the American South,
the allusion certainly painted the British in the least flattering of terms.
Not for the first time, the Irish press looked to India to make its points about the
inequities and the iniquities of the British Empire. Upon hearing of the Indian famine
that began in the fall of 1899 and would ultimately take the lives of nearly one million
people, the United Irishman was quick to make the comparison with the Irish famine,
proclaiming: “So there it is in a nutshell. The Indians perish as the Irish perished,
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because English Government stands between the nations and the rational utilisation of the
natural resources of their own land.”206 The paper connected the imperial dots for its
readership, linking the famines with the struggle in the Transvaal, declaring, “That, too,
would be the fate of the smiling farms of the South African Republics, if strong men in
rightful arms were not there to shoot straight, and to shoot often.” Ardent nationalist
Maud Gonne—who would wed Major John McBride of the Transvaal Brigade at the
conclusion of the war—offered her own assessment of the relationship between the
Empire and its subjects, stating, “We in Ireland, like those in India, have let ourselves be
hypnotized by England’s pretended greatness, and have thus brought about our own real
weakness.”207 The message was clear: India and Ireland should no longer be servile;
violence was the only response that would compel the British Government to change its
course. Thus, the Irish advanced-nationalist press, once again, exploited the crisis in the
Transvaal, in order to further the nationalist agenda, and mold reader opinion about the
British Empire.
Contrary to what many in the Indian native press complained was a double
standard employed by the British Government in its treatment of Indian and Irish
journalists, it was not always the case that the Irish press benefited from British leniency.
Ireland was in England’s backyard, and the presence of government officials in Dublin
Castle meant that the Irish press was always under surveillance.208 Anti-British rhetoric
on Griffith’s part compelled Dublin Castle to ratchet up its surveillance on the United
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Irishman, which the government was convinced was publishing articles that were nothing
short of “seditious and treasonable.”209 Moreover, the fact that the majority of Ireland’s
newspapers required no translation made it fairly simple to discern if journalists were
bordering on sedition with their pro-Boer output. Certainly, Arthur Griffith proved so
outspoken on the subject of army recruitment and British conduct in the Transvaal that
the office of the Chief Secretary for Ireland made a particular practice of acquiring
advance copies of the United Irishman. Each issue was meticulously scrutinized, with
examiners marking questionable passages before sending them on to the Chief Crown
Solicitor to decide if the writing was sufficiently objectionable as to warrant taking
action.
As the summer of 1900 approached, the knowledge that British forces were
battling both Boers and Boxers excited nationalists in the Irish press. In London, the
Evening Telegraph took note of the phenomenon, declaring caustically, “Thus it is ever
with the Irish Nationalists. Whenever they find Britain or British soldiers and sailors in
trouble, they rejoice.” Offering an even more pointed analysis of what it viewed as the
Irish nationalist philosophy, the paper continued, “They have no love for the Boers or the
Boxers, but it is sufficient for them that these people war with England.”210 Indeed,
articles lambasting British policy in the Transvaal now vied for space in the United
Irishman with those taking to task the Empire’s actions in Peking. Outlining a blueprint
for Irish independence, James Connolly informed the readers of the Workers Republic,
“Now it only wants a native rising in India, and then would come our Irish
209

Secret memorandum from Chief Secretary’s Office, Police and Crime Division, CO 904/159, National
Archives, Kew, London.

210

Evening Telegraph, cited in United Irishman, 30 June 1900.

92

opportunity.”211 The author, however, had little faith that his countrymen would emulate
the martial spirit of the Chinese and the South Africans, suggesting that the Irish would
“rise up in our millions . . . pass ‘strong’ resolutions, and then go home and pray that
somebody else may beat the Sasanach.”212 Connolly left his reader with an indelible
slogan: “The Boers are invulnerable on kopjes, the Boxers are death on missionaries, but
we are irresistible on ‘resolutions.’”213 While praising the Boers for their tactical use of
the South African terrain and acknowledging the ferocity of the Chinese rebels, Connolly
was clearly frustrated that his countrymen seemed to prefer pronouncements and
posturing over substantive action.
Given this virulently anti-British, anti-imperial stance, it is not surprising that the
British capture of Pretoria on 7 June 1900 elicited from the Irish press not a chorus of
victory cheers, but a dissonant moan of discontent and a decidedly embittered grunt. By
the summer of 1900, it seemed the Boer War would no longer afford choice opportunities
to verbally engage the British foe. The Irish nationalist press, however, was not willing
to let go of this meaty bone without a fight. The United Irishman described the British
victors as “Imperialists, elegant, brilliant, and idle; courageous too; but not capable of
undergoing the burden of a war,” and reminded its readers that “in the last years England
has been victorious only where she has had allies to fight with her of all colours.”214 By
contrast, the fallen Boers were “men with a firm faith of great power of resistance and
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health, simple, calm, and trusting in their righteous cause.”215 The paper was quick to
mark the distinction between the combatants, noting “The first it is true can bring ten men
into the field against one of the other, and their means are inexhaustible. But the others
have right on their side, and have proved during the last six months that their strength of
purpose is not diminished.”216 For Griffith, Irish right was certain to triumph over British
might, if only his countrymen would remain as steadfast as the Boers.
Although the Irish nationalist press initially expressed doubt that Britain would
engage the Boers in battle, once the die was cast and Britain had committed its troops,
editors wasted no time exploiting Britain’s trials in the Transvaal. Viewing the war as a
grasping move by a greedy imperial power, the papers pounced on the crisis as an
unparalleled opportunity not only to foster Irish solidarity with the Boer cause, but also—
and more importantly—to denigrate all things British. The press did more than report the
war. Arthur Griffith and his colleagues urged their readers to shun the British recruiting
effort, shamed those countrymen who enlisted in the British cause, and raised funds to
support John McBride’s Irish Transvaal Brigade and the Irish Ambulance Corps. In
addition to highlighting tales of British bungling and ineptitude, Irish nationalist editors
headlined tales of British savagery, while simultaneously dismissing stories of Boer
atrocities as the product of a Jewish press in league with the Government. The Irish
advanced-nationalist press made sterling use of British failures abroad to chip away at
Britain’s imperial reputation, daily belittling the British Government. The non-stop
barrage of anti-British rhetoric demonstrates that the Irish press was not only interested in
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offering fraternal support for the Boer effort in South Africa; rather, the journalists were
keen to exploit the war as a means of furthering the Irish nationalist political agenda at
home.
If Ireland’s nationalist press remained remarkably consistent in its aggressively
pro-Boer, anti-British rhetoric, early Indian nationalist press coverage of the conflict was
notable for a more nuanced journalism. Beyond the immediate interest in determining
the eventual victor of the war, and analyzing what it would mean for relations between
Britain and the Transvaal, were the thornier and more complex questions of the impact of
the war on British prestige and the consequences for the Empire, itself. The Boer War
crystallized for many in the Indian native press not only the defects of the British
Government, but also the serious problems inherent in imperial rule. These years
witnessed a marked political shift by the native press, as it moved from gentle
remonstrance with, to harsh rebuke of the British Government and the British Empire at
large. By analyzing Britain’s motivation for war, seeking to understand its refusal to
deploy native troops, and, in particular, observing Britain’s treatment of Boer women and
children, the Indian press used the crisis in the Transvaal to unleash a full-throated
outpouring of anti-imperial rhetoric. As such, the Boer War marked a decisive turning
point in native loyalty and admiration for the Empire. Even a cursory reading of the
Indian coverage of the Boer War reveals a growing discontent with the Government, and
a profound disillusionment with the country’s role in the Empire. Moreover, as would be
the case with their coverage of the Boxer Rebellion, the distinct differences between the
Irish nationalist press and the Indian nationalist press regarding the South African war
brought home the prickly question of race in the Empire.
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Just as the Irish press had doubted Britain would go to war, initial news of the
impending crisis aroused little concern among the native press in India, as confidence
emanating from the British Government served to promote an air of inevitable victory.
“The success of British arms in the Transvaal is certain,” boasted the Bengal-based
Manbhum, asking, “What nation of the world is not aware of the heroism and indomitable
courage of the British?”217 British preparation for the conflict duly impressed the
Samiran, which informed its readers, “The British have never displayed so much anxiety,
have never made such vast preparations, have never acted with so much caution, have
never so much discussed the question of fighting such an insignificant and half-civilized
enemy as the Boers.”218 The paper seemed to suggest that the fuss and furor over the war
were at odds with the circumstances, leaving the impression that if the mighty British
Empire was in such a worried state, then perhaps not all of the pertinent facts about the
war had been shared with the Indian people.
Of all the provinces in India, Bengal had long constituted one of the most
problematic for Britain, in terms of both politics and security—lending layers of
complexity to its criticism in the press of the British Government. The Bengali soldiers
in the Indian Army had been in the vanguard of those who rebelled against the British
during the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and were still considered highly suspect more than
four decades later. As such, Bengali recruits were excluded from participation in the
British Army. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Mutiny, the British Government had
instituted a doctrine of the “Martial Races,” which sought to classify Indian ethnic groups
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as either brave and fit for the rigors of war, or sedentary and non-martial.219 Griffith and
his Irish colleagues clearly were not alone in their adoption of questionable racial
theories. Britain’s governance of India reflected its own brand of institutionalized
racism—a practice that deeply dismayed and even offended its Indian subjects.
Under the guise of cataloguing soldiers according to their active or sedentary lifestyle,
officials cleverly managed to marginalize not only those, such as Bengalis, whose loyalty
to the British Army appeared questionable, but also those of superior intellect.220
Regardless of the fact that Bengali soldiers had led the Mutiny, by the end of the
nineteenth century the British had successfully imprinted on the public an image of the
province as weak and unmanly, the home of the “effeminate Bengali babu,” whose short
stature and vegetarian diet stood in stark contrast to the sturdy manly meat-eaters of the
Punjab.
Not surprisingly, the native press in Bengal, led by the Hitavadi and the
Bangavasi—two organs that would come to earn the scorn of the India Office for their
“inveterate hostility to government”—proved highly vocal in voicing disapproval of
British conduct in the Transvaal.221 Whereas there was little doubt that Britain would
emerge victorious in short order, these papers expressed concern about the British
Government’s actual motivation for the war. “The fighting strength of the English is
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unlimited, their wealth and resources are infinite, their collection of arms and ammunition
is extraordinarily vast, and their troops are invincible,” wrote the Hitavadi.222 “It is the
proud consciousness of this fact,” suggested the paper, “that leads the English to hold the
world in contempt, to think that there is no one in this world who can be their fit
opponent.”223 The Hitavadi could not resist identifying what it conceived of as a
troubling flaw in Britain’s thinking, hinting that such pride was certain to precede a most
unfortunate fall.
Together with most observers, the Indian native press expressed astonishment
when the Boers immediately seized the upper hand and besieged the towns of Mafeking,
Ladysmith, and Kimberley. “The English people, whose prowess and intelligence have
established a world-wide empire, who leveled the pride of martial France to dust, who
have always successfully stood in the way of Russia carrying out her warlike designs,”
commented the Decca Prakush, “are now being beaten at every step by a handful of
Boers—by the inhabitants of such a small country as the Transvaal.”224 The sense that
Britain had dramatically and drastically underestimated the physical and moral strength
of the Boers was prevalent throughout the coverage of the British setbacks in the
Transvaal. Given that journalists had gone to great lengths to loyally laud British
military might, they now sought an explanation for the unexpected turn of events. For
many, the reverses were rooted in British pride, as the Madras-based Swadesamitran
observed: “The folly of the British in having originally thought lightly of the Boers now
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becomes patent.”225 In Bengal, the always critical Hitivadi ruefully explained to its
readers: “That the French are laughing in jubilation, that the Germans are indulging in
ridicule, that the Dutch are shouting in joy, that the Russians are looking on with eyes
beaming with delight and that the sound of heart-rending banter is coming from
America—all this is the outcome of that excessive pride on the part of Great Britain.”
As did many nationalist journalists in India, the Hitavadi regarded such hubris as a
dangerous weakness—a possibly fatal flaw preventing Britain from recognizing and
acknowledging its tenuous position in the hierarchy of world powers.
Not all papers, however, were willing to attribute the losses to a fault on the part
of the British. Instead, many in the native press were quick to credit the prowess of the
Boers. “The Boers have displayed great heroism, cheered the Persian Hablul Mateen,
“and President Kruger has done the work of a Bismarck.”226 The ardently nationalist
Bangavasi opted to sing the praises of the Boer general who had managed to inflict such
losses on the British forces: “Bravo! Joubert, old Boer General, bravo! . . . A fly you
have fought with fire. A hare, you have tormented the lion. A dwarf, you have, so to
say, touched the moon with your hand. Bravo, General Joubert, bravo!”227 The Samiran
hailed the Boers’ “indomitable courage, unconquerable energy, and unparalleled
heroism.”228 The Hitavadi agreed, stating, “The oppression of the Indians in South
Africa has led us to hate the Boers, still we feel constrained to praise their bravery with a
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thousand tongues,” while the Vartadarsh conceded, “The Boers are, in a way, our
enemies; nevertheless, we cannot but admire their bravery, patriotism and love of
independence.”229 Whereas the Irish nationalist press immediately championed the
Boers, merely because the Boers were waging war against their mutual British enemy,
the Boers had to earn the praise of the loyal Indian nationalist press, by virtue of their
martial achievements on the field of battle.
Regardless of their professed loyalty to the British Government, it seemed that
members of the native press could not resist expressing their admiration for the Boers’
ability to resist and overpower British forces. In the Punjab, the Paisa Akhbár extolled
the Boers’ mobility and marksmanship, as well as their “inexhaustible supply of
remounts” and “intimate knowledge of the country,” before conceding that it was a
“foregone conclusion that in the long run the Boers will have to submit to the
inevitable.”230 Going even farther in its praise, the Sat Dharm Pracharák declared that
the Boers’ “great gallantry and steadfastness” had earned the country the right to remain
independent.”231 As the war progressed and the Boers refused to succumb to British
forces—even in the face of what was to become Britain’s scorched earth policy toward
the Transvaal—the native press would find itself even more torn between the combatants.
It was not surprising to the British that the Irish supported the Boers, given that
the Irish nationalist philosophy was decidedly opportunistic and antagonistic. The native
press in India, however, had frequently proclaimed its loyalty, avowing that the Boers
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were their foes specifically because the Boers were the enemies of the British. The
Bangavasi insisted, “The three hundred millions of loyal Indians are sincerely praying for
British victory.”232 As with the Irish nationalist press, however, Indian nationalist
journalists made clear, however, that the loyalty was tendered in anticipation of a quid
pro quo. “Indians are a loyal people,” affirmed the Tripura Hitaishi, “and want to get the
right of self-government, living as they do under British rule.”233 The Sanjivani asserted
that even a British defeat would not dampen Indian loyalty; rather, it would strengthen
the bond: “The Indian will then really be a citizen of the British Empire, and will receive
the glorious rights and privileges of British subjects.”234 Under the guise of expressing
its profound loyalty, the native press was actually seizing the opportunity to school its
readership in the traditions of British Government, and, by extension, the inalienable
rights to which the Indians, as subjects of Her Majesty, believed they were entitled.
Given these unabashed declarations of loyalty to the British Empire at the onset of
the South African crisis, the ensuing pronouncements of admiration for the Boers,
combined with accusations that Britain was waging an unjust war, marked a significant
shift in the dynamic that existed between the Indian native press and the British
Government. As readings in a number of papers make clear, this stage of the conflict
witnessed the beginning of concern in the press about the impact of the reverses not only
on the outcome of the war, but also on British prestige. The initial Boer victories were
accompanied by a change of fortunes for Britain’s military forces, and would ultimately
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inflict irreversible damage on Britain’s status among the European nations. Regardless of
the fact that the Boer contingent was not, in reality, heavily outnumbered until British
reinforcements arrived, the perception was that a cadre of peasant farmers had
unexpectedly and altogether miraculously thrashed Europe’s most formidable fighting
machine. India’s native press circulated this perception, exercising its power to shape
public opinion toward the crisis in the Transvaal.
Indeed, the native press in India emphasized the impression that the reverses
boded ill for Britain’s standing amongst the European Powers. Recalling recent history,
the Hablul Mateen predicted woefully, “If England is defeated in the war, she will fall
not only in the estimation of the Boers, but also in the estimation of Europe, as Italy did
after her defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians.”235 The Hitavadi cautioned, “Our
enemies are waiting for an opportunity. The reverses in the Transvaal War are sure to
lower British prestige in the eye of the other European Powers.”236 In the Punjab, the
Paisa Akhbár of Lahore specifically fretted about the relationship between Germany and
Britain, asserting that “99 per cent of the residents of the Fatherland are heart-and-soul
with the Boers, and that it is their earnest desire to ruin and humble England.”237
The Charu Mihir was more forthright about the reasons for the deterioration of Britain’s
vaunted reputation—advising Britain to negotiate with the Boers at the earliest
convenience: “British prestige will not suffer if such a brave nation as the Boers are
allowed to enjoy their liberty,” suggested the paper, adding, “but British prestige will
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greatly suffer if England is compelled to conclude a peace after reinforcements have
failed to conquer the Boers.”238 Unlike Irish nationalist journalists who repeatedly sought
to demolish the reputation of the Empire, at this early juncture the majority of Indian
nationalist journalists still prized their connection with the British.
The issue of how the native press in India was covering the British reverses in the
Transvaal proved somewhat of an incendiary topic, given that the Anglo-Indian press
openly accused the native press of savoring each British defeat. For their part, the AngloIndian papers rejected even the most tepid critique of Britain’s conduct of the war, and, in
fact, launched their own barrage of criticism at members of the vernacular press for what
the papers characterized as acts of disloyalty in time of war. In the Punjab, the Taj-ulAkhbar of Rawalpindi responded to the charges by declaring that Indians had “never
hesitated to lay down their lives in the service of the Government,” while the Paisa
Akhbár of Lahore that stated that Muhammadans throughout India “offered prayers to the
Almighty for the victory of British arms in south Africa.”239 In Bengal, the Mihir-oSudhakar also issued a staunch declaration of Muslim loyalty, declaring, “We are pained
to hear of the loss of British life and money in the Transvaal War,” adding, “The
Mussalmans, who are the most loyal subjects of the English, consider British difficulty as
their own difficulty.”240 This avowal of loyalty to the Empire appeared to be a striking
refutation of Ireland’s vaunted policy of opportunism.
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Several native papers across India pointed out the stark difference between
attitudes toward the war in Ireland and on the subcontinent. The Hablul Mateen in
Calcutta claimed that Ireland’s demonstrable sympathy for the Boers “is one of the chief
causes of the determination of the Boers to fight against the British.”241 Noting that
“liberal contributions are being made to the War Fund in India” at the same time the Irish
were enlisting financial support for the Boers, the Koh-i-Núr of Lahore insisted that if
any native had “behaved like the Irish, his fellow countrymen would have killed him like
a dog and torn him to pieces.”242
Many in the Punjabi native press—including the Civil and Military News, Sialkot
Paper, and Paisa Akhbar, did, indeed, urge their readership to contribute to the war fund;
however, several papers expressed concern that the generous instinct was misplaced,
given the ravages of the recent famine. The Akhbár-i-‘Am insisted that “charity should
begin at home,” while the Sada-i-Hind declared, “Those who neglect to subscribe
towards the Famine Relief Fund and yet contribute towards the War Fund can only be
regarded as anxious to show their loyalty.”243 There was, even at this early point in the
war, an understanding that from the British perspective, India’s sufferings paled in
comparison to the military setbacks in the Transvaal.
The Hitavadi used this knowledge to launch its own response to the criticisms of
the Anglo-Indian press, claiming that the fate of India was inextricably wound up with
the fate of the Empire: “For our peace as well as for our happiness, for our trade no less
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than for our domestic economy, for the protection of our lives no less than for the
protection of our property, we are entirely dependent upon the English.”244 The paper
then launched its own volley at the critics, demanding, “Will our Anglo-Indian
contemporaries kindly explain to us how it can be possible for the Indians, under
circumstances like these, to rejoice over the reverses of English arms?”245 The native
press truly had nothing to gain from an imperial loss, given that they still held out hope
that a victorious Britain would reward their loyalty. When the criticism of the vernacular
press—and the Indian public, in general—did not desist, the Hitavadi leveled its own
pointed accusation: “The Anglo-Indians . . . ought to know that in abusing the natives
they are, in fact, abusing the Government. If the Indians be really dissatisfied with
British rule, it must be to the discredit of the British Government.”246 With this
statement, Bengal’s most outspoken paper confirmed that loyalty to the Empire was not
synonymous with slavish admiration and obedience; Britain’s rule of the subcontinent
was not beyond reproach. The Hitavadi and other like-minded nationalist papers saw the
conduct of the Boer War as a harbinger of what editors warned were alarming portents
for India.
Seeking a more concrete explanation for the reverses in the Transvaal beyond that
of British pride and overconfidence, the Hitavadi identified specific aspects of the
fighting that would prove most onerous to British troops. “The English are fighting in a
foreign country,” explained the paper, “while the Boers have taken up arms to defend
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their independence at all costs.”247 The writer continued, listing the disadvantageous
conditions under which the British troops labored: “The operations have to be conducted
in unknown mountain passes, in a steep country covered with dense jungle and in a
climate unsuited to Englishmen.”248 That the terrain and climate were decidedly
unfriendly to British troops raised one of the more pressing questions of the war—a
question that would preoccupy the native press for the duration of the war and long after:
Why did the British not deploy Indian troops in the struggle with the Boers?
The desire to fight for the British Empire constituted one of the most glaring
differences between the Indian native press and the Irish nationalist press, and one which
underscored the troubling issue of race in imperial relations. Whereas Arthur Griffith and
his colleagues not only urged a boycott of British recruiters, but also were instrumental in
forming the Irish Transvaal Brigade to fight alongside the Boers, the native press in India
was dismayed that Britain continually overlooked the trained Sikhs and Gurkhas.
“Would it not do to send the Gurkhas, who are so well trained in the art of English
warfare?” inquired the Hitavadi.249 Answering its own question, the paper enumerated
the myriad benefits of employing Indian troops: “There are thousands of native soldiers
who are able to lay down their lives for any portion of the dominions of the QueenEmpress. If these men are sent to the Transvaal under the command of competent
leaders, the trouble and hardship of soldiers unaccustomed to war will be considerably
mitigated.”250 The Charu Mihir chimed in, insisting, “The Sikhs and Gurkhas are always
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spoken of in high terms. They would have felt happy if they had been allowed to show
their valour in the war.”251 It certainly did not escape the notice of Indian journalists that
the government thought nothing of sending in ten thousand well-armed Indian troops to
combat the Chinese army in Asia, whereas those same native troops were forbidden to
fight the Boers in South Africa.
The Civil and Military News cited the Boer oppression of Indian immigrants in
South Africa as a primary reason the British Government should permit natives “to go to
the Transvaal and wreak vengeance on the Boers.”252 Moreover, Britain’s refusal to
employ Indian troops was proving troubling not solely in the concrete terms of
adaptability to terrain and climate, but regarding India’s place within the Empire. “India
is part and parcel of British dominion,” proclaimed the Charu Mihir, asking, “Why, then,
are not Indian soldiers allowed to maintain the glory of the Empire?”253 The Sanjivani in
Calcutta ruefully answered the question: “But though the Boers are enemies, still they
are white men, and our rulers have therefore refused to accept the services of Indian
princes, being unwilling to employ black men in killing white men.”254 The paper
continued its analysis, quick to point out the hypocrisy in the British war policy. “The
Government has scruples in sending black men to the seat of war, but it has no such
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scruple in accepting black mens’ horses and money for conducting the war.”255 In this
regard, the Sanjivani clearly felt the need to air the grievances of its readers. Their
animals sent to the front, their meager income taxed for the war effort, but their offer of
services rejected, the native population deeply resented British policy that could not look
beyond prejudicial racial theories.
In the Punjab, home to the Sikhs and Gurkhas, the Patiála Akhbar lamented the
fact that British soldiers had gone soft, and scoffed that “Tommy Atkins becomes raving
mad if he cannot get his brandy and soda in the appointed time.”256 The paper suggested
replacing Tommy Atkins with Jack Sepoy, who would undoubtedly “soon make short
work of the Boers.”257 The Wasir-i-Hind expressed the same sentiment, extolling the
bravery of Jack Sepoy, “noted for his gallantry and intelligence all over the world,” and
insisting that the Boers “would never have been able to entrap him.”258 The omission
proved even more rankling as it became increasingly evident that each new shipment of
recruits was less well-equipped than the last in adapting to the harsh terrain. The critical
Bangavasi delved deeper into the issue, cataloguing the countless conflicts in which
Indian troops had assisted British forces in quelling disturbances across the breadth of the
Empire: “The native troops of India have fought side by side and shoulder to shoulder
with British troops in Tirah and Afghanistan, Burma, and China, and Egypt,” boasted the
paper, adding, “But now they have been compelled to sit idle and inactive. Is not this
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likely to wound our heart?”259 One by one, the Bangavasi listed and dismissed the
reasons put forth for bypassing India’s native troops, rejecting out of hand the charges
that the Indian troops were weak and insufficiently trained, that “their audacity and
presumption will increase,” should they succeed in routing the Boers, or that success
would “embolden the native tribes of Africa.” 260 Nationalist journalists saw beyond the
unconvincing litany of excuses offered by the Empire for refusing native participation,
and pressed their case repeatedly.
Challenging the wisdom of refusing to employ Sikhs and Gurkhas, the Bangavasi
charged that Indian troops were “being treated with that indifference and suspicion with
which a woman treats the children of a co-wife.”261 If, indeed, the subcontinent was
indeed the jewel in the crown, reasoned the press, why did British generals shun the use
of native sepoys on the front lines against the Boers? The Bangavasi helpfully supplied
the answer to its readers, explaining, “Here is the answer. The Transvaal war is a war
between two white Christian nations, and, under the terms of the Berlin Treaty, native
troops cannot be employed in a war between two white peoples.”262 The paper took
particular offense at the implication that Indians were uncivilized, and that the sight of
native troops slaughtering “civilized” Dutch troops would be “an eyesore to the European
nations.”263 The outspoken paper reminded its readers—including those in the British
Government—that India could boast a long and esteemed civilization that produced
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literary works that were “the wonder and admiration of the world.”264 “Complexion is
not the standard of civilisation,” declared the Bangavasi; adding that civilisation could
only be found “in the excellence of the soul and the heart.”265 Demonstrating impressive
unanimity, Indian nationalist journalists pressed home their point that the war in South
Africa should be fought along political and not racial lines.266
Nor was it solely Indian journalists who questioned the Crown’s refusal to employ
Indian troops against the Boers. During Parliamentary debates over the cost of the Boer
War, Colonel Victor Milward, Conservative Member of Parliament from Stratford-onAvon, argued that the Indian troops had proven their worth and that therefore “we should
prove the solidarity of our Empire and its defences,” by permitting the native soldiers to
“hold the line of communication in South Africa.”267 Notably, John Dillon—the MP
from East Mayo and Redmond’s lieutenant—countered this proposition by declaring, “I
think it is a very wise thing to resolve that no coloured troops of any kind shall be
employed.”268 Given that Irish nationalists frequently sought to establish solidarity with
India, this was an astonishing pronouncement. Dillon’s stand makes it apparent that
whereas there might be a kinship whenever political interests happened to coincide, there
as yet remained a racial divide between the Irish and the Indians. Henry H. Howorth,
former Member of Parliament for Salford South, strongly expressed his own dismay at
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the seemingly shortsighted British policy, extolling Indian troops as soldiers “who are
burning and thirsting to be employed now, and to prove once more their devotion to their
Empress and their loyalty to this country!”269 Enumerating the many advantages to be
gained by the addition of Indian troops, Howorth identified not only their discipline and
experience, but also the fact that they were already armed with British weaponry and
could provide their own horses. “They never flinch from work or duty, their courage
never flags,” opined the author, before demanding, “Why should they be left out in the
cold because their skins are a little darker, and as if they were savages?”270 Looking
toward the day when a Russian invasion of the north-western frontier would compel the
British Empire to call up its Indian troops, Howorth demanded to know how Russian
soldiers differed from their Boer counterparts.
The refusal of the British Government to employ Indian troops became one of the
salient issues for the growing nationalist movement in India, and the native press
gratefully seized upon the topic to further its political agenda. By questioning why a
country that repeatedly pledged its loyalty to the Empire was nonetheless considered
suspect on the battlefield, the native press did more than underscore the hypocrisy
inherent in the government’s policy. Indian nationalist journalists shone a piercing light
on the increasingly corrosive racist policies of the British Empire—hammering home the
idea that despite protestations by the government, Indian subjects were, indeed, thought
of as second-class citizens—“barbarians” not fit to engage a “civilized” white enemy.
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Moreover, by pointing out that the Irish press was vocal in its opposition to the war, yet
Irishmen were still trusted with vital roles on the battle front, the Indian native press
underscored the duality of imperial policy. The native press went to great pains to
establish its contention that India was unique among imperial strongholds: “Indians are
not Irishmen,” avowed the Hitavadi. “They are famous for their loyalty. A kind word
from the Government comforts us even under oppression and ill-treatment.”271 As the
Hitavadi was quick to point out, however, India’s loyalty was proving a mixed blessing
for its inhabitants. “India is, and always has been, loyal and peaceful,” declared the
paper,” but added the caveat, “Under British rule, the Indian people have become much
more peaceful, and their valour, military instinct, and self-help have almost disappeared,
so that she is no longer in a position to do without England.”272 The Hitavadi admitted
ruefully that knowledge of India’s placid compliance was a primary reason the British did
not feel compelled to honor their responsibilities toward the subcontinent. Instead,
observed the paper, “It is the Boers, the Irish, and the people of the English colonies who
are the only peoples feared by England.”273 The Hitavadi was among nationalist
publications slowly coming to the realization that resistance and rebellion were the only
currencies that would buy imperial favors.
Although the Irish press was quick to identify India as a fellow victim of British
imperialism, the Indian native press was not yet disposed to claim affinity with the Irish.
Instead, the native press repeatedly pointed to the example of the disaffected Irish in
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order to underscore the loyalty of the Empire’s Indian subjects. Despite the fact that Irish
soldiers were fighting in the Transvaal in both the Boer and British armies, India was, in
fact, more directly invested in the outcome of the conflict, for two more very specific
reasons: the well-being of Indians in South Africa and the security of India’s borders.
Whereas the Irish press certainly expressed its concern for Irish troops stationed
in the Transvaal, those troops were not subject to the same sort of social, political, and
economic persecution suffered by Indian immigrants living in the Transvaal. In part
because of the correspondence of Mohandas K. Gandhi, who had returned from his
studies in England to practice law in South Africa, it had become common knowledge
that this large community of Indians had suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the Boers.
The Bangavasi informed its readers that “Mr. Gandhi, the well-known Gujarati Barrister
of Johannesburg, has written us a letter, complaining of Boer oppression of Indians in the
Transvaal.”274 As the Hitavadi explained, “The present war has been undertaken to
enable English residents of the Transvaal to have a share in the government of that
country. Indians have no such aspirations. All they want is security against
maltreatment.”275 If Britain were to emerge victorious, the native press theorized, surely
the British Government would demand that living and working conditions for the Indian
immigrants would be markedly improved, and the prejudice to which they were daily
subjected would disappear.
Despite the fact that the Boer War elicited from the Indian native press many of
the same criticisms—ranging from British shortsightedness and ineptitude, to the role of
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race in deploying combatants —there were, in fact, specific concerns about security that
were linked directly to geographic location. If India had worried that the Boxer
Rebellion was a distraction for Britain, the morass that was the Transvaal gave rise to
concerted fears that the mother country no longer had a watchful eye on the subcontinent.
Particularly among the members of the press in the north of India, this precipitated
worries about the Russian bear menacing the frontiers. In Bengal, there was considerable
concern about the subcontinent’s vulnerability to a Russian invasion, should the Boers
distract the British with prolonged fighting in the Transvaal. The press took it upon itself
to chastise the British Government for becoming distracted by what many perceived as an
unnecessary war. “If they ever invade India, cautioned the Hitavadi, “we shall be the
first to suffer. That is why we feel it is necessary to say so much beforehand.”276 “The
English are busy in the Transvaal war,” commented the Basumati, “and the huge Russian
snake is about to make another advance in Asia.”277 Casting a nervous eye at the borders
and the build-up of Russian forces, the Sanjivani noted excitedly, “The Indian public
have been thrown into great anxiety to learn that thirty thousand Russian soldiers have
arrived close to the Afghan frontier, and that a Russian ambassador has already come to
Kabul.”278 Thus, the papers in the north, while expressing concern about the conduct of
the war, reserved much of their anxiety for the fact that the conflict was distracting
Britain from the business of empire.
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The capture of Pretoria by Lord Roberts on 5 June 1900 prompted an
unprecedented outpouring of elation throughout Britain, with triumphant headlines in the
British press and a spate of victory demonstrations in the streets of London. The
expectation worldwide was that the Boers would cease all hostilities and surrender. Yet,
if the British press was giddy and ecstatic, the Irish press was decidedly disgruntled and
disconsolate. Their avowed enemy had escaped what had appeared to be an evertightening noose of defeat and dishonor. The native press in India, however, was more
measured in its response, attempting to display its loyalty, while simultaneously
expressing its concern over Britain’s ostentatious celebration of victory. “Is it not a
regret,” queried the Hitavadi, “that the English, who are unrivalled in wealth and
strength, should forget themselves in their rejoicings over the defeat of the insignificant
Boers?”279 “All this leads us to suspect,” concluded the paper, “that the British people
are gradually losing all their splendid virtues. They who before allowed themselves to be
moved, except by the most serious disaster, are now moved even by a small gust of
wind.”280 For nearly one year, from the first rumblings of war, through the initial British
reverses, to the actual capture of Pretoria, the native press in India had, for the most part,
remained loyal and unquestioning. Driven by what it perceived as a celebration that was
out of all proportion to the event itself, however, many in the native press began to
express profound dismay about the British Government, the British people, and the
British character.
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To the Irish nationalist press, the Boer War functioned as a handy club with which
it could bludgeon its British political foes—criticizing the government, the military, and
the Empire, itself. The plight of the Boers provided an object lesson to its readers on how
a subject people could control its own destiny, even in the face of seemingly
insurmountable odds. Yet, despite the involvement of Irish soldiers fighting both
alongside and against British forces, the Boer War was, in fact, simply the most
convenient weapon in the arsenal of the Irish advanced-nationalist press at that specific
moment in time. The tone of its coverage did not alter, nor did the editorial content
undergo any transformation as the war progressed. Indeed, the outcome of the war would
not materially change the lives of those in Ireland, and Arthur Griffith and his colleagues
were too canny to place all of their nationalist eggs in the Boer basket. After confessing
surprise that the Boers had not defended Pretoria, Griffith surmised that the Boers had
chosen to “save the men and guns for the second part of the war,” and predicted that the
conflict would ultimately end with the overthrow of British supremacy in South Africa.
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“No one should prophesy unless he knows,” cautioned Griffith, before adding slyly,

“I prophesy because I know.”282 The fact that Griffith’s claim to omniscience was more a
case of wishful thinking than convincing evidence was not enough to deter the editor
from prematurely predicting the Empire’s downfall.
The war, however, was far more personal to members of the native press in India,
given the fact that the treatment of Indians residing in South Africa was at stake.
Moreover, Britain’s preoccupation with the Boers, as well as the Chinese Boxers, meant
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that India’s frontiers were vulnerable and natural disasters such as the Indian famine were
not addressed with the rapidity they warranted. Finally, Britain’s decision to reject the
services of Sikhs and Gurkhas in the Transvaal, while simultaneously deploying Indian
troops in Peking, infused a level of palpable racial tension into relations between the
Empire and its Indian subjects. Using the conduct of Britain in the Boer War as
incontestable evidence, the native press brought home to its readers the sobering reality
that despite the avowed loyalty of India, its subjects, and its troops, Indians would never
achieve parity with their British or Irish counterparts. The outbreak of violence in China
and the renewal of hostilities in the Boer War would find the Indian press questioning not
merely whether Indian subjects would ever stand on equal footing with Britain, but
whether a future in the Empire was something to be desired or spurned.
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“Perdition to Pigtails”: The Boxer Rebellion

Peking was burning—schoolhouse and warehouse, church and chapel alike—set
alight by Chinese Boxers enraged by the presence of European missionaries and western
industrialists. Panic and confusion reigned, as terrified personnel swept through the
streets, fleeing their legations in search of a safe haven that would offer even temporary
refuge from the massacre that would surely follow. Barricaded at last within the walls of
the British legation, for which sandbags offered the only fortification, were
representatives from fourteen different nations—men, women, and children—including
two thousand Chinese Christians.283 On the evening of 20 June 1900, the Boxer rebels,
supported now by the forces of the Chinese imperial army, surrounded the legation,
cutting off any means of escape or any hope of rescue. The siege had begun.
The final year of the nineteenth century produced the opening salvos in a trio of
conflagrations that would embroil no fewer than nine imperial powers. The Boxer
Rebellion (1899-1901), the Second Boer War (1899-1902), and the American War in the
Philippines (1899-1902) sprawled over two continents and would begin the dramatic
reshaping of the balance of power among the world’s mightiest nations. America and the
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British Empire were the only two powers to have forces on the ground simultaneously in
two different wars during this period. For its part, America’s handling of its
responsibilities in the Boxer Rebellion and the conflict in the Philippines served to
enhance her stature as an emerging world power. Britain’s role in the Asian crisis,
however, combined with numerous setbacks in the protracted war in South Africa served
to tarnish her prestige, deplete her man-power and materiel, and diminish her competitive
standing internationally.
Indian and Irish nationalist journalists, for so long consumed by news emanating
from South Africa, now found themselves transfixed by dramatic developments in China.
The concurrent timing of the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War provided Indian and
Irish journalists with an enviable pair of targets on which to sharpen their rhetorical
knives. British policy that could not be faulted in one conflict was invariably a fertile
source of criticism in the other. Although nationalists in India and Ireland fiercely
adhered to many of the same philosophical tenets, the Boxer Rebellion brought to the
forefront several distinct divisions between those members of the Indian and Irish
nationalist press. In addition to the significant role geography played in shaping attitudes,
issues of race and religion sharply divided the journalists, dictating the disparate
approaches they would take in covering the conflict in Asia. Already disturbed by
discrimination toward Indian troops in the Boer War, the Indian nationalist press would
skillfully use the Boxer Rebellion to highlight the hypocrisy of a British military policy
that barred trained Indian soldiers from fighting against the Boers, yet readily deployed
them in a battle against fellow Asians. Events in China precipitated a wave of pan-Asian
sentiment among Indian nationalist journalists, who would use their practiced rhetoric to
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illuminate troubling examples of racial and religious bias—prompting their readers to reexamine the basis for their loyalty to a white and Christian empire. The Boxer Rebellion
also emphasized the contrasting agendas pursued by the Indian and Irish nationalist press.
Whereas editors on the subcontinent reluctantly criticized the conduct of the war, Irish
nationalist—and particularly advanced-nationalist editors—deliberately sought damning
evidence of British arrogance and ineptitude with which to convince their readers of the
necessity of breaking free from Britain’s imperial grasp. Thus, a side by side
examination of press coverage of the Asian uprising and the crisis in South Africa
illuminates the national interests of India and Ireland, and what they would portend for
the Empire.
The end of China’s isolationist policy—which had endured for centuries—
ushered in an era of uneasy relations between the Celestial Empire and foreign powers,
including Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Whereas the Chinese government had
initially welcomed foreign powers, it rebuffed all attempts to permit the import of opium,
which it had prohibited since 1729. The British, however, who oversaw the cultivation
and production of opium in India, recognized that encouraging opium use in China would
tip the balance of trade in Britain’s favor. China’s refusal to enter into trading
agreements with the West would lead to its engagement in a series of misbegotten
wars.284 Chinese forces succumbed to Britain in the First Opium War (1839-1842) and
were bested by the combined forces of Britain, France, and the United States in the
Second Opium War (1856-1860). The ensuing 1842 Treaty of Nanking and 1858
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Treaties of Tientsin did more than mark an end to hostilities and permit the import of
opium. By granting special privileges to the foreigners, it created a powerful class, which
was free to travel or trade at will, and remained virtually immune from Chinese law.
“The Government of China having compelled the British merchants trading at Canton to
deal exclusive with certain Chinese merchants,” read the first clause of the Treaty of
Nanking, “agrees to abolish that practice in future at all ports where British merchants
may reside, and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever
persons they please.”285 The same treaty permitted British subjects to reside where they
chose, “without molestation or restraint.”286
By the end of the century, China had the unfortunate distinction of having been on
the losing end of several more notable battles with foreign powers. It forfeited IndoChina to the French as a result of yet another ill-conceived conflict and lost control of
Korea to Japan at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Arthur Griffith’s
United Irishman ascribed China’s loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese conflict to Chinese
war methods, which the paper characterized as “antiquated,” rather than any “superiority
of Japanese mettle and resources.”287 Indeed, the paper characterized the Chinese
intellect as “the equal, if not the superior, of the Frank,” adding, “If he lacks enterprise
and originality, it is because he is the slave of custom and the serf of prejudice.”288 In
Griffith’s estimation, a reliance on ancestral guides was a sound domestic policy, but a
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disastrous course of action when engaged in relations with foreigners. Those relations
worsened in 1897, when Germany effectively managed to parlay the deaths of two
German missionaries into an excuse to wrest control of the Shantung peninsula. By the
end of the century, as a result of these combined losses, the Chinese government had
ceded control of large areas of its former territories to foreign powers. A country which
had once jealously guarded its borders and repelled the intrusion of foreigners found
itself playing host to contingents from Britain, France, Germany, Russia, AustriaHungary, Italy, Japan, and the United States—the so-called Eight-Nation Alliance— all
of which established legations in Peking.
Released from onerous restrictions, foreigners expanded their reach
geographically as well as ideologically, by aggressively challenging eastern thought and
behavior. Religion, in particular, would prove to be the premier catalyst for the Boxer
Rebellion, as the Chinese people, long accustomed to their own traditions and culture,
bristled under the combined onslaught of missionary zeal and foreign ideas. The
concerted efforts of the European powers to westernize the Chinese populace led to deep
resentment among the Asians. By 1899, this anti-western, anti-foreign sentiment had
crested, needing only further provocation—real or imagined—to swell into a tidal wave
of animosity that would crash down with unrelenting force on the foreign legations.
The Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists (I-ho-t’uan)—known as the
Boxers because of their extraordinary acumen in martial arts—arose to assume the mantle
of China’s defense. Support for the Boxers arose, in part, as a result of a belief in their
supernatural powers. The Boxers draped themselves in a cloak of supposed invincibility,
ostensibly protected by potent magic that would ensure the defeat of their enemies and
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sweep the Boxers to triumph. In May 1898, the group, comprised largely of peasants in
the north of China, began targeting Christians, posting public notices reading, “Protect
our country, drive out foreigners, and kill Christians.”289 The brutality escalated in the
spring of 1900, as the Boxers embarked on a reign of terror, burning churches and
slaughtering missionaries, as well as newly converted Chinese Christians. In Peking, on
June 13, the summary execution by the German Minister, Clemens von Ketteler, of a
young Boxer seemingly ignited the fuse, prompting an explosion of violence, in which
thousands of Boxer warriors descended upon the walled city, burning Christian churches
and murdering clerics and converts, alike.
One week later, on the afternoon of 20 June, with the city burning around them,
nine hundred British, French, German, Russian, Japanese, and American diplomats and
soldiers sought refuge in the Legation Quarter, and would remain under siege for the next
fifty-five days. The Qing regime belatedly and perhaps shortsightedly aligned itself with
the cause of the Boxers—the “brave I-ho-t’uan followers”—issuing an official
Declaration of War on 21 June.290 The accusations leveled at the foreign powers by the
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Dowager Empress and her court attempted to provide a rationale for the wholesale
slaughter of foreigners and Christians, charging: “The foreigners have been aggressive
towards us, infringed upon our territorial integrity, trampled our people under their feet,
and taken our property by force.”291 The declaration, although specifically alluding to the
plight of the Chinese, echoed and reflected the grievances of Britain’s Indian subjects,
thus securing for the Boxers some measure of pan-Asian sentiment.
With Peking in chaos, railway and telegraph lines destroyed by the Boxers, and
few reporters on the ground, there was little chance that reliable accounts would make
their way to the West. “Nobody can guess what is taking place beyond the veil which has
descended over the scenes of rumored massacre and pillage,” intoned the New York
Times, adding “and the wildest conjectures are afloat.”292 In the absence of verifiable
news, the press leapt eagerly on any scrap of information, relating rumors of atrocities to
their readers in a feverish frenzy of hyperbole that couched the conflict in terms of East
versus West, heathen versus civilization.293 Given a lack of factual data concerning the
siege, press organizations around the world elected to enhance and embellish the few
available nuggets of news. The unreliability of official reports would be a recurring
under purely popular direction, when Manchu officials decided to use the movement for their own
xenophobic ends.”
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theme in foreign press coverage of Britain’s imperial wars, particularly those in the more
far-flung regions of the world. The perception of what was happening in China or in the
Transvaal swiftly took precedence over reality—allowing Irish and Indian nationalist
editors to shape, fashion, mold and even distort the story in such a manner as to further
their own political agenda.
The role of geopolitical factors in contemporary analysis of the Boxer Rebellion
was more apparent in the writings of Indian journalists than in that of their Irish brethren.
That a strong element of Asian solidarity was present in the coverage by the native press
in India was undeniable. The more outspoken members of the press did, indeed, read the
struggle in terms of a geopolitical East versus West conflict, depicting the western
European powers as the aggressor, heartlessly preying on the weak. According to many
members of the native press, no less than the continent’s political independence was at
stake. The fiercely nationalist Hitavadi asserted that events boiled down to a simple
question of “whether the black and yellow races of Asia will or will not be deprived of
their liberty by the civilized and warlike nationals of Europe.”294 The paper concluded,
“All the Asiatic nations, therefore, have their political interests involved in this war.”295
Moreover, support for China in the Indian native press cut across ethnic and religious
lines, most notably uniting Hindu and Muslim—each harboring anti-Christian and antiWestern sentiments. Thus, the Boxer Rebellion served as a catalyst in India for a unified
anti-imperial front.
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Demonstrating their shared perspective, the Hindi Hindustan suggested that the
European Powers “will crush the Boxers like locusts, and divide China among
themselves,” while the Bengali Hitavadi likened the European forces to “vultures
flocking to the carcass.”296 Continuing the theme of animalistic savagery, the
Darussaltanat and Urdu Guide of Madras characterized China as a dying pig, whose
liver was ruthlessly extracted by the British lion and whose entrails were being greedily
consumed by the Russian bear.297 Whereas the image of an innocent lamb to slaughter
was a regular feature in Indian editorials, the normally conservative Bangavasi in
Calcutta, asserted, “opium-eating China” was not a helpless victim; rather, the populous
empire was a sleeping giant newly awakened, poised to do battle with the powers of the
West.298 The editorial was one of the first to reflect a growing pan-Asian sentiment,
presenting the Boxer Rebellion in stark terms of an East versus West conflict.
The Persian language Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen offered one of the
more interesting analyses of the tendentious relationship between Asia and the European
powers. The paper suggested there were three options regarding the manner in which
Asiatic sovereigns should conduct business with Europe: exploit the rivalry among
European nations in a quest for security; grant concessions in order to remain on friendly
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terms; or remain locked in a hostile relationship. Condemning outright all three
strategies, the paper reminded its readers: “Neither friendship nor enmity with the
European Powers will be of any help to them. There is rivalry among the European
Powers so long as their personal interests are concerned, but as against the poor Asiatics
they are united.”299 The writer warned, “They will not shed one another’s blood or spend
a farthing for our sake.”300 Yet, after the siege had ended and China was boldly
attempting to recover Manchuria, the Hitavadi noted pointedly, “The Chinese Empire has
been saved from destruction by want of unity, and jealousy and distrust among the
Western Powers.”301 Indeed, the paper praised China for coming to an understanding that
“in spite of the strength of the Western Powers their mutual jealousy has made them
almost impotent.”302 The writer suggested that the continuing envy and enmity among
the European Powers would lead inevitably to a fresh round of global conflicts.
The Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen saw in the events in China an object
lesson for the Persian people. A substantial Persian population had been a fixture in India
since the eighth century, with the first Persian-language paper making its appearance in
1822. Although largely assimilated into Hindu culture and customs, the Persian
community was cognizant of the dangers of complacency, and repeatedly expressed
concern not only for India, but also for the land from which their ancestors had
emigrated. “One day Europe will take up arms against us,” the paper warned.303 Laying
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out the rationale for self-preservation, the writer explained, “Persia being the only Islamic
kingdom where the Muhammadan law is strictly enforced, the Persian akims ought to
protect Islam. If Persia is conquered by Europe, Islam will die.”304 Two weeks later, the
paper cautioned, “Foolish indeed must be the nation which thinks that it can prosper by
allowing foreigners to come into its own country.” However, unlike the majority of the
native press in India, the Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen placed much of the
responsibility for the failure of the Boxer Rebellion on the Chinese themselves, whom the
paper accused of being “a cowardly nation. Five hundred millions though they are, they
could not stand against fifty thousand European troops. This is all due to the fact that
they are very idle and spend their time of peace in luxury.” The paper concluded with the
stern warning: “The Chinese affair is a good lesson for the people of Persia.”305 Whereas
the paper specifically advised the people of Persia to stiffen their collective spine and
prepare to fight in defense of their country, concern about the enfeeblement of the Indian
population would become a common refrain throughout the course of the conflicts in
China and South Africa.
Conveniently ignoring Japan’s role in subduing the Boxers, the Bangavasi
focused on the efforts of Britain, Russia, Germany, and France to bring China to heel,
drawing a historical comparison between the European alliance and the Crusaders.
“History,” proclaimed the paper, “does not record another instance of such union of
Christian armies for the prosecution of a war against one nation.”306 Acknowledging the
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religious underpinnings of the Rebellion, the Rangalaya drew a pointed distinction
between Chinese martyrs and those in previous conflicts, recalling, “The great heart of
Gladstone felt pity for the victims of the Bulgarian atrocities, but then, those victims were
Christians. But how many Europeans have shed a tear for the poor Chinese, the fathers
of civilization, when they are being killed like so many insects?”307 At the war’s end, the
Moslem Chronicle issued a harsh rebuke to the European powers for the “wholesale
slaughter of Chinese, of brutal treatment of children, of outrages on women, and every
conceivable form of brutality and licentiousness.”308 “And all this was done,” charged the
paper, “by men who adore Christ—the Great Saviour who gave up his life for the love of
men.”309 The propensity to point out the disparity between Christian words of peace
preached by the European Powers and the violent deeds perpetrated by those same
entities reflects the collective resentment harbored by Indians with a long experience of
hearing their own faiths disparaged.
Whereas the suspicion that the western Christian powers were trying to subvert
ancient religions resonated among much of the native press, many journalists sought to
ascribe deeper political motives to the actions of Britain and her allies. The editor of the
Sat Dharm Prachárak sounded an alarm concerning the agenda of the allied powers and
feared that “evangelical Europe merely wishes to partition the heathen Chinese
country.”310 “Indeed,” scoffed the paper, “both America and Africa having already been
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divided, what other field was left for the display of the Powers’ Christian spirit of
philanthropy?”311 Such commentary reveals Indian suspicions that the British Empire
would use the mounting tensions between Hindus and Muslims as an excuse for
partitioning India.
Citing the vigorous military preparations of the allied powers, The Wakíl also
suspected partition was in the offing, and characterized as disingenuous all European
denials to that effect, while the Siálkot Paper urged Great Britain to prevent any partition,
“as this would have the effect of lowering her prestige and injuring her trade in Asia.312
The Jámi-ul-Ulúm provided a caustic rationale for the partition, suggesting that the
European Powers, “supposing China to be a good tit-bit, opened their mouths to swallow
it; but as none could be allowed to eat it up singly, they agreed to partition it among
themselves.”313 In a more pointed commentary, the paper sarcastically ascribed a holy
motive to the actions of the “pious Christian Powers,” hinting that perhaps they mistook
the Celestial Empire for the Heavenly Kingdom promised by Christ.314
As the above accusation makes clear, the Indian press did not attribute the Boxer
Rebellion merely to a desire for geopolitical hegemony; rather, they strongly detected
both racial and particularly religious motives in the actions of the West, with China being
consumed by “Christian poison.”315 The issue of Christian proselytizing would return at
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conflict’s end, with the Moslem Chronicle suggesting that if Christian missionaries were
permitted to roam China at will, then the door should certainly be open to
“Muhammedans trying to extend their faith also.”316 Regarding the methods employed
by Christian Europeans in their alleged crusade to dominate Asia, the Hitavadi not only
identified the Bible, but also the brandy bottle and the bayonet as “three well known
means of spreading knowledge and civilization in uncivilized countries.”317 Thus, the
provision of opium, which the paper termed “death and worse than death” to a Chinaman,
was the first step in the eventual subjugation of the Chinese people, with the revenueproducing trade “enforced at the cannon’s mouth.”318 These shared perceptions of how
the West had sought to vanquish the independent spirit of the Chinese people resonated
with Indian journalists, further solidifying their anti-imperialist stance.
If opium was the thin edge of the imperial wedge, then the presence of Christian
missionaries provided the leverage to crack open the door to the Chinese empire. The
refrain was echoed across all five provinces of India. In the eyes of the Indian press, the
permanent settlement of missionaries in China was destined to provoke disturbances
among the Chinese populace, which would escalate into violence and killings. Indeed,
the Bengalee, edited by ardent nationalist Surendranath Banerjea, held European
missionaries directly responsible for the Boxer Rebellion. “Real and fancied outrages on
European missionaries have been used by almost every European power as efficient
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handles to screw from the Chinese money and territory,” charged the paper, while the
Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen sardonically cheered: “Bravo Christian
missionaries! You are well versed in the art of carrying on political intrigues.”319 Toward
the war’s end, the Vakíl remarked, “it is a crying shame that the Christian Missionaries,
who are never tired of posing as the champions of outraged humanity, should have joined
the soldiers in looting the Chinese.”320 In the wake of the defeat of the Boxers, there was,
indeed, an epidemic of looting—in which every occupying nation took part—with
civilians, soldiers, and even missionaries descending on the city to scoop up their share of
Chinese antiquities.
Offering an idea which they ascribed to Lord Curzon, the Vrittanta Chintamani
indicted Christian missionaries as the source of all anti-foreign feeling in China: “Their
high living, their large families, their contempt for the Chinese and their religion, their
mixing freely with women, and their employing large numbers of women, mostly single,
in mission work,—these are all disliked by the Chinaman.”321 Although conceding that
the Boxer cause was “misdirected” and doomed to failure, the paper lauded the rebels’
motives as both “patriotic” and “unimpeachable.”322 The Madras paper was not alone in
this description of the rebels. In Bombay, the Kál,—the publication of radical journalist
Shivram Mahadev Paranjape—also invested the Boxers with patriotic impulses,
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“however differently it may be characterized by selfish Europeans.”323 Among the most
extremist of Indian nationalists, Paranjape determined to portray both the Boxers and the
Boers as lovers of independence, driven to violence by a desire to defend their countries.
The implied message was that Indians who professed a love for their country could prove
their patriotism only by openly resisting imperial domination.
Not for the first time, the native press also questioned the veracity of western
reporting regarding this latest imperial conflict. The Prabhat scoffed at the recently
dispelled rumors that Chinese warriors had not only killed the men, but also raped and
then massacred the women, as well as their children. Reflecting the Hindu philosophy,
the paper proceeded to advance the theory that even if the Chinese had committed
atrocities, of equal importance was how the Europeans were treating the Chinese—details
which seemed absent from western coverage of the Rebellion. Moreover, the Prabhat
attempted to provide a rationale for the Chinese massacre of their own women, stating,
“They believed that their chastity would not be safe in the hands of the Europeans. So
they put them to death. If this is barbarity, what is heroism?”324 Whereas Indian readers
perhaps had little reason to fear that the British would rape their wives, their households
had been subjected to intrusive searches during the recent plague epidemic, prompting
them to identify with the Chinese determination to protect their women from humiliation.
Inasmuch as many in the native press chose to reject rumors of Chinese atrocities
and elected to believe the worst of the European powers, the motive was more complex
than at first might appear. “We are not weeping for China,” explained the Rosndmá-i323
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Mukaddas Habdul Mateen, “and we sympathize with this Celestial Empire only because
it forms a part of the East, the portion of the world to which we belong. We are weeping
for ourselves.”325 The Indian Mirror, however, noting that a British general was lying on
his deathbed, held out a measure of hope for moral redress, asking, “When will these
Powers learn to recognize and fear the law of Karma?”326 The paper returned repeatedly
to the idea of karmic retribution. Long after the end of the Rebellion, as more details of
atrocities emerged, the paper stated fervently, “Such acts must demand God’s vengeance
some day.”327 There were many who feared that the vision of Europe carving up China
would soon be repeated in India. Given the unlikelihood of mounting sufficient physical
resistance to such an incursion, perhaps karmic retribution could stop the imperial powers
before they sat down to dine off the subcontinent.
The Pan-Asian sentiment which infused much of the reporting often hampered the
ability of Indian journalists to maintain objectivity. The same Indian papers that were
dismissive of reports of atrocities committed by the Boxers reprinted lurid tales of
atrocities allegedly committed by the European powers. The Swadesamitran expressed
little surprise at the behavior of the French and German soldiers, whom they termed
“illiterate and irresponsible,” because it had become common knowledge that “the Great
German Emperor himself has ordered his soldiers to show no mercy to the Chinese.”328
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The Phoenix also expressed particular horror at the behavior of the German troops,
stating that the cruelties practiced by the other European powers “pale into nothingness
when placed beside the heartless, atrocious and diabolical butcheries perpetrated by the
German troops on inoffensive men and women in China.”329 In the estimation of the
editor of the Sat Dharm Parchárak: “European civilization has been weighed and found
wanting.”330 Long accustomed to hearing Asian civilizations denigrated and dismissed
by European conquerors, Indian nationalists now seized the opportunity to identify the
moral failings of Britain and its fellow European powers. This criticism would both
heighten and narrow its focus to Britain with the renewal of hostilities in the Boer War.
Britain was not without defenders in the native press, however, with the
Lokopakari insisting that British generosity was at all times on display and that no British
soldiers took part in the ill-treatment of the Chinese.331 The Rahbár also praised the
behavior of the British troops for acting “comparatively very humanely.”332 Paranjape’s
Kál, while crediting British soldiers for refraining from committing atrocities in China,
was—not surprisingly—unwilling to absolve British troops “for reprehensible conduct
toward the Boers in South Africa.”333 The same paper assailed the Chinese people for
seemingly being in a celebratory mood while attending the execution of their Boxer
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leaders. “Such men as derive pleasure from witnessing the death of their leaders are fit
for slavery and deserve being trodden underfoot by foreigners; they are utterly incapable
of appreciating the high motives which inspired the actions of the Boxers.”334 The paper
reserved its praise for those who fought to the death for a noble cause, excoriating those
who so quickly turned their backs on their leaders, in an effort to curry favor with their
conquerors. Although the article made reference to events in China, the implication was
that readers should stand steadfast in support of nationalists fighting for the rights of the
Empire’s Indian subjects.
Several voices among the Indian press were insistent that the European press had
deliberately exaggerated the gravity of the crisis in China, in order to provide a rationale
for further escalation. “In our opinion,” stated the Rosndmá-i-Mukaddas Habdul Mateen,
“the object of all that is being said about the seriousness of the Rebellion in China and the
fighting resources of the Chinese army, is to justify the aggressiveness of the European
powers in China.”335 In the estimation of the writer, Europe had only been waiting for a
pretext to conquer “the fertile empire.”336 Now that the world had been made aware of
Chinese transgressions, the Europeans “will not come back from China till they have
conquered and divided it among themselves.”337 The paper left the fate of the Chinese
people in no doubt: “They will become accustomed to the disgraceful life of a slave.”338
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Already, many in the nationalist press had begun to despair that Indians had become
woefully accustomed to their status as British subjects and had lost the will to regain their
freedom. The Rosndmá-i-Mukaddas Habdul Mateen’s use of the imagery of slavery, in
order to rouse the Indian reader from this stupor of acceptance, was a tactic also
employed by Irish advanced-nationalist journalists, to invigorate their Irish readership
and rally them to the cause of independence.
Unlike the war in South Africa, in which Indian troops were forbidden to fight
white Boer soldiers, the British Government saw no problem in employing Sikhs and
Gurkhas to combat the Boxers in Asia. Indeed, following the fifty-five day siege in
Peking, the Sikhs and Gurkhas comprised part of the eight-nation rescue mission sent to
relieve the beleaguered foreign diplomats and soldiers, and were the first foreign troops
to enter the newly liberated Legation Quarter. As the Boer War progressed, and British
troops became increasingly taxed by the guerilla tactics of the Boers, the native press in
India would become increasingly vocal about this duality of policy. Despite the litany of
reasons the Empire provided for refusing to deploy Indian troops in South Africa, their
quick decision to send troops to China only emphasized the already glaring role of race in
military policy. Not only did the doctrine of martial races divide Indian castes into those
presumed to be more courageous and hardy, but also Britain’s agreement with the
European Powers at the Berlin Conference barred troops of color from fighting white
troops. There was, moreover, the question of why the Empire was slow to appoint Indian
officers. The Imperial Cadet Corps was not founded until 1901 and no Indian would be
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admitted to the military academy at Sandhurst until 1919. 339 The debate over whether
Indians were racially suited for command posts was as much about the specter of white
troops objecting to an Indian leader, as it was about the character of native cadets.340
Tellingly, the only applicants admitted into the Imperial Cadet Corps were the sons of
native Princes or those belonging to the martial races. The Indianization of the British
Army thus proceeded in fits and starts until the founding of the Indian Military Academy
in 1932.
India was not the only dominion concerned over which colonial troops should be
deployed in Britain’s imperial wars—and what remuneration they would receive. In
Australia, debate swirled around whether the Boxer Rebellion constituted such a serious
imperial conflict that the involvement of colonial troops was even essential. 341 Those in
the Australian government who opposed deploying that country’s troops in China pointed
to the fact that Australian troops were already fighting for the Empire in South Africa,
“where Indians could not be used.”342 Moreover, given the fact that the British
government could pay Indian troops fighting in China less money than other colonials,
why would the Empire want to send Australian troops, whom they would have to pay
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more? Thus, Britain’s decisions as to where it would deploy Indian troops impacted
opinion and policy not only in India, but also throughout the Empire.
Yet, press coverage of Indian troops deployed in the Boxer Rebellion seemed less
concerned with questioning British policy in South Africa than in underlining the
glorious opportunities the Asian conflict offered native troops. Unlike the crisis in the
Transvaal, the Boxer Rebellion offered a chance to prove Indian loyalty, courage, and
talent. Indeed, given the 20,000 troops sent to China by Japan—which did not occasion
any outcry from the native press about Asians fighting Asians—the Public Gazette
argued for the swift deployment of even more Indian troops, urging the British to grant an
opportunity “to our hardy sepoys of showing their bravery on the battlefield.”343
Specifically, the editor urged the government to reserve Sikh soldiers for the frontier wars
and to deploy Muhammadans for the war in China. The idea that Muhammadans should
no longer be sent to the frontiers stemmed from the fact that the frontiers were home to
many Muslims. Therefore, “although the Muhammadan soldiers did not refuse to fight
their co-religionists, still they could not fight to their hearts’ content.”344 Notably, the
British Empire classified Sikhs and Mohammedans as ranking among the finest of India’s
martial races. Given Russia’s repeated glances toward India, it was essential to man the
borders with those considered physically and temperamentally suited to engage the
enemy on behalf of the British Army. Indeed, with the exception of the Gurkhas, Dogras,
and selected Hindustanis and Pathans, General Roberts—then Commander-in-Chief,
India— had declared, “there are no Native soldiers in our service whom we could venture
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with safety to place in the field against the Russians.”345 This seeming reliance on the
doctrine of martial races to determine fitness in the field was a constant irritant to Indian
nationalists who sought unity based on common aspirations for India, rather than division
based on questionable racial theory.
Beyond the issue of the deployment of Indian troops, the native press identified a
more compelling concern for the people of India. There were many who lamented the
fact that the prolonged war in South Africa was preoccupying Britain to an alarming
extent—exhausting its military capabilities, tarnishing its prestige, and, most especially
distracting it from the business of Empire.346 Neglect, and (worse) exploitation, of Indian
resources was a common theme. The accusation extended to the course of the Boxer
Rebellion, during which the British Government ordered India to supply fodder for
British horses and other animals. Commented the Khulna with suitable alarm: “If India is
made to supply the Chinese expeditionary force with fodder for three months, there will
not remain in India a single head of cattle living.”347 The timing was particularly
unfortunate and telling, as India was suffering yet another one of her devastating famines,
during which millions of cattle died of starvation.
Among the members of the native press, there was also concern over the
disrespectful manner in which they perceived the British were treating China, an ancient
empire. Certainly, this was a long-standing complaint regarding the British handling of
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India, with Bal Gangadhar Tilak and his colleagues constantly reminding the reader that
the Indian civilization pre-dated that of Britain by several centuries. Without a doubt, the
despoiling of the graves of Manchu emperors, together with the robbing of antiquities—
“in order that the relics may enhance the beauty of the British Museum”—touched a
nerve in many Indian observers.348 Since the arrival of the East India Company,
British explorers, adventurers and collectors had been making their fortunes and their
reputations by amassing India’s antiquities, which frequently ended their journey in the
exhibition cases of British museums.349 The Oudh Times offered even more poignant
commentary on the topic, opining, “It is a sorrowful and humiliating sight to witness
Christian and professedly civilized and young nations like the Germans, the French, and
the British engaged in an attempt to portion out among themselves an old Empire,
inhabited by a venerable and inoffensive people like the Chinese.”350 The paper was
even more distressed that the European Powers engaged in the conquest so soon after the
Hague Peace Conference, and accused the allied powers with eschewing any attempt at
arbitration in favor of charging into a war.351
It did not escape the notice of some in the Indian press that the other European
powers on the ground in China were attempting to force Britain’s withdrawal from the
arena. “But the British people,” stated the Puduvaimitran, “fearing that the honour and
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glory due to their empire will be impaired if they do so, are resolved to maintain their
ground in that country at any cost.”352 Although reporting that the British government had
dispatched 10,000 troops from India, the paper noted that the other foreign powers,
particularly France and Russia, remained idle, hoping that a British defeat would lead to a
hasty departure. The writer commented, “Everything is topsy-turvy in China.”353 As the
war progressed, the Puduvaimitran continued to inform its readers of Britain’s isolation
from the other allied powers—a condition which the paper claimed “forbodes unknown
troubles to her!”354 “At the conflict’s end, the paper lamented, “Thus all they have
gained in South Africa has been more than counterbalanced by the loss they have
sustained in China.”355 The Puduvaimitran’s message was clear: whereas all of the other
European powers had benefited from the outcome of the Rebellion, only the British had
lost both power and prestige in China.
The resolution of the Boxer Rebellion evinced mixed emotions from those in the
Indian press. Whereas the Jyoti exclaimed, “Any good news regarding China fills the
mind of every Asiatic with joy,” there was apprehension about the continued European
presence on the continent.356 The Bangavasi summed up the cause of the anxiety,
quipping. “Saying one thing and intending another is a wonderful resource of European
politics.”357 The Kál was among those who deemed “unfair and exorbitant” the cost of
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war reparations demanded by the European Powers, and warned that “tranquility so
purchased” would not be long-lasting.358 Of particular concern were the intentions of
Russia, whose Cossacks had ruthlessly mown down Chinese resisters and violated the
Chinese women. Lamented the paper, “The fearful way in which the Czar’s vow of
peace was fulfilled produced a paralysing effect on the hearts of all Asiatics.”359 With the
constant rumbling about a possible invasion of India by Russia, fears for the safety of
Indian resisters and Indian women were palpable. The prospect of Russians swarming
over the border also fueled discussions of whether native troops would be allowed to face
them in combat, given the proscription of native troops engaging white troops in battle.
The role of the Indian troops throughout the Boxer Rebellion continued to be a
subject of much discourse at the conclusion of the conflict. The Lokopakari expressed
pride in the performance of the Indian troops, who had earned a “very good name” during
their deployment in China.360 However, the Phoenix was clearly disturbed by the fact
that any mention of Indian troops was omitted from the list of those recognized for their
service during the Rebellion. “They fought side by side with their white comrades-inarms, shared the same dangers, underwent the same privations, and endured the same
hardships,” the paper remonstrated.361 “But while the British soldier gets all the praises
and rewards, the Indian sepoy, who gave as good an account of himself, gets nothing
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beyond the blows he received in the course of the war.”362 This oversight was
particularly galling in light of the fact that the Sikhs and Gurkhas were the first to enter
Peking at the conclusion of the siege.
Given its proximity to the subcontinent and the litany of grievances with which
India could readily identify, the Boxer Rebellion held special interest for the Indian
nationalist press. Like the Boxers, they resented western attitudes toward the religions of
the East, and bristled at the ubiquitous presence of Christian missionaries. There was, as
well, an inherent respect for a fellow Asian civilization of such antiquity. The issue of
race, however, was paramount, with the Empire deploying Indian troops to fight fellow
Asians in China, yet barring them from joining the British Army in South Africa to
engage the white, Christian Boers. With the Boer War and the critical days of the Boxer
Rebellion coinciding, the Indian nationalist press took pains to point out to readers the
glaring disparity in imperial policy and attitudes. Although the Boxer Rebellion was not
accorded as many columns as the Boer War in the Indian press, the coverage it did
receive was frequent, extensive, and pointed in its critique of Western attitudes and
actions. Yet, for all their cavils and complaints, Indian journalists remained courteous in
tone and unfailingly loyal to the Empire.
By contrast, the Boxer Rebellion did not hold the same fascination for the Irish
nationalist press. It was another continent, another religion, another race. Indeed, when
Irish journalists did raise the issue of race, it was not to denigrate Britain or other white
European powers for a presumption of superiority over the Asian race; rather journalists
used the occasion to characterize the Boxers as part and parcel of the “Yellow Peril.”
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Although the nationalist press did pay lip service to the Boxer Rebellion, there was a
noted scarcity of coverage in their papers, with the majority seemingly content to provide
updates from Reuters and to reprint feeds from the Evening Telegraph, London Daily
Express, and the Times of London.363 Unlike the Indian press, there was no widespread
condemnation of the atrocities committed by foreign soldiers, nor much mention of the
role played by European missionaries in allegedly fomenting agitation among the
populace by attempting to convert the Chinese people. One of the only papers weighing
in on the causes of the war was the Freeman’s Journal, the organ of the Irish
Parliamentary Party. The paper attributed the blame for the rebellion to the Chinese
imperial authorities—a charge which it claimed “destroys the myth” that the Europeans
powers were compelled to entry the fray because the Imperial Government “had found
itself powerless to cope” with the rebels.364 The editor of the Freeman’s Journal
reserved its most pointed criticism for Lord Salisbury, fearing that the Prime Minister
might attempt to annex territory in the Yangtse Valley—a policy the paper characterized
as “insane.”365 The fresh concern about Salisbury was particularly ironic, given his 1898
promise to maintain the Chinese Empire. In that speech, Salisbury had laid out a
blueprint for bringing China into the modern age, pledging “to invite it into path of
reform, and give it every assistance which we are able to give it, to promote its advance,
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and to increase its commercial prosperity.”366 In two short years, British policy had
rejected cooperation in favor of conquest, sounding bells of alarm for observers in the
Irish nationalist press.
The fact, moreover, that much of the Irish press perceived that the British,
Japanese, American, and Russian powers were constantly at odds gave Irish critics
license to attack not only Britain, but also all things imperial. As the Freeman’s Journal
caustically noted, “Never was the mutual jealousy of the Western Powers more cynically
exhibited than in this conflict with the forces of Eastern barbarism.”367 Notably, not until
after the war did the press in India come to share the Irish view of a fractious relationship
amongst the European powers concerning the matter of dividing the spoils of China.
“Such a friction is impossible,” asserted the Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen, “so
long as there is a fear of a rising of the natives against them.”368 Whereas the Irish paper
saw in the behavior of the European powers discord born of deep-seated envy and greed,
the Indian paper saw only a momentary disruption of European harmony—a united front
in the face of native resistance.
Yet, Irish nationalists evinced little of the sympathy for the Boxers apparent in the
Indian nationalist press, prompting the question of why Irish journalists failed to connect
with the Boxers’ cause as they had with the struggle of the Boers. As references to the
“Yellow Peril” and Griffith’s rants against the Jew-Jingo press indicate, there is much in
the nationalist press that can only be interpreted as racist. Certainly, Ireland could not be
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expected to espouse any of the pan-Asian sentiment expressed by the Indian nationalist
press, but there are no Irish nationalist editorials voicing any support for the rebels.
Perhaps the rationale for this lack of Irish empathy relates less to the Chinese,
themselves, and more to the troops combating the Boxers. Those lone Irish journalists
who do defend the Boxers do so not because they admire Chinese resistance to
Christianity or rejection of western traditions, but rather because their opponent is the
British Empire.
Therein exists one of the most significant differences between Irish attitudes
toward the Boxers and the Boers. The war in South Africa was ripe for criticism because
Britain—the target of the Irish nationalists’ wrath—was the only European power
involved, and thus wholly responsible for the course of the war and solely culpable for
any atrocities committed. In China, however, the fact that Britain was not the only
European power involved was enough to distinguish the Boxer Rebellion as a conflict in
which the Irish did not have as much of a national stake. Still, the overall omission of
analysis and editorializing in the Irish press is somewhat perplexing, given the chance to
criticize the actions not only of British troops in China, but also the behavior of the
Protestant missionaries. Both of these themes—occupation by an alien force and
religious subjugation at the hands of the occupiers—should have played naturally into the
hands of the nationalist press.
If the Irish nationalist press failed to focus its full attention on the Rebellion, the
Irish advanced-nationalist press—uncompromising in its insistence on independence for
Ireland—was fully engaged with the events in China. Writing in the Workers Republic,
socialist James Connolly lashed out at the war as a capitalist device to conquer new
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markets, alluding not only to the aggression the West directed toward the East, but also to
the tension that simmered among the Europeans. “The great industrial nations of the
world, driven on by their respective moneyed classes,” sniped Connolly, “now front each
other in the far East, and, with swords in hand, threaten to set the armed millions of
Europe in terrible and bloody conflict, in order to decide which shall have the right to
force upon John Chinaman the goods which his European brother produces.”369
Connolly reserved special enmity for both the British Empire and, not surprisingly, for
the Tsar of Russia, who “speaks to-day of universal peace, in order that when, in the near
future, he hurls his armies across the frontier into China, India or Constantinople . . . he
may be able to point to this action of his as proof that the battle was not of his
seeking.”370 In Connolly’s estimation, any professed motives for war other than capitalist
greed and the hunger for new markets were wholly lacking in credibility.
In light of Arthur Griffith’s avowed animosity to all things British, it is not
surprising that the one paper that weighed in with pointed editorial comment on the
Boxer Rebellion was Arthur Griffith’s United Irishman. Having returned from the
Transvaal in 1898, Griffith could not have founded his paper at a more fortuitous
moment. The organ afforded him a podium from which to denounce the British and
simultaneously launch his nationalist program. Provocatively proclaiming, “I believe
there must be something good in any individual, body, or nation which the English press
reviles,” Griffith proceeded to excoriate the British newspapers for repeating what he
369
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considered slanderous lies.371 “I have sufficient knowledge of who and what the Boxers
are,” the editor avowed, “to be aware that they are not robbers and murderers with a
penchant for harpooning pious Christians.”372 For Griffith, the question was not whether
the Boxers possessed admirable and heroic qualities; rather, he sought solidarity with a
people who were fighting to maintain some semblance of independence in the face of
encroaching foreigners.
Although his affinity for the Boxer cause was clearly eclipsed by his passion for
the Boer campaign, the underlying factor that determined the Irishman’s loyalty was the
presence of a nationalist underdog stepping into the ring with an imperialist heavyweight.
Given his political agenda, it became unimportant whether the Boxers were vanquished
by the European Powers. “Yet, though the Boxer fails, why should I not admire him?”
asked Griffith.373 Answering his own question, the editor summed up the underlying
argument: “Ignorant, as we reckon ignorance, conservative, fanatical, he is still an
Oriental Nationalist.”374 This was a back-handed compliment, to be sure, with Griffith
expressing his willingness to overlook what he considered the egregious shortcomings of
the average Chinese rebel, provided that “Oriental” was vigorously espousing the cause
of nationalism. Only then could the editor use the Chinese Boxer as a model for the
educated, liberal-minded Irishman to emulate.
Having decided at the outset of the Rebellion that the Chinese were largely
blameless, the United Irishman proceeded to enumerate the myriad ways in which the
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foreign powers were the culpable party, journalistically indicting the Europeans on
charges of “criminal neglect and criminal folly.”375 The paper expressed particular horror
at the “ridiculous ultimatum” sent to the Chinese, as well as the attempt to capture
Peking, regardless of the fact that there had been no formal declaration of war.
According to the United Irishman, the foreign powers should have fully expected the
blowback from China. Instead, “Europe and America are aghast at the temerity of the
Chinese, at their audacity, their resistance.”376 “When the Powers learn history,”
concluded the article, “they will have learned sense.”377 Griffith and his colleagues rather
transparently identified with a proud people subjected to the imperialist whims of a
conquering army.
As the events in Peking grew increasingly desperate, so did the description of the
Boxer Rebellion in Griffith’s paper. What began as the “Chinese Question” in the
Foreign Notes section of the United Irishman rapidly transformed into the “Chinese
Situation,” followed by the “Chinese Crisis,” and finally the damning “Chinese Fiasco.”
Indeed, by the end of July, the paper was referring to China’s plight as “the grimmest and
most grotesque that has occurred to any country in this century.”378 Notwithstanding his
own hyperbole, Griffith was quick to pounce on the European press for its own
exaggerated reporting: 379 “Harrowing tales from well informed sources reached the
West of terrible things being done in Pekin and of magnificent things being left undone
375

United Irishman, 7 July 1900.

376

Ibid.

377

Ibid.

378

United Irishman, 28 July 1900.

379

United Irishman, 14 July 1900.

150

by the Powers,” the paper reported, adding sardonically, “Whereupon the autocrat of the
breakfast table waxeth wroth and vows perdition to pigtails and disgrace to all and sundry
who do not happen to belong to the blessed English race.”380 Not for the last time would
Griffith accuse the British press of spreading rumor and falsehood in pursuance of its
national interests. Moreover, the editor could not resist taking a swipe at those who sat
safe at home in Britain, confident of their superiority and secure in the knowledge that the
sun would never set on the British Empire.
Specifically, the editor denounced the European Press for credulously swallowing
whole and then regurgitating propaganda from the region. Griffith would return
repeatedly to the subject of the European press, taking them to task for, among other
things, their gullibility. “First of all, there came the sensational report of the massacre of
the foreign ambassadors. At first it was gravely given out that not only had this the
sanction of the Government, but that a special Imperial edict had been issued giving
authority to the Boxers in their alleged barbarous acts.”381 “Gradually,” noted the paper
wryly, “these Shanghai romances are being discredited.”382 Griffith seemed to delight in
debunking the tales of horror: “But later on these redhot reports become watered down,
and from a story of a complete wiping out of the foreigners in Pekin we descend the scale
'of sensationalism,' until we know that at least two Legations are still standing a few days
ago.”383 The implication was that the European press was unreliable, untrustworthy, and
unrepentant in its anti-Boxer bias.
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Griffith’s disdain for the highhandedness with which the European Powers
conducted their affairs dictated the manner in which he assigned culpability for the
Rebellion. He noted that the European press blamed the Government and people of
China, “and urge that Pekin should be razed to the ground as an act of vengeance,”
whereas the Dowager Empress “has laid the onus of the whole melancholy business on
the shoulders of the representatives of the Powers.”384 Griffith’s antipathy toward
imperialism was evident throughout the pages of the paper. He prided himself on
providing his readers with news unfiltered by the British press—particularly if it
bolstered his own political agenda. The United Irishman reprinted in full the opinion of
the Amrita Bazar Patrika, which had claimed that “the Boxers are establishing the proper
position of man in human polity; a man can never be made a slave; he has the spark of
divinity in him.”385 The reference to the Boxers as imperial slaves of the various
European Powers clearly resonated with Griffith’s own view of the Irish as imperial
slaves of Britain.
Indeed, joining in the chorus of criticism leveled by the Indian native press, the
United Irishman bemoaned the lack of respect accorded to the ancient Chinese Empire.
In the editor’s estimation, “China was treated not as a ‘civilised' Power of old standing
amongst the nations, but like an East African tribe, whose popular outbreak is revenge by
wholesale burnings of chief's kraals without distinction.”386 Griffith’s paper pointedly
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identified with the plight of the Chinese, viewing the struggle in Asia as one more
instance of a subjugated people ready to break its bonds. Whereas the Indian native press
frequently portrayed China as helpless prey to the so-called vultures of Europe, the
United Irishman altered the analogy. “China at present,” claimed the paper, “is like a
hedgehog which everyone kicks about as he pleases, not knowing perhaps what it is.”387
The paper cautioned, however, “when China gets its back up, some of the bristles will
annoy those Powers now foremost in the kicking.”388 The warning was evident: the
Chinese hedgehog might appear docile and incapable of defense, but any resort to
“unjust, unwise, and impolitic aggression” by the European powers would earn the
aggressors a painful comeuppance.389
1.11

Still, Griffith cautiously backpedaled from his earlier wholesale support of the

.

Boxer cause, explaining, “One does not defend the Boxers: one defends nothing. It is a
question as to who exactly it was that caused the state of things which led up to the
Government of China being temporarily suspended by an enraged Mob.”390 Given the
endless stream of criticism it directed daily at the British Government, it is not surprising
that the United Irishman reserved most of its scorn for Britain, elevating it above all the
other foreign powers as the prime instigator of the Boxer Rebellion. It was of little
consequence that there was no unilateral action on Britain’s part that instigated the
rebellion. Novelist T.O. Russell, a contributor to the United Irishman, unapologetically
asserted, “British greed and British blackguardism has brought about the present state of
387
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things in that country.”391 More than any of the other Irish publications, the United
Irishman was quick to espy the negative effect the Rebellion was having on British
forces, mired as they were in the morass that was the crisis in the Transvaal. “Chained as
she is in South Africa by the heroic Boers,” proclaimed the paper, “she cannot adopt the
role of head pacificator to her own advantage, as she did in Egypt in 1882; so she urges
Japan to join as her catspaw, to keep the place warm until she is relieved of the incubus in
the Transvaal.”392 British forces were, indeed, strained to the breaking point, with Britain
continually forced to deploy more troops to South Africa. Japan, by contrast, fielded
more than twenty thousand troops in China, supported by a sizable contingent of
warships. The implication was that Japan would be Britain’s proxy in maintaining order
in China.
Demonstrating an understanding of the scope of Britain’s troubles in the
Transvaal, the writer linked the onset of the Rebellion to the South African conflict,
claiming, “It seems an absolute certainty that it was the war in South Africa that brought
about the war in China, with all its horrors of murders, tortures, and unspeakable
misery.”393 The writer claimed that whereas the Boxers were initially intimidated by
British and other European forces, the knowledge that a small untrained army of Boer
farmers, “not half as numerous as the inhabitants of some Chinese country towns,” was
able to rout the well-armed, professionally trained, numerically superior British forces,
provided the Chinese dissidents with the confidence to launch the Rebellion.394 Taking a
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page from the Fenian playbook, Russell concluded that the only credible reason the
Chinese Imperial government chose the timing of the revolt against the foreign powers
was that they believed “England’s difficulty was China’s opportunity.”395
In truth, it was not only the Chinese who sought to take advantage of Britain’s
difficulty in the Transvaal. The United Irishman rather gleefully reprinted an article from
La Patrie, in which the French journalist Lucien Millevoye described Britain’s “intrigues
in China” as utterly hopeless, given her most unfortunate travails in South Africa.396
Millevoye saw an unprecedented opportunity for continental Europe to exploit what he
characterized as this undeserved stroke of luck, by standing united and “barring the way
to English greed.”397 Griffith was quick to exploit any opportunity he spied to relay to
his readers criticism of the British Empire, believing that if even one European power
was skewering British policy, the attack lent credence to the Irish editor’s constant stream
of anti-British rhetoric.
One Irish journalist who, like the journalists of the native press in India, delved
deeper into the Rebellion to discern the integral role of religion in the uprising was
Frederick Ryan. The Irish playwright and journalist contributed two lengthy articles to
the United Irishman, including an analysis of what he perceived as the link between
religion and revenge in China. Writing in the aftermath of the crisis, Ryan advised the
readership of the United Irishman to consider how they would feel if roles were reversed
394
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and the Chinese dispatched to the west of Ireland a barrage of Confucian and Buddhist
missionaries, who “ostentatiously flouted the people’s religion.”398 Whereas the author
acknowledged the “litany of massacres and butcheries” ascribed to the Chinese Boxers,
he also assailed the Christian press for disseminating “whole cartloads of lies.”399 Ryan
alluded to a speech by Wu Ting Fang, the Chinese ambassador to Washington, who
commented that the press so readily believed the erroneous news that all foreigners had
been massacred that St. Paul’s Cathedral had accordingly scheduled a memorial service
for the victims.400 Ryan observed acerbically that St. Paul’s “will have to be a little more
careful in the future.”401 Even more than their Indian counterparts, Irish nationalist
journalists deeply distrusted the so-called official reports emanating from China, and
mocked those gullible enough to attach weight to each tale of horror.
Ryan, himself a socialist, also disdained the role of capitalism in the motives of
the western powers, which he characterized as rapaciously consuming resources, while
forcing the Chinese peasantry into what amounted to slave labor.402 Ryan scoffed at the
rationales provided by European powers for their incursions into and takeovers of new
territories. “In the Transvaal the pretext was Outlander grievances or heaven-knowswhat. In the Philippines it was Spanish tyranny.”403 Ryan suggested that the Irish
response to a similar double-barreled assault of religion and capitalism would
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undoubtedly be resentment toward those who “came to save their souls and incidentally
annexed any of their belongings that they could.”404 The writer believed the desperate
quest for new markets was, in fact, the underlying motive for Europe, America, and Japan
to flex their combined muscles. The slaughter of missionaries and ambassadors was
merely a pretext for their actions.
Over the course of the uprising, the majority of Indian nationalist and Irish
advanced-nationalist journalists positioned themselves firmly in the corner of the Chinese
rebels, but there were distinct differences in their rationales for doing so. Arthur Griffith
and his Irish confreres largely adopted their stance as a means of furthering their
journalistic assault on the British Government. Chief among their aims—indeed, perhaps
the only goal—was to characterize the British as international bullies: single-minded in
their imperialist aims; aggressive in their expansionist pursuits; and devoid of
compassion as regards the people whom they subjugated. For the editors, there was little
real identification with the Boxers; rather, the Rebellion offered yet another opportunity
to verbally savage the British—an opportunity Griffith and his colleagues were all too
eager to exploit.
The Irish enmity toward the British, however, could take the journalists only so
far, particularly when so many other foreign powers were involved. Accordingly, once
the summer months of 1900 had passed, even the coverage in the United Irishman
became spotty and perfunctory, with brief articles taking the place of analysis and
editorial brio. The seeming lack of empathy expressed by the Irish papers with the
Chinese people stands in stark contrast to the solidarity the Irish contemporaneously
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expressed with the Boers. Given that Ireland constituted a Western country, the press
could not simultaneously support the Boxers and characterize the conflict as an East
versus West concern. Inasmuch as Ireland was a Christian nation, the writers—with
Frederick Ryan being the notable exception—were hard-pressed to denigrate the behavior
of Christian missionaries. Whereas Ireland was primarily a nation of white Europeans,
the journalists either would not or could not join in the chorus of those detecting racial
motives for the actions of the European Powers. Thus, in the Irish nationalist press, there
is little or no mention that geography, religion, or race—factors that consumed the Indian
native press—had any part in initiating the Rebellion or determining the manner in which
it was prosecuted by Britain and the other foreign powers.
There is little doubt that native journalists in India deemed the Boxer Rebellion a
more complex conflict than that perceived of by the Irish press. Far from viewing this as
a simplistic case of the British Empire engaged in a battle versus the Chinese rebels, or
even a matter of imperial powers assertively tossing around their combined weight, the
Indian journalists uncovered a tangled jumble of disturbing prejudices at the core of the
Rebellion. Given that the subcontinent constituted part of Asia, the Indian press was
quick to detect an attempt by European powers to impose western ideology and culture
on a Chinese nation too weakened by repeated assaults to resist. As India was a nation
comprised of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and myriad other
religions—all at one time criticized and even ridiculed by British Christian conquerors—
the native press instinctively understood the resentment elicited by the missionaries in
China. Lastly, as India was a nation composed of people of color—whose soldiers were
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permitted to fight the yellow Boxers, but not the white Boers—the press instantly
detected the role of race underlying the Rebellion.
Underlying many of the differences in the Irish and Indian coverage of the Boxer
Rebellion— and, in turn, the Boer War— was the significant matter of national security.
While undoubtedly resentful of Britain’s perennial presence on the Irish isle, complete
with an endless stream of edicts emanating from Dublin Castle, Ireland was never, in
fact, in fear of an external attack. Her virtual isolation combined with her proximity to
England meant that no other nation was likely to attempt invasion. In addition, although
the issue of Britain deploying Irish troops in the service of the Empire would figure
dramatically in the Transvaal conflict, Irish troops were not a factor in the Boxer
Rebellion. Freed from concerns about security, and with well-trained Irish soldiers
stationed at home, Ireland’s nationalist journalists truly could seize the opportunity to
exploit Britain’s difficulties in Asia. By stark contrast, India lived in constant fear of
invasion. “Any mention of the word Russia, the mere reading of the letters which form
the word,” wrote the Basumati, “has somehow the effect of rolling up the heart.”405 The
Bharat Mitra was convinced Russia was preparing to invade India by sea, while the
Hablul Mateen stated emphatically, “There is no doubt that Russia has the conquest of
India at heart.”406 The specter of Russia hovered over the writings of India’s Bengali
journalists, who bemoaned Britain’s preoccupation in Asia and Africa, and envisioned a
salivating Russian bear waiting to devour an unprotected India.
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The fear was not simply a matter of Britain being an absentee landlord. The
Hitavadi worried that India had grown increasingly dependent on the protection of
Britain. “Under British rule, the Indian people have become much more peaceful, and
their valour, military instinct, and self-help have almost disappeared, so that she is no
longer in a position to do without England.”407 The doctrine of martial races embraced
by the British Army—and drummed into the consciousness of the Indian people—had, no
doubt, contributed to this sense of encroaching enfeeblement. Given that Britain was
continually increasing the size of its empire, “by depriving one country after another of
its independence,” the paper fretted that more enemies would arise to challenge imperial
might, thus eternally depriving India of Britain’s protection.408 Moreover, the lack of
imperial protection was compounded by the fact that the few Indian troops deemed
sufficiently manly and courageous were being dispatched to China, and would
undoubtedly return the worse for wear. Given the depletion of military forces on the
subcontinent, the Hitavadi was clear on one point: “England ought to have remained
neutral in the China affair.”409 Thus, even those native journalists who sought some
measure of independence recognized that England’s difficulty—far from constituting the
subcontinent’s opportunity— was, in fact, imperiling India.
Questions of national security would continue to factor into the essential
differences between Irish and Indian coverage of Britain’s imperial wars. Indeed, it is
difficult to examine coverage of the Boxer Rebellion in isolation, given that the timing of
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the uprising paralleled that of the war in the Transvaal. Yet, while the Boer War would
produce more of a lasting material impact on the Empire, the crisis in China offers an
ideal prism through which to examine Irish and Indian attitudes toward race and religion.
Clearly, India’s native press felt more of an affinity with China and the rebels, and was
disturbed by what it saw as a foreign crusade to impose Christian religion and western
thought on the continent. Ireland’s nationalist journalists were less invested in the
outcome of the conflict, viewing the Chinese as allies who helpfully distracted the British
lion, permitting the Irish to go about the business of furthering their nationalist agenda.
Although the Boxer Rebellion endured for three years, intense British
involvement in the conflict was actually of brief duration, lasting only a few months.410
Moreover, unlike the Boer War, in which the British Empire struggled alone against
enemy forces, the Eight-Nation Alliance marshaled its combined forces in China,
ostensibly ensuring that no one nation bore the brunt of the enemy’s attack. Thus, it
would seem that the impact of the Boxer Rebellion on the fortunes of the British Empire
pales in significance beside the cataclysmic events of the Second Boer War.
The critical period of the Boxer Rebellion was of only short duration, affording
journalists in India and Ireland a brief window of opportunity to question imperial actions
and shape national attitudes. Yet, the questions of race and religion raised by Indian
journalists would remain at the forefront of their coverage of the Empire, just as Irish
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attitudes toward the British would become even more entrenched as the new century
dawned. The Boxer Rebellion gave Indian and Irish journalists a chance to flex their
muscles and stockpile ammunition; the escalation of the Boer War would see them
launch an unprecedented attack.
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“Conscience Has Lost Its Hold”: The Boer War Redux

The pattern had been set—simple in its design, yet dramatic in its execution. On
a July night in the little town of Bethlehem, deep within the former Orange Free State,
British troops surrounded a farmhouse and cleared women and children from the
household, allowing them to grab only a few meager possessions before chasing them
into the night.411 On the orders of General Sir Archibald Hunter, the command was given
to set the farm ablaze. Columns of smoke billowed into the air, the acrid smell filling the
lungs—a warning to all those who would aid and abet the Boer guerillas, more
determined than ever to oust the British from their homeland. General Hunter’s quarry,
the wily Boer General Christiaan Rudolph De Wet, had escaped into the mountains, and
would harry and harass the British forces for two more long and bitterly-fought years.
The rejoicing in Britain over the end of the Transvaal War had been premature and
tragically short-lived.
Although initially cloaked in secrecy, the policy of farm-burning could not long
remain hidden from the public—particularly as young soldiers penned letters home
describing in detail their new orders and the devastating consequences of those
commands. Given that Lord Roberts and other officials were studiously funneling their
own version of events in the Transvaal to friends in the British press, the clandestine
letters and reports received by editors in Dublin from their own contacts in South Africa
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enabled the Irish press to provide an alternate version of the truth.412 Dutifully
forwarded to the newspapers, those letters would feature prominently in the columns of
the advanced-nationalist press in Ireland. Headlines such as “We Burnt All the Farms,”
“It Burned Brightly,” and “Every Farm We Burn” ignited their own fiery responses
among the readership and fueled increasing animosity toward the British Government
and the methods the military had elected to adopt.413 Britain’s scorched earth policy in
the Transvaal, involving not only the burning of farms and the slaughtering of livestock,
but also the imprisoning of women and children in concentration camps, aroused passions
from friend and foe alike. Questions persisted as to why a mighty imperial force such as
Britain felt compelled to resort to such draconian measures against an enemy as
seemingly insignificant as the Boers.
The contextualizing of the Boer War afforded the Indian native press and the Irish
nationalist press an unparalleled opportunity to forward their agenda, as it permitted them
to openly debate the policies of the British Government and critically assess the Empire’s
standing among European nations. Leading the interrogation were the advancednationalist press in Ireland and the native press in India. Throughout the duration of the
Second Boer War, this select group of journalists believed it carried a responsibility not
only to inform the masses about events in the Transvaal, but also to diligently interpret
each new occurrence for its readership. Thus, it was not enough to provide the outcome
of a particular battle or the latest casualty numbers; the press scrupulously analyzed each
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decision and military tactic—from farm-burning to the internment of women and
children—and, most importantly, provided context for each new phase of the war.
Accordingly, each reverse was interpreted either as a military blunder brought on by
pride, or a demonstration of outdated British military strategy, while each victory was
simply seen as inevitable, given Britain’s superior numbers. Hence, whether enduring
the siege at Mafeking or emerging victorious at Pretoria, Britain was rarely portrayed in a
positive light in the columns of nationalist newspapers.
Given this predilection for placing the most unflattering interpretation on the
Empire’s conduct in the first year of the war, it is not surprising that Britain’s adoption of
a scorched earth policy to subdue the Boers left it vulnerable to savage journalistic
attacks in both Ireland and India. Hubris and military ineptitude might be indications
that Britain’s power was waning; however, the burning of farms, the slaughter of
livestock, and the internment of Boer women and children in concentration camps were,
in the capable hands of Arthur Griffith or Bal Gangadhar Tilak, definitive proof that the
Empire had lost any sense of morality or humanity. As the Som Prakash mournfully
intoned, “Conscience has lost its hold upon England.”414 Ironically, Britain’s attempt to
demonstrate to the Boers and to the world its military might actually empowered and
emboldened the press to criticize the Empire with a new ferocity—and to persuade its
readership that the time to proclaim independence from the Empire was fast approaching.
Britain’s difficulty was truly becoming the nationalists’ opportunity.
In Bombay, Bal Gangadhar Tilak—newly released from prison, after serving a
sentence for sedition— assumed the leadership of the anti-imperialist forces in the native
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press. On 27 July 1897, pursuant to Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, the
Government of India had arraigned and imprisoned Tilak on charges of exciting feelings
of disaffection and attempting to excite feelings of disaffection, based on the content of
articles appearing in the 15 June issue of the Kesari. 415 Like Arthur Griffith in Ireland,
Tilak was both a political leader and a journalist, revered both for his staunch advocacy
of the Indian peasant and passionate defense of India. Tilak’s presence in the largely
middle-class Indian National Congress enabled him to become intimately acquainted with
political movements and trends, while his stewardship of the English-language
Mahrátta—and especially the Marathi-language Kesari (“The Lion”)—afforded him a
platform from which to present his nationalist ideas to the masses. His crusade earned
Tilak the soubriquet Lokamanya (“Beloved Leader of the People”), and the Kál
fulsomely hailed him as “our national hero, the fountain source of our agitation, the father
of the Swadeshi and the boycott movements, and the guardian of national education.416
Years later, Jawaharlal Nehru would credit the editor with being the first Indian
nationalist to reach the masses.
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Despite the victory of Roberts in Pretoria, few in the Indian press believed that
hostilities were drawing to a close. Already, several papers had decried the almost
universal rejoicing over the prospect of the war’s end. Now, with news reaching India of
continued Boer resistance via guerrilla tactics, more papers weighed in on what the next
phase of the war would portend for the combatants. The Puduvaimitran—the most vocal
of the vernacular papers in Madras—mocked the very idea that the war had ended,
charging the British with deception and exaggeration, while the Puduvai Nésan accused
Lord Roberts of spreading false rumors among his troops, “in order to instill courage into
their minds.”417 The latter paper warned about the damage the war was inflicting on
British prestige, and asserted that the Boers would ultimately prove victorious, “driving
the British to seek a snug corner to hide their heads in.”418 The proclamation by Lord
Roberts announcing the annexation of the Transvaal was greeted with derision by the
Puduvaimitran, which scoffed at the British presumption and lauded the persistence of
the Boers, “still fighting with unabated vigour and undaunted courage.”419 Resembling
Irish nationalist newspapers in tone, these overt criticisms boded ill for the Empire,
indicating that some native journalists had gone beyond polite questioning of policy to
wage a frontal attack on British honor and prestige.
Editors in the Indian native press seized on several troubling links between India
and the Boer War to drive home their message that Britain would callously and
opportunistically continue to use the subcontinent as the British Government saw fit; the

417

Puduvaimitran. 6 October 1900, Puduvai Nésan, 20 October 1900.

418

Puduvai Nésan, 20 October 1900.

419

Puduvaimitran, 20 October 1900.

167

thoughts and wishes and desires of Indians being of little or no importance. In Bombay,
Tilak unapologetically used the pages of the Kesari and the Mahrátta to thump the
Empire resoundingly. As the Mahrátta was published in English, it was the Kesari—
acknowledged by officials as “the most influential of the vernacular papers”—and the
Kál—described as “the most virulent and treasonous in its writings”—that provided the
most persistent and pugnacious criticism of the British prosecution of the war.420 As the
war entered its second winter, the Kesari attempted to knock the British Empire down a
few pegs, suggesting that British forces would never be able to make peace in the
Transvaal, as long as the British Government “continues to show an attitude of
haughtiness and arrogance toward the Boers.”421 Implicit in this criticism was the
understanding that Indians had also been victims of Britain’s arrogant policies.
The fact that political leaders such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak in Bombay and
Surendranath Banerjea in Bengal (the Bengalee) had access to their own newspapers
meant that they were at liberty to use these papers in support of the nationalist cause—
instilling suspicion, distrust, and even disaffection in their readership.422 Inadvertently,
Britain’s maladroit management of the war in the Transvaal continued to hand the native
press issues with which to persuade the masses of the justice of the nationalist agenda.
The lack of Indian troops deployed in the conflict, the deportation of Boer prisoners of
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war to India, the treatment of Indian immigrants in South Africa, and especially the brutal
policies adopted by the British army in the second year of the war, all provided
ammunition to editors seeking to convince their readers that the Empire did not, in fact,
have their best interests at heart. By repeatedly questioning British motives for the war
and criticizing the Government’s conduct of the prolonged conflict, the native press in
India was laying the groundwork for a nationalist platform it would continue to construct
after the war’s termination. The Empire may have long mined India for its human and
natural resources, but now members of the native press were learning to exploit Britain’s
handling of its imperial wars for their own nationalist purposes.
Whereas there was a dearth of Indian troops making their way to South Africa,
India was now inundated by a veritable flood of Boer prisoners of war shipped to the
subcontinent for the duration of the conflict. In an effort to diminish possibilities of
escape into the South African countryside—and to absolve itself of any responsibility for
feeding those who had been captured—the British army deported more than 25,000
prisoners of war to colonial outposts that included St. Helena, Ceylon, and Bermuda. In
India, the hill station of Ahmednagar was one of more than a dozen repositories of Boer
prisoners of war, and ignited a heated debate in the Bombay papers over the choice of
location, the cost to India, and the impact of the presence of the prisoners.
The press played an integral role in disseminating knowledge of the camps, and
its questioning of Britain’s choice of India as a detention center for Boer prisoners gave
rise to a debate over the role that the Empire had assigned India to play in the conflict.
The Jám-e-Jamshed —described by officials as a “gossipy society journal of the
Parsis,”—grumbled in protest, “We do not see why India particularly should be pestered
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with the inconvenience of detaining a band of Boer prisoners. We are sure other
dependencies of the Empire like Australia or Ireland would have treated a similar
proposal with scant respect.”423 The Karachi also objected to the influx of Boer
prisoners, declaring, “We have already got quite a number of these ragged gentry
encamped in our midst, and though, of course, we have the highest respect for their
patriotism and valour . . .they do not seem to be exactly the sort that one would like to
associate and rub shoulders with.”424 The paper, moreover, expressed its anxiety about
Britain’s policy of housing the prisoners in India, not merely on the grounds of
inconvenience, but also out of concern for the peril they posed. “They will be a
disturbing factor in our populace, and may even prove a source of danger to the
Government,” the Karachi warned, adding ominously, “Government does not seem to
know the danger it is courting.”425 Sounding an even more somber note as the war
neared its end, the Gujarati criticized Curzon for believing natives would attribute the
number of prisoners to Britain’s military prowess. The paper reminded officials that “the
loyalty of the Indians is not due to England’s might, but to her integrity and sense of
justice.”426 India would take pride in its place in the Empire, only if the Empire placed its
duty to conscience ahead of its desire for conquest.
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Underlying the Indian concerns about events in South Africa was the issue of
race. The native press persistently characterized the conflict as the White Man’s War,
effectively persuading its readership that the British and the “Dutch” behaved in a
manner that was not merely incomprehensible, but unconscionable. As the war entered
its second year, the Persian newspaper Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen in Bengal
voiced its suspicion of European motives, stating, “It is only for the sake of self-interest
that the European nations make friendships with other nations. Their promise, their
agreement, their friendship and their patriotism—all these are as hollow as their
bombastic cilivisation.”427 Worried, Banerjea’s Bengalee opined, “This paper is afraid
that the unequal treatment of races is being carried on with a view to conciliating the
Boers, who, with their old-fashioned Christianity, which treats the children of Ham as the
legitimate slaves of mankind, would strongly resent any suggestions for the ‘equality of
the Indians.”428 The paper reminded its readership that one of the justifications for the
war had been the cruel treatment of Indian workers, and that Britain had promised it
would secure “equal rights of civilized races.”429 “Now, however,” noted the Bengalee,
“the tune is changed to ‘equality of all the white races.”430 There was an underlying
suspicion that the warring Europeans were more united than divided, particularly as
concerned the natives of South Africa and the Indian immigrants.
In a similar vein, the Indian Spectator professed confusion at the position of the
British Government vis à vis the future of the Indian immigrants, stating, “We do not
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understand Mr. Chamberlain’s statement that the status of Indians in South Africa is a
matter of considerable complexity.”431 The paper provided its own rationale for the
Government’s compliance in the segregationist policy, asserting, “We see no difficulty
except the narrow-minded jealousy of British settlers who are more influenced by
selfishness and race prejudice than by higher political considerations.”432 Paranjape’s
Kál was even more pessimistic in its assessment of the global situation, warning, “The
white colour is about to annihilate the red, black and yellow colours and Jesus Christ has
almost eaten up the kernel and given the shell to Muhammad, Manu and Confucius.”433
The editor’s double-barreled comment not only assailed Europe’s assumption of racial
superiority, but also suggested that Christians were determined to subvert India’s own
revered religions.
As if to provide more fodder for this argument of the Indian native press, the lull
in the fighting in South Africa had coincided with the outbreak of intense hostilities in the
Boxer Rebellion, allowing the papers to focus attention on yet another imperial war in
which white European Christians seemingly conspired to determine the destiny of
“uncivilized” Asians. The press utilized this well-timed ammunition to remind their
readers of India’s dependence upon the British Empire—an entity that apparently viewed
both Africans and Asians as little more than heathens in need of instruction, correction,
and permanent subjugation. By using the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion to
underscore racial and religious distinctions, the native press laid the groundwork for a
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post-war nationalist agenda, which sought to persuade Indians that their best hope lay in a
program of self-reliance, rather than prolonging the state of dependency upon the British.
The Kál, therefore, urged its readers to glean what it hoped was the appropriate lesson
from the war in South Africa, stating, “the Boers are not only lovers of independence, but
that they are determined to make any sacrifice for preserving their liberty, instead of
surrendering and living under foreign yoke.”434
As the war progressed, native papers in Bombay and Bengal took the lead in
instilling in their readership a desire to break free from an empire whose behavior it
deemed unconscionable. After decrying Lord Kitchener’s plan to forever banish all Boer
prisoners of war and to brand as murderers those who killed British soldiers, the
outspoken Hitavadi in Bengal mourned, “How barbarous is the policy adopted by the
generous English people in order to extinguish the fire of heroic patriotism in a gallant
nation!”435 In Bombay, the Phoenix, noted for its support of the Indian National
Congress, was equally appalled by the policy, charging, “The etiquette of war might
permit this kind of thing, but every sentiment of humanity imprinted by God on the flashy
tablet of the human heart shrinks and recoils from it with horror.”436 British conduct in
South Africa was alienating not only those extremists who were predisposed to criticize
the Empire, but also those who normally couched their views in more moderate language.
Not all criticism, however, was directed at the Empire. Just as they promoted
pan-Asian sentiment in supporting the Chinese against the forces of Christian Europe, the
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Indian nationalist papers repeatedly contrasted the independence-loving Boers—so
willing to fight for their country—with the subservient Indians, who valued compliance
and cooperation over confrontation. The Prekshakm informed its readers, “Although the
Boers are destined to become extinct, they do not yield because they are buoyed up by
the delusive hope that their love of liberty will be a lesson to the whole world.”437 The
Gurakhi also pointed out the obstacles that would prevent India from emulating the Boers
and tasting the “heavenly nectar of independence,” stating, “Our case is not like theirs.
There are no factions amongst them as there are amongst us. They are not like us
wanting in sense, jealousy of one another’s prosperity and addicted to bribery, but have
been fighting for the last two years firmly and unitedly for their own independence.”438
The papers repeatedly held up a mirror to their readers, intent on identifying the flaws
that might foil Indian aspirations of independence.
Throughout the first year of the South African conflict, the Indian native press had
debated Britain’s motives, questioned the Empire’s refusal to deploy Indian troops, and
worried about the impact on British prestige of the initial military reverses. Despite the
implied (and even occasional overt criticism), the tone of the press had remained cordial
and diffident, keen to demonstrate its loyalty. Indeed, J.D. Rees, a colonial administrator
in India, extolled the loyalty of the native press during the Boer War, proclaiming, “never
before in its history did the Indian Press brush aside all smaller issues, forget all its
disagreements with the Government and its servants, and offer up one loud, continuous
and evidently sincere prayer for the speedy arrival of that victory, which they never
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doubted would be ours.”439 Rees did acknowledge a sole complaint registered by the
Native Press—in the matter of the Crown’s refusal to employ Indian troops against the
Boers—which Rees attributed to the troops ardent desire to “share the present dangers
and eventual triumphs of the campaign.”440 Moreover, he conceded that the attitude of
the Native Press might even be characterized as pro-Boer, particularly concerning the
rationale for the war and the run-up to the conflict.
When the British generals chose to resort to a scorched earth policy in South
Africa, however, the demeanor of the native press noticeably altered, becoming more
aggressive and obstreperous. Whereas the native press castigated Germany for the
atrocities committed in the Boxer Rebellion, and simultaneously praised the British
soldiers for refraining from engaging in acts of terror, the Boer War rattled the image of
unassailable British conscience and morality. The merciless policy pursued by the
British forces in the Transvaal was unfathomable to those in the press who had long
boasted of British liberality and generosity. The Hitavadi provided a litany of British
acts of war that it characterized as outrages, including the looting of villages, “reducing
whole villages to ashes,” and especially the expulsion of women and children from their
homes.441 As reports of slaughtered horses and burned farms and homesteads filtered out
of South Africa, the native press functioned as the conduit by which the Indian masses
became aware of each act of war.
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It was the fate of Boer women and children, in particular, which shattered Indian
faith not only in the rightness of the British cause, but also in the very nature of the
British Empire. Drawing the parallel to Rome’s treatment of Carthage, the Champion
blazoned the headline “Delenda est South Africa!” and proclaimed, “This is the eternal
war-cry of the Jingos with Chamberlain Africanus at their head.”442 Although not wholly
absolving soldiers of blame for their deeds, the paper was quick to lay the blame for the
policy squarely on the shoulders of Britain’s politicians, explaining, “We cannot, and we
will not, believe that British soldiers and British officers can relish the work of
devastation and cruelty, which is revolting to all who are not blinded by passion and
prejudice.”443 The Champion detailed the litany of tactics employed by the British in
their attempt to subdue the Boers, charging, “The burning of farms, the desolation of
homes, and the measures from which women and children suffer are irreconcilable with
the bravery of the soldiers or the chivalry of officers. It is the men who led England into
the war that are plunging England into this disgrace.”444 Horrified that British troops
would starve Boer animals by burning their fodder, the always-vocal Kál sarcastically
wished the British better luck forcing the Boers to surrender using this new tactic than
they had burning the farms of their opponents. “May this new trick at least be successful!
Otherwise the next expedient would be that of burning the Boers themselves!”445 The
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paper was quick to add, “Of course there would be nothing improper even in such
conduct, for it would doubtless be suitable to Christian charity and western morality!”446
Shivram Mahadev Paranjape, the Kál’s editor, once again used the war in South Africa to
criticize not only British military policy, but also western assumptions of superiority.
Expressing profound horror at the stories emanating from the concentration
camps, the Bombay-based Native Opinion wrote in sorrow, “The starving of the Boer
women and children is certainly monstrous and ‘dishonouring’ to a nation professing to
be Christian.”447 Referring to reports of aberrant Boer behavior detailed in the British
press, the paper scoffed at the “scanty accounts” and opined that “the barbarous Boer
shows more chivalry and large-mindedness towards his antagonist than the civilised
Englishman.”448 In Bengal, the Hitavadi expressed its horror, stating, “The stories of
oppression which are reaching Britain even under such censorship are enough to make
one’s hair stand on end.”449 The paper added, despairingly, “The nation which is famous
for its kindness and liberality, manliness and sense of justice has come forward to crush
its enemies in the manner of a uncivilised people.”450 According to a Government of
India translator, Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s Kesari expressed shock that while women and
children “are kept . . .on insufficient food and are dying in large numbers on account of
typhoid fever, the Boer prisoners in India should be enjoying themselves and making
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merry.”451 In sharing its dismay over the plight of 63,000 Boer women and children
housed in concentration camps in South Africa, the paper managed to expose the stark
difference between their fates and those of the Boer prisoners in India.
Beyond the impact of the atrocities in South Africa on British prestige, the native
press correctly predicted the effect of the carnage on the Boer resisters. When reports of
British soldiers burning houses filtered back to Bengal, the native-owned Bengalee
expressed fear that such acts would only prolong the war. “They will naturally increase
the Boer’s love of independence,” stated the paper, “which is not calculated to evaporate
at the sight of burning homesteads and famished children, of looted property and insulted
women.”452 The Hitavadi sounded much the same sentiment, querying, “What
consideration can those people have for laying down their arms, who have lost, by the
barbarity of British soldiers all they possessed on earth, house and home, property and
relations?”453 The Persian Rosnama-i-Muáddas Hablul Mateen stated unequivocally,
“The Boer does not die even at death’s door, and it is not likely that the Boer fire will be
quenched before another year has passed away.”454 In Bombay, the Kesari voiced its
esteem for the Boer farmer, who “is still fighting with energy against such a formidable
enemy as the British, although he sees that his wife and children are under British
custody, that his farm is destroyed, and that the whole of his land has been occupied by
the British army.”455 Even Tilak’s more diplomatic paper, the English-language
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Mahrátta, questioned British accounts of impending victory, informing its readers, “We
are told every day of so many Boers being killed and captured, and yet after a prolonged
occupation of South Africa by about 200,000 British soldiers we find a full contingent of
16,000 Boer troops remaining in the field.”456 In pointing out the disparity between
British accounts and reality, Tilak left his readers with the impression that the War Office
was covering up British military ineptitude. The Indian nationalist press was no longer
simply parroting the propaganda received from the War Office; it was interpreting and
analyzing news—in the process teaching the people the value of forming their own
opinions and standing up for their beliefs.
The endless stream of comments regarding the protracted nature of the conflict
served not only to communicate the fairly obvious fact that the war’s end was far from
imminent, but also reminded readers that the British Empire was distracted from the
business of India by a rugged group of Transvaal farmers willing to fight and die for their
country. The cold reality, claimed the papers, was that India was suffering through a
catastrophic famine; yet Britain was too preoccupied with Boers and Boxers to think
about bread. The implication was that the only way to make Britain pay attention was to
emulate the Boers in ferocity and fervor.
The concluding years of the Second Boer War saw an increase in the number of
allusions to Ireland made by the native press within the Bombay Presidency, the most
politically astute of the provinces—perhaps owing to the presence of the Indian National
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Congress in its midst. The references provide evidence that the press in India saw the
value of paying attention to the Irish example, though there existed some confusion as to
whether that model should prove inspirational or cautionary. “The example of Ireland is
not calculated to cheer up a dependency like India, opined the Mahrátta.”457 The paper
enumerated the myriad links between Ireland and Britain—from religion, caste, color, to
education and the arts, to the well-paid employment opportunities the Irish enjoyed in the
arena of public service. Moreover, the Mahrátta pointed out to its readership that Ireland
had representation in Westminster, and could therefore reap “the glory and rewards of the
Empire.”458 “And yet the result of the active work of Irish patriots during the last sixty
years from Daniel O’Connell onwards,” intoned the paper, “has been that Ireland, after a
century of the operation of the Act of Union, is now face to face not with the repeal of
that Act, but its modification in such a way that her franchise or representation in
Parliament would be cut off by about 40 per cent.”459 The implication was clear: if
Ireland, with its numerous ties to Britain, could not bring Home Rule to fruition, or even
maintain its strong voice in Westminster, what chance did India have of winning
concessions from Britain?
The pro-Congress Shri Savaji Vijay drew yet another unfavorable comparison
between the Irishman and the Indian, in terms of the former’s disloyalty to the Empire,
and the latter’s ingrained “loyalty and gentleness.”460 “The Irish are not only disloyal at
heart, but seem to delight in parading their disloyalty,” charged the paper
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disapprovingly.461 Yet, given Ireland’s rejoicing at each defeat of the British and the
demonstrative Indian support of the Empire, the paper wondered why it was India’s
nationalists who were branded with sedition.462 “We do not know what Government
would do, if India were to follow the methods of Ireland,” mused the Shri Savaji Vijay,
before dismissing the possibility out of hand: “But, of course, there is no denying the fact
that India will never adopt such methods.”463 The double standard adopted by Britain in
how it treated the native press in India and the nationalist press in Ireland was provoking
an element of resentment, and a willingness to entertain other options than devout
loyalty.
For its part, the Kál worried that the Irish had reached the point at which they
would demand independence outright, and if the request remained unrequited, then war
with Britain would soon follow. “We are afraid Ireland may soon become a second
Transvaal,” pronounced the paper.464 The Mahrátta reminded the Government that it had
only itself to blame “for the gloomy outlook in Ireland.”465 It is by justice and love that
the heart is won and not by fear or coercion.” As the war neared its end, the Kál painted
an even starker portrait for its readers, asserting, “England holds the Indians, like the
Irishmen, between her jaws, and the consequences of this state of things are no less
keenly felt in India than in Ireland.”466 Implicit in the brief statement was a simple truth:
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Britain not only had to be apprehensive about Ireland becoming a second Transvaal, but
also it needed to be equally concerned that India would become a second Ireland.467 Still,
the paper chastised Ireland for its intransigence in the face of a British victory in South
Africa. “If they cannot forget their grievances for a moment and join in the chorus of joy
like the Indians,” scolded the paper, “we must needs call them extremely ungrateful.”468
Regardless of its reputation as an anti-Government agitator, the Kál did not hesitate to
take Michael Davitt and the Irish to task for not celebrating the long-awaited peace.
Inasmuch as the native press was beginning to identify similarities between
Ireland and the subcontinent, the final year of the war showcased one of the more
pronounced differences between coverage of the conflict by the Indian and Irish press—a
difference that foreshadowed the religious contention of the ensuing decades in India.
The atrocities in the concentration camps led not only to strident Indian nationalist
attacks on the Empire, but to a broader attack on Christianity as made manifest by the
behavior of the British. “One cannot but feel great respect for Christianity as he ponders
upon this kind act of England,” pronounced the Kál.469 “The followers of Christ, who
has been described as the Prince of peace,” wrote the paper with dripping sarcasm, “have
been instrumental in bringing about the death of twelve thousand women and children, in

466

Kál, 16 May 1902.

467

Interestingly, at war’s end, the Gujarati worried that the conditions of the peace might transform the
Transvaal into a second Ireland “on a wider scale,” while the Kál gloomily predicted, “if England continues
to rule the Transvaal unrestrained, it is beyond the shadow of a doubt that the latter will gradually get more
and more entangled in the meshes of servitude until in a few years’ time it becomes another Ireland or
India.” Gujarati, 8 June 1902; Kál, 13 June 1902.
468

Kál, 20 June 1902.

469

Kál, 10 January 1902.

182

addition to the large numbers of men they have killed on the battlefield.”470 Noting that
the capture and killing did not even cease during Christmas, the Kál mockingly professed
sorrow that the subcontinent was not a Christian nation: “Surely, India would be
extremely happy if she were to embrace this religion, and it is a matter for regret that
such a consummation does not seem possible in spite of all the zealous efforts made by
Christian missionaries to bring it about.”471 Nor was the Kál the only native paper to
launch an attack on Christianity. In Bengal, the Persian journal Rosnama-i-Mukaddas
Hablul Mateen uttered disparagingly, “If these be the war tactics of a Christian people,
enlightened by the civilisation of the West, it does not look well for Europeans to express
contempt and displeasure for what a few half-educated and half-civilised Chinese have
done.”472 The Bangabandhu stated simply: “Christian morality is verily a puzzle to
us.”473 Whereas the Irish press insisted that Britain was politically and morally at fault
for launching a war against another Christian nation, many in the Indian press indicted
the Christian religion as much as the nation.
The aftermath of the Battle of Tweebosch would provide the native press in India
with an unprecedented opportunity to extol the character of the Boers, while demeaning
that of their imperial opponents. The battle, which proved disastrous for the British, was
notable for the capture of General Paul Methuen at Tweebosch, on 7 March 1902.474 The
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subsequent unexpected release of the badly-injured Lord Methuen by the Boer General
De la Rey prompted an outpouring of praise by the native press, which lauded the Boers’
act of rare wartime benevolence. In Bengal, the Sanjivani cheered, “Delaroy’s [sic]
magnanimity has astonished the whole civilised world. The generosity of the Boers has
won the admiration of all.”475 In Bombay, the Shri Sayaji Vijay also extolled the
“splendid magnanimity” of the Boers, but noted pointedly, “What a contrast between
their conduct and that of the British!”476 Nationalist editors, once overwhelmingly loyal
to Britain, found themselves increasingly alienated from an Empire that engaged in
dishonorable conduct.
Thus, the Kál—after dutifully crediting the Boers for their generosity—reserved
most of its commentary for the acts of the British, sniping that the Boers’ gesture was “in
striking contrast with the pusillanimity and ingratitude of the English who have not only
not released a single Boer prisoner, but have, on the contrary, ruthlessly executed some of
the Boer Generals on one pretext or another.”477 Tilak’s English-language paper, the
Mahrátta, informed its readers that Methuen’s capture was the result of “successful
military strategy by the Boers,” but noted that his release “was still a better strategy.”478
Its sister paper, the vernacular Kesari, declared, “If after this generous act the English
should still adhere to their determination not to make peace with the Boers unless they
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consented to give up their independence completely, then they must be regarded as the
most illiberal, selfish and ambitious nation in the world.”479 The lesson was clear: the
British, whom the Indians had long admired, were wanting in the humanity and moral
conscience of which they boasted to their imperial subjects. Perhaps the time had come
to reevaluate the relationship between the Empire and the inhabitants of the subcontinent.
In the final months of the war, the British Government discovered that the native
press still had one more weapon in its anti-imperialist arsenal: the treatment of the
Indians in South Africa. The Kesari informed its readers, “The ill-treatment of Indian
settlers in the Transvaal was mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain as one of the reasons for
declaring war with the Boers. The Indian settlers, therefore, naturally expected that their
grievances would soon be redressed.”480 The paper was quick to point out the flaw in
this optimistic thinking, noting indignantly, “But far from this expectation being realized,
we find that the British colonials in South Africa have formed a league with a view to
expel all Indian immigrants from the country.”481 Kept apprised of the penal laws by
former stretcher-bearer Mohandas K. Gandhi, Bombay papers related details of the harsh
restrictions to their readers. The Mahrátta reported that “soon after Pretoria came under
British control, an Indian was fined £10 for walking on the foot-path,” while the Kaiser-iHind denounced “the many stupid disabilities which the Government has created there to
shut out Indians.”482 The fact that Indian immigrants had actually supported the war
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effort, serving as stretcher-bearers throughout the conflict, aroused further resentment on
their behalf. In the face of such loyalty, how could the British abandon their Indian
subjects in such a callous manner?
As it had many times during the course of the conflict, the nationalist press
exploited every slip of the British Government, using each political and military gaffe to
encourage its readers to depend on themselves—and not the Empire—for their salvation.
Lamenting the thought that “not a spark of humanity is left in the white settlers in South
Africa,” the Jam-e-Jamshed reported, “We are told that memorial medals will be
presented on the Coronation Day to all school-going children of the white settlers in
Natal, their black playmates rigourously excluded from the presentation.”483 The paper
left no doubt what it thought of the policy, stating accusingly, “Such a selfish and mean
policy only casts a slur on British prestige and tends to widen the gulf between the rulers
and the ruled in India.”484 The Mahrátta declared, “If India’s loyalty is to be requited in
this way and if the Indians are to be branded as serfs unworthy of touch, surely the days
of broad statesmanship are hopelessly over.”485 Its sister paper, the Kesari, commented
acerbically, “The question of providing good wives to British colonists in South Africa is
being keenly debated in England; but the question of cancelling the oppressive and
barbarous laws passed against the Indian settlers by the Transvaal Government is still
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neglected!”486 Whereas nationalist journalists had once attacked Boer abuse of Indian
immigrants, they now used their publications to criticize British treatment of the
immigrants, and to point out to their readership the similarity of British and Boer Indian
policy.
Although the Indian press would generally praise the terms of the final treaty
between the Boers and the British and were relieved at the rapprochement between the
parties, they harbored a litany of grievances about the conduct of the war. Certainly, the
papers criticized Britain’s motives for engaging in the war and tactics in conducting the
war. There were, however, more personal reasons for assailing the Government,
including the lack of Indian troops deployed to the Transvaal, the presence of Boer
prisoners in India, the mistreatment of Indian immigrants in South Africa, and the fact
that the war daily distracted the Empire, preventing it from addressing issues of poverty
and devastating famine on the subcontinent.487 These factors prompted the press to
demand convincing answers from the Government, and to convey to its readers the
unsettling impression that the status quo was no longer acceptable.
Significantly, by this moment in time, the native press in India was beginning to
better understand the part it could play in disseminating information to the masses. Bal
Gangadhar Tilak’s vernacular newspaper, the Kesari, was certainly in the vanguard of
this movement, and, as the war neared its close, provided what amounted to the most
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detailed and compelling declaration of the role of the Indian native press. “Twenty years
ago,” wrote the paper, “the writers of the Press appealed only to the educated classes,
taking little account of the uneducated masses who form the bulk of the community. The
Kesari, however, struck a new note, and recognised their proper place in national life.”488
The paper elaborated on what it saw as its responsibility to the masses, insisting, “we
have always regarded it as a part of our legitimate duty to acquaint the people with the
nature of British administration, to point out to them the harm it has done and the
measures that we must adopt, individually, collectively, for the removal thereof, to foster
public spirit and the spirit of union among the people and to lead them to utilize that the
spirit towards the accomplishment of our objects.”489 However diplomatic the words
may have sounded, the image of a united India whose subjects would work together
collectively to obtain their objective was certain to produce uneasiness among
Government officials. This warning shot across the bow alerted the Empire to the newfound power of the press.
The Kesari left no doubt about its intentions, or its targeted readership,
proclaiming that its writings “are meant not only for Government but also for the
people.”490 “Our aim is to impart to our readers our thoughts and even our mental
disquietude,” Tilak explained, “and if the writings in the Kesari do not accomplish this
object, our labours will have been in vain.”491 The paper was well aware that the
Government was displeased with the criticism from the native press. Yet, despite the fact
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that Tilak had already been imprisoned under charges of sedition, the editor refused to
back down, proclaiming the determination of the native press to soldier on in
performance of what it envisioned as its duty. “Our aim is not to deprive any one of his
kingdom,” avowed the Kesari, “but simply to prepare the people, under the aegis of
British rule, for the improvement of their condition, and as long as we have no other end
in view we have no reason to be afraid of anybody.”492 Inherent in that promise was the
idea that the press would side with the people against the Empire, if it perceived the
necessity for such an action.
The Indian native press had couched its original disapproval of the Boer War in
terms of reproach and reproof and, to all appearances, only reluctantly launched outright
criticism at Britain and the Empire. Moreover, the editors were constantly aware of the
propensity of British officials to accuse vernacular papers of sedition. Thus, more often
than not, Indian native journalists wisely disguised their criticism as gentlemanly banter.
By contrast, the Irish advanced-nationalists had long rejected out of hand any attempt at
subtlety, and had opted, instead, for wholesale condemnation of the conflict, the
Government, and the Empire—even before the onset of hostilities. The Irish press
clearly realized it had been given a gift, and it intended to parlay that generous offering
into Irish independence.
Coverage of the Irish Transvaal Brigade combined with reports of Irish casualties
among the imperial forces and harrowing tales of atrocities committed by the British
created an indelible impression of a war gone terribly wrong. The work of the Irish
advanced-nationalist press played a critical role in keeping the travails in the Transvaal
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front and center in its journals, helping convince the populace of the rightness of the
nationalist cause. Oratory from Irish parliamentarians laid out much the same positions,
but the masses generally heard about them because their speeches appeared verbatim in
the United Irishman, the Freeman’s Journal, and their ilk. Whereas John Redmond and
John Dillon refuted, rebuffed, and repudiated British policy during the three-year conflict
in South Africa, their posturing was largely meant for the ears of the Government. It was
only because the Irish nationalist press reprinted and disseminated those speeches and
analyzed those positions in the newspaper that the masses became aware of the war of
words in Westminster, and by extension, the salient issues of the Transvaal crisis itself.
The continuance of hostilities gave the advanced-nationalist press yet another
opportunity to praise the courage and fortitude of the Boers, and to place before the Irish
populace an instance of a beleaguered people who refused to submit to their English
oppressors. The year 1900 had witnessed the birth of yet another advanced-nationalist
journal, with the founding of The Leader by D. P. Moran. Moran, who would become
the foremost proponent of an Irish-Ireland reserved exclusively for Irish Catholics, often
proved as fond of excoriating the weaknesses of his fellow countrymen as he was of
damning British policy in the Transvaal. In an article entitled, “If the Boers Were Irish,”
Moran informed his readers that “The Transvaal is led by men, and not by ranters and
exploded heroes.”493 In the editor’s estimation, the Irish predilection for sentiment would
keep them forever harnessed to the past, incapable of building an Ireland for the Irish.
“Boers have no sentimentality in them,” Moran declared, before conceding, “We have
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little else.”494 Elaborating on those characteristics which separated the Boers from the
Irish, Moran identified the former’s experience as riflemen, but also the aggressive
“business-like” approach they took to acquiring the military might to combat British
forces.495
During the summer of 1900, much of the Irish nationalist press had turned its
attention to the Boxer Rebellion, eyeing another chance to portray Britain as an
aggressor. The war in China, however, yielded fewer opportunities to single out the
British Empire as the villain, given the involvement of seven other European nations.
Moreover, the press was able to uncover much less common ground between the Irish
and the Chinese rebels, given the disparities in race and religion—the very factors that so
preoccupied the native press in India. Finally, unlike the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion
was not a conflict for which Britain recruited Irish soldiers, or one in which the Irish
lined up to fight against the British; therefore, the press could not exploit the tragic
deaths of countrymen. Thus, journalists in Ireland welcomed the opportunity to return to
covering the more recognizable South African battlefield, particularly one which had
already yielded such rich material for skewering the British.
In India, the sheer size and population of the subcontinent meant that the volume
of papers far exceeded those circulating in Ireland. Moreover, despite the obvious
leadership of figures such as Tilak and Paranjape in Bombay and Banerjea in Bengal,
vocal and persistent criticism of the Empire was not limited to their newspapers; rather,
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by the end of the Boer war, Britain found itself besieged by papers in a variety of dialects
throughout all five provinces, including strongly worded editorials from the Bengalilanguage Bengalee, the Gujarati-language Jam-e-Jamshed, the Marathi-language Kesari,
and the Tamil-language Puduvaimitran. By contrast, in Ireland, the most relentless
criticism came from the mouthpieces of just a handful of nationalist editors, with Arthur
Griffith’s United Irishman and the Freeman’s Journal—the mouthpiece of the Irish
Parliamentary Party and normally more moderate in its criticism—being the most ardent
and aggressive. Griffith seized upon the fact that only a small number of Boers had
surrendered to the British forces to offer an interpretation of how the Boers viewed the
English, cheerily listing the battles in which the Boers had bested their imperial
opponents. “Unhappily the Boers have been misled by Spion Kop, Stormberg,
Magersfontein, and a few other encounters into believing that the British soldier is not
Achilles redivivus,” smirked the United Irishman.496 Continuing its mythological
analogy, the paper concluded, “They have found that, heroic though Atkins be in his own
estimation, he has heels all over his body.”497 In the absence of new British losses to
relish, Arthur Griffith’s paper looked for any occurrence in the Transvaal that might
enable it to show Britain in a bad light.498
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Upon learning that a delegation of Boers had made its way to the United States, to petition President
McKinley to intercede with the British on behalf of the South African republics, the United Irishman
informed its readers that the journey had been futile. In fact, the American president “discouraged every
hope that the United States Government would raise a finger to stave off the crushing of the Republics.”
The paper reserved most of its scorn for the Republican Party, explaining, “In foisting the war with Spain
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the coils of Imperialism, and could, therefore, hardly throw stones at England for pursuing a like course.”
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true to form, served not so much to indict the United States or demonstrate support for residents of the
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The United Irishman also transformed its coverage of the hanging of the “heroic”
Lieutenant Hans Cordua—the German would-be assassin of Lord Roberts— into a
wholesale condemnation of British policy in the Transvaal. The paper charged, “Up to
this the English had contented themselves in the Transvaal with finishing off the
wounded on the field of battle, permitting the wives of the Boers to be outraged by the
Kaffirs, expelling families, burning farms, and devastating the crops. Their ferocity was
not yet satisfied; they had need of a judicial murder.”499 Certainly, the ferocity of the
Irish advanced-nationalist press was not satisfied. The more opportunities journalists
could seize to accuse the British Government of murder, slaughter, tyranny, and
inhumanity, the more readily they could make the case to their readers that a separation
from the Empire was not merely advisable, but essential.
Griffith and his colleagues went to great pains to ferret out any aspect of the war
which could help demonize the British and their prosecution of the war. Not content to
excoriate Britain’s conduct of the war, the article segued into a forceful attack on the
figure of the ailing Queen Victoria, charging “She has made Ireland a vast graveyard;
India an immense charnel house. And now the turn of the Boer peoples is come.”500
Warming to his theme, Griffith wondered if God would “grant her the favour of closing
her ears so that in the hour of agony she will not be troubled by the groaning of the
Philippines, but to invoke the devastation wrought by British imperialism. The United Irishman held out
hope that if Bryan were to win the upcoming election, his first duty will be to aid President Kruger by
demanding the preservation of the Independence of the Boer Republics.” “The Boer Peace Delegates,”
United Irishman, 17 July 1900.
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sufferers?”501 In terms of official response to the editorial, it certainly did not help
Griffith’s case that this was the second United Irishman attack on the monarch within a
six-month period, as the paper had vilified the Queen on the occasion of her visit to
Dublin in April.502 On that occasion, Dublin Castle ordered a raid of the paper’s offices
and all issues were confiscated and Griffith had informed his readers, with a wink,
“Private visits have become quite the thing of late.”503
In India, however, the Madras-based Jámi-ul-Ulúm was surprised to learn that
Griffith had merely been sentenced to pay a fine of ten shillings, or serve fourteen days in
prison. The Indian paper expressed its wonderment, exclaiming, “Such is the treatment
accorded to the Irish, who are (always) in open rebellion.”504 The Jámi-ul-Ulúm
contrasted Griffith’s sentence with the eighteen months imprisonment meted out to Tilak
in 1897, as well as a similar prison sentence handed down to the editors of the Jámi-ulUlúm and a life sentence being served by the editor of the Pratod, “because he expressed
his preference for the Government in Canada to that in India.”505 This disparate
treatment of the Irish and Indian editors was but one instance of the British Government
establishing a troubling double standard in how it dealt with criticism emanating from
Ireland and the subcontinent. As with the Government’s refusal to deploy Indian troops
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to South Africa, the Indian press was dismayed that Indian loyalty should be repaid with
such obvious disdain.
The Jámi-ul-Ulúm would have been pleased to learn that the British Government
continued to target Griffith throughout the summer, convinced the editor was publishing
articles designed to incite rebellion by Irish soldiers deployed alongside British troops in
the Boer War. 506 A brief glimpse of an advance copy of the issue of 1 September was
enough to propel Dublin Castle into action. “One of the definitions of sedition is ‘to
bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign,’” roared the Chief Secretary, adding, “I
cannot conceive any writing more seditious than the article referred to in margin.”507
Deeming the article “a bad case,” the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, George Henry Cadogan,
not only issued a warrant demanding that the paper halt publication for six months, but
also ordered that the Under-Secretary for Ireland, Sir David Harrel confiscate every
available copy of the offending issue of 1 September 1900.508 Officials not only seized
every copy in Dublin, but also those in every major Irish population center, including
newspapers in counties Kerry, Clare, Galway and Mayo, as well as 150 copies in Belfast
and fifty-seven in Londonderry—an indication of the widespread circulation of the
United Irishman beyond the capital. The pattern of surveillance, seizure, stoppage, and
suppression would reoccur throughout the seven-year life of the United Irishman.
Warrants to “open and detain” all copies of the paper for a period of six months were
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issued on almost a semi-annual basis from September of 1900 until the summer of 1906,
appearing first under the signature of Under-Secretary Sir David Harrel and then signed
by his successor, Sir Antony MacDonnell.
Arthur Griffith pulled no punches in relating the events surrounding the latest
seizure of his publication, announcing, “Last week, for the third time, the ignoble head of
a dishonoured family ordered his pimps and uniformed thieves to steal the issue of the
United Irishman.”509 The United Irishman revealed that the issue in question had
actually been on sale for two days before Dublin Castle sent officials to suppress it, and
thus “there were few issues left in the newsagents’ shops.”510 The editor crowed with
pride, “In the Irish press there is but one voice the cowardly governors of our country
fear, and that voice is ours.”511 Behind closed doors, officials were compelled to
acknowledge the power of Griffith and the advanced-nationalist press to turn public
opinion against the British Government.
Deliberately highlighting the division within nationalist ranks, Griffith blasted the
Irish Parliamentary Party for not coming to the paper’s defense in Westminster, and
uttered not only a rebuke of the Government’s actions, but also a ringing manifesto of the
United Irishman’s mission. Proclaimed the editor, “We came into being for the sole
purpose of aiding in the destruction of the Empire whose soldiers are today firing the
homes of the farmers of the Transvaal and corralling the Hindus that they may perish of
hunger the faster. Possibly we may destroy it, or possibly it may destroy us, but
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assuredly it may not intimidate us.”512 Once again, Griffith connected Ireland’s
beleaguered status to that of the Boers in South Africa, and, perhaps as significantly,
forged one more link between Irish and Indian subjects of the Empire. With an innate
understanding that the Boer War would ultimately be won by the British, Griffith was
seeking another example of British oppression that he could present to the readers of the
United Irishman.513
Whereas Arthur Griffith was certainly the primary instigator of the Irish pro-Boer
movement, and the advanced-nationalist United Irishman the most aggressive in its antiBritish stance, the paper was by no means the only Irish paper to mount a sustained
campaign of criticism directed at British conduct of the war in South Africa. Taking
stock of the conflict at year’s end, the nationalist Freeman’s Journal made no attempt to
disguise its disapproval of the manner in which Britain had conducted the war in South
Africa.514 The paper ridiculed Britain’s multitude of setbacks in the war as the
“succession of ‘temporary’ ‘checks,’ ‘incidents,’ and ‘mishaps’ to which the Boers have
subjected the toy soldiers who contemplated a picnic to Pretoria, with the Transvaal
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mines in the background.”515 Indicative of the close relationship it maintained with
Michael Davitt, the Weekly Freeman proudly printed in its pages “The Boer Story of the
War,” Davitt’s decidedly pro-Boer analysis of the conflict. Included in every issue of the
Freeman’s Journal for a period of months was an “Important Announcement” alerting its
readers about what it was calling the “Publication of the Year.”516
Unlike the advanced-nationalist press based in Dublin, the regional papers
initially adhered to the optimistic line offered by the British Government, assuring its
readers that despite the renewal of hostilities, the Boers could not sustain their resistance
and the war would soon be over. As casualties mounted, however, evidence of concern
began creeping into the coverage of the war, and the regional press joined those
struggling to make sense of contradictory press releases. Thus, in quick succession, the
Nenagh News suggested that the British losses contradicted any hope of a speedy
termination to the war, the Connaught Telegraph maintained “Brave Boers Still Firm,”
and the Southern Star declared, “Boers Will Fight to the Death”—even as the Kildare
Observer reported that the Boers were short of ammunition, and the Nenagh Guardian
related the news that the Boers “have not only lost all hope of success, but are fighting
among themselves.”517 In their slower move to condemn the British, the regional papers
more closely resembled the Indian native press than the aggressive advanced-nationalist
press based in Dublin, who insistently pressed for full Irish independence.
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As with the native Indian papers, the turning point for many journalists in the
regional press was Britain’s adoption of its brutal new tactics of intimidation, and the
ensuing tales of war atrocities perpetrated by imperial forces. By the opening days of
1901, the Anglo-Celt of County Cavan was proclaiming that a “savage order of
extermination” had been issued by Lord Kitchener, the Butcher of Khartoum, and
declaring, “Many who sighed for the establishment of British supremacy in the Transvaal
would now be very glad to get back to the Boer regime.”518 The cost of the ongoing war
to the Irish taxpayer preoccupied the Meath Chronicle, which avowed, “Not even the
Jingoes can be satisfied with such disastrous results of their policy,” and the Southern
Star was forced to conclude, “Though the war in South Africa is still continued with all
the severity and cruelty that has been exhibited by the English Government since the
commencement of hostilities, we find no indications leading to the conclusion that it is
yet drawing to a close.”519 Ultimately, it was Britain’s resort to harsh measures that
tipped the opinion of Ireland’s provincial papers against the Empire.
The Boer War provided the Irish nationalist press with tangible examples of what
it characterized as egregious imperial overreach, with the implication being that Britain’s
aggressive actions in the Transvaal were identical to its treatment of the Irish. In a
scathing indictment of British expansionism, Arthur Griffith compared the land grab and
subsequent slaughter of Boers in the Transvaal to a cowardly murder committed by a man
who lusted after the property of his neighbor and “battered his brains out.”520 The editor
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was insistent that proselytes should abandon their support of British Imperialism for two
critical reasons. “The first is an Irish reason—it is robbery plus murder,” charged
Griffith, adding, “The second is an English one—it won’t pay. . . The experiment of
trying to coin dividends out of Boer blood ruined it.”521 At every instance, Griffith used
the South African war to sound the death knell of British Imperialism.
As more evidence surfaced of Britain’s resort to increasingly ruthless tactics, the
advanced-nationalist press issued its most resounding denunciation of the British cause.
Editorials in the Freeman’s Journal heightened in intensity of feeling with each new
revelation of British military policy. “With a full sense of our responsibility as
journalists,” the Freeman’s Journal made public Kitchener’s orders to give no quarter to
Boer prisoners, characterizing the policy as “the suspension of civilised warfare in the . . .
campaign against the bravest and most honourable soldiery that ever stood up to defend
the liberty of a nation.”522 Noting that the Daily Telegraph and the Standard had called
for the “cold blooded murder of prisoners,” the paper accused the military of capitulating
to the demands “urged months ago by the Jingo Press in its feeble and cowardly rage.”523
The Freeman’s Journal labeled the conflict “a war not for freedom but for gold,” and
blasted a Government which seemed more concerned about an imminent attack on the
mines than it did about the loss of thousands of Irish and Scottish soldiers, which it bore
“with philosophic resignation.”524 Reporting on Irish Parliamentarian John Dillon’s
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“scathing indictment of British savagery in South Africa,” during the previous evening’s
session in Westminster, the Freeman’s Journal, the Party’s official organ, praised the
performance of Dillon, who “thrust aside the screen of official falsehood and subterfuge
with which it was sought to hide their naked atrocity from the gaze of a horrified
public.”525 Appalled by news of British internment of women and children, the paper
departed from its previously more measured criticism and launched its most ferocious
attack on the Empire—aligning the Freeman’s Journal, at least temporarily—with the
criticisms offered by the advanced-nationalist press.
By the summer of 1901, even much of the regional press had abandoned their
blind acceptance of British war releases. The Southern Star was ridiculing the work of
the paid military censor who made a practice of depicting the Boers in the worst possible
light and, “who carefully edits every page of manuscript until he satisfies himself that the
blundering of the Generals is carefully concealed.”526 Headlines such as the Anglo-Celt’s
“The Truth Leaks Out” and the Connaught Telegraph’s “The War that is (not) Over”
were designed to inform readers that the British were not to be trusted, and that the truth
could only be found in the columns of the nationalist-leaning Irish press.527 The reality,
however, of just how far the regional press had distanced itself from the British
Government became clear only when word of British military atrocities broke through the
censors’ barriers. In response to Lord Chamberlain’s proclamation that “No war in the
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history of the world has ever been conducted with greater humanity,” the Southern Star
righteously demanded, “In heaven’s name, what are the Colonial Secretary’s ideas of
humanity? Murder, pillage, loot, fire, confiscation, and outrage, and all the unspeakable
horrors of a ferocious soldiery—are these Mr. Chamberlain’s principles of humanity, for
these constitute the policy of the war.”528 The Government had grown accustomed to
unpatriotic outbursts from the United Irishman and Freeman’s Journal in Dublin, but it
did not expect such a wholesale rejection of its war policy from West Cork.
Indeed, as details of conditions in the concentration camps began to surface, the
sad truth of the situation did far more damage to Britain’s liberal image than any
fabrication the advanced-nationalist press could have invented.

At the same time that

the Government was extolling the sanitary conditions in which the families dwelled, the
United Irishman was informing its readers that “the water of the Modder River full of
typhic germs has been served to the Boer families in the camps of concentration” and that
only one doctor was present in the camp at Johannesburg, “though epics of measles and
typhus have swept whole families.”529 It did not help the British cause that officials were
desperately attempting to put a positive spin on such cavalier treatment of women and
children.
In November, the issue of race once again intruded into coverage of the war. The
United Irishman furnished its readers with official Government figures on the
concentration camps as of September, which reported the deaths of more than 2400 white
internees. The British Government did not furnish figures for the deaths of non-whites,
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and, significantly, the Irish advanced-nationalist press did not seem to notice the
omission—demonstrating the fears of the Indian native press that white men only cared
about the lives and deaths of other whites. The United Irishman predictably condemned
the British Government for the policy, but it also indicted the British people, whose
failure to protest indicated to the paper their tacit approval. “They are not shocked at it,
they are doing nothing to prevent it,” stated the United Irishman.530
Claiming the camps were an act of war, the paper charged, “The English people
are literally making war upon women and children wholesale.” In a more unexpected
move, however, the United Irishman also accused the Irish, themselves, of complicity,
arguing that Irish soldiers were engaged in fighting in South Africa, Irish money was
helping to fund the war, and the Irish people remained silent on the subject of the camps.
In one of its more fascinating accusations, the article found Irish newspapers culpable of
being “more anxious to score against English politicians than to preserve our National
honour.”531 Given that the advanced-nationalist press previously had been going to great
lengths to illustrate that the British and the Irish were not cut from the same moral cloth,
this seemed a rather damning admission. Within a week, however, the paper had
returned to form, blaming the British alone for the horrors in the camps, and printing a
poem entitled “Kitchener,” in which the opening salvo read:
“Hail, conqueror of babies
Thou Kitchener of a king.”532
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Both the Freeman’s Journal and the United Irishman continued to harp on the
lack of trustworthy news emanating from official sources. “Owing to the obvious falsity
of most of the news that is now allowed to come through from the seat of war in South
Africa, and the deliberate inadequacy of Lord Kitchener’s official despatches,” claimed
the Freeman’s Journal, “it is almost impossible to gather anything like a clear idea of
what is going on in the Republics.”533 Unable to obtain from British sources what it
considered reliable news, the United Irishman regularly poached articles from other
European organs, and sought out firsthand reports from Europeans on the ground in
South Africa. Notably, the paper reprinted a letter from a Frenchman in Pretoria, who
provided evidence of farm-burnings, as well as the “inhuman and unchristian treatment”
meted out to women and children in the concentration camps.534 The letter estimated that
one half of the children in the camps perished, and that “six hundred and forty-one
children out of every thousand perish monthly.”535 The death of these innocents outraged
world opinion and did more to incur anti-British sentiment than any other event in the
war As such, it provided Indian and Irish nationalist journalists with the most damning
and potent ammunition to date.
By the autumn of 1901, the Freeman’s Journal had figuratively thrown up its
hands, seemingly unable to convey to its readers the full scope of the war’s horror: “In
Lord Tennyson poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade.” Among many other indignities visited on the
classic poem, the writer amended the line “Into the valley of death rode the six hundred” to read ““Into the
valley of cows rode the six hundred” and altered “Cannon to right of them / Cannon to left of them” to read
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good truth, the elements of farce and tragedy are so blended in this preposterous war that
one hardly knows whether to laugh or cry over it. It is advancing backwards.”536 The
paper despaired, wondering if Britain would ever stumble upon an efficient tactic for
bringing the war to a satisfactory close. “Arson won’t end the war, nor murder, nor
wholesale infanticide, nor warlike proclamations. What else is left?”537 By enumerating
the dishonorable strategies allegedly undertaken by the British, the paper once again
made clear to its readers that the Empire had relinquished the moral high ground to which
it had long laid claim. Left unspoken was the implication that Ireland needed to distance
itself from any nation that chose to engage in such heavy-handed conduct against a
people who were desperately fighting for their homeland.
Like Irish parliamentarian John Redmond, the Freeman’s Journal refuted the
charges leveled by Englishmen that Ireland sympathized with the Boers purely out of
hatred for all things British. “There may be something in that, here and there,” conceded
the paper, before proclaiming, “we are on the side of the Boers, not because we hate or
dislike England, but because we are profoundly convinced that the Boer cause is a just
one.”538 To bolster its position, the advanced-nationalist press took pains to illustrate to
their readers that the European Powers were demonstrably in agreement with Ireland’s
view of the Boers and the British. Even the Freeman’s Journal noted that Frankfurt-onMain was but the latest German city to record its disapproval of the Boer War, hosting a
protest meeting attended by thousands. Given the growing rivalry between Germany and
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Britain, Irish nationalists took a special delight in regaling their readers with German
criticism of the Empire. The paper shared the details of the assembly, including the fact
that the guest speaker was none other than the nephew of the Boer General Christian de
Wet.539 The United Irishman informed its audience that the annual celebration of Bastille
Day “was made the occasion for a magnificent pro-Boer and anti-English
demonstration.” 540 The paper characterized Britain as “the most deadly enemy of
France, as well as of liberty,” implying that Britain’s actions had left it isolated, and that
it was properly reviled by all right-thinking nations and peoples as the enemy of freedom.
Two months later, the United Irishman gleefully shared La Patrie’s estimation of new
British military tactics. The French paper denounced Britain’s new strategy, saying,
“their new plan surpasses its predecessors in ignorance of military tactics and (if the word
is not too strong) in insanity.”541 These critiques of British tactics bolstered the Irish
depiction of imperial conduct as so aberrant it had alienated the other European powers.
Yet, even as Britain’s scorched earth policy was taking its toll in the Transvaal,
and thousands of women and children were perishing in the concentration camps, it is
clear that many in the Irish press had begun to turn their attention away from Britain’s
martial adventures in South Africa, and toward a fuller discussion of the path to Irish
independence. The war had served the advanced-nationalist press admirably, enabling it
to offer endless incentives to its readership to move out from under British stewardship
and stake a claim to Irish self-reliance. Indeed, James Connolly, writer for the socialist
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Workers’ Republic, was silent on the issue of the Boer War throughout its final years,
instead focusing on improving the lot of Ireland’s workers and reserving his scorn not for
the military, but for capitalists. In September of 1900, Arthur Griffith had advised his
readers of a new organization, Cumann na nGaedheal—the Society of Gaels—which the
editor had founded in an effort to establish common cause between the disparate
nationalist groups in Ireland. Articles on the Irish language, Irish education, Irish music,
Irish literature, and Irish industries began to displace the heretofore rabid coverage of the
war in the Transvaal. In the United Irishman, caustic reporting on the conflict was now
more often than not relegated to a few paragraphs under “Foreign Notes,” while a regular
column on “The National Movement” was instituted, and the paper now made a practice
of printing at least one article wholly in Irish. Once obsessed by Britain’s misadventures
overseas and doing further damage to the Empire’s already vulnerable reputation, the
advanced-nationalist press now began to turn inward—focusing its attention on the
domestic programs that it hoped would prove Ireland’s ability to stand alone.
The press, however, also fully understood that it would be some time before
Ireland could effect a break from the Empire, and journalists intended to use the
remaining time to their advantage. As the war entered its final months, the Irish
nationalist press could not resist a few well-timed parting shots, returning once more to
their disparagement of the British prosecution of the war. “The debate which took place
last evening in the House of Commons on the war,” proclaimed the Freeman’s Journal,
“showed that the Government is determined to continue both the cruelty and stupidity of
its policy and that the Liberal opposition is afraid to challenge it.”542 Echoing the rhetoric
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of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the paper staked out its most intransigent position to
date, declaring, “Certainly, it is impossible now to conceive that Ireland could, under any
circumstances, or for any consideration, give one ounce of her political influence,
whatever it may be worth, in favour of the prosecution of a war which to the majority of
the people seems to be the most cruel, wanton, unjustifiable attack by a great Empire on a
free little nation the world in modern times has ever witnessed.”543 The war in South
Africa had transformed the rhetoric of the Freeman’s Journal, until it now sounded as
unforgiving and uncompromising as the criticism emanating from the pen of Arthur
Griffith or James Connolly.
Despite its disingenuous protestation that it did not harbor scorn for all things
British, the Freeman’s Journal clearly took pleasure in ridiculing the performance of the
British army. In its post mortem on the war, the paper lauded the tactics of the Boer
scouts, “who were so well posted that if a British column or convoy moved from any
point, all the commandoes within seventy miles knew it the same day.” 544 Contrasting
Boer strategy with the ineptitude of British generals, the Freeman’s Journal commented
wryly, “What a happy thing it would be for the British war office if it could get some of
the Boer leaders to teach it how to organize an intelligence department.”545 The paper
was particularly waggish in noting that whereas the House of Commons had declared that
less than 10,000 Boers remained in the field at the end of the war, over 16,000 had
already come in. The paper could not resist one more jibe at the expense of the British:
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“The War Office was in the dark when it began the war, and it was in the dark when it
finished it.546 The United Irishman greeted the end of the war with its own artful
repudiation of the British Empire. Rather than congratulate Britain on a victory, the
paper referred to the outcome of the conflict as a “temporary escape from annihilation as
an Imperial power at the hands of . . . ‘Peasant Republicans.’”547 The United Irishman
cheerfully predicted the demise of the British Empire, citing its “worship of luxury,”
“dislike and inability to face facts,” and “hysteria” as three irrefutable and historically
accepted signs that it was headed for a downfall.548 As ever, there was no attempt to
disguise the fact Griffith and his fellow advanced-nationalists were implacable foes of
Britain and the Empire.
The three-year Boer war did not materially change the attitudes or the opinions of
the Irish advanced-nationalist press. Irish opinion was firmly pro-Boer and against
Britain long before the war began. The war was simply the most readily available means
of harassing and haranguing Britain at that moment in time. Thus, journalists across the
full spectrum of Irish nationalism used the war to focus attention on what they perceived
as the inequities and iniquities of the British Empire. By portraying the Boers as
oppressed freedom fighters desperately attempting to defend their homeland, the United
Irishman, Freeman’s Journal, Leader, Worker’s Republic and other nationalist organs
underscored the link between Ireland and the Transvaal, and transformed the Boer
struggle into an Irish cause. The fact that Britain’s prosecution of the war earned it the
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disapproval of the other European Powers and precipitated a vertiginous drop in the
country’s prestige was a felicitous outcome. Given Britain’s eroded standing at war’s
end, the Irish advanced-nationalist press was reinvigorated, knowing that Britain’s
treatment of the Boers would focus new attention on Britain’s relations with Ireland.
Most importantly, the war gave impetus to the burgeoning nationalist movement, as the
press characterized Britain’s prosecution of the war as driven by greed and self-interest—
leaving readers with the unshakeable impression that Britain would never do for Ireland
what Ireland could do for itself.
The native press in India and the advanced-nationalist press in Ireland initially
approached the Boer War from different perspectives and with different objectives—
criteria which dictated the form and content of their coverage. Throughout the protracted
war in South Africa, the relentless barrage of scorn and disdain directed from Irish editors
at Britain and the Empire became de rigueur—a three-year onslaught that was wholly
unsurprising in both its content and embittered tone. By the end of the first month of
hostilities, journalists had established their modus operandi: attack, reload, and fire again
with unflinching commentary. Thus, when the papers attempted to draw attention to the
real horrors of Britain’s scorched earth policy and the implementation of internment
camps, there was no discernible difference in the level of dramatics.
Yet, if Arthur Griffith and his fellow advanced-nationalists chose to sing their
anti-Imperialist rhetoric at full volume, the criticism of Tilak and the Indian native press
had been offered sotto voce during the first phase of the war, making its subsequent rise
to a full-throated crescendo startling in both its volume and intensity. The war afforded
the Indian press an opportunity to air the long-held resentment felt by much of the
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subcontinent—the uneasy sense that India’s problems would never ascend to a place of
prominence on the Empire’s agenda. The Irish advanced-nationalist press was heartily
proactive in its approach to the war. Journalists in Ireland deliberately, knowingly used
the conflict to give impetus to a nationalist movement. By contrast, the Indian native
press was reactive. Whereas it certainly harbored nationalist ambitions before the war, it
would not have acted on them as doggedly, were it not for the crisis in the Transvaal that
placed in stark relief the subservient relationship of India to the Empire.
If the goal of the press in both countries was not only to reach the masses, but also
to persuade them to embrace the nationalist movement, the Boer War provided journalists
with a seemingly unending supply of imperialist arrogance, swagger, and callous
disregard for Britain’s subjects. The British Government had sought to seize the gold
mines in the Transvaal. Instead, the Indian and Irish nationalist press mined the war for
evidence of avarice and tyranny, painting a portrait of imperial hubris that would prove
indelible and enduring. The press had focused on the horrors of an external conflict to
grab the attention of its audience. The time had now come to turn inward, to hold the
mirror up to readers, and convince them that the resources existed within their own
borders to solve their most pressing national problems. The state of dependency on the
imperial monolith must end. The era of self-reliance was about to begin—and it was the
nationalist press that would ensure that the watchwords of this new age would not be
subjugation and submission, but Swadeshi and Sinn Féin.
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The torpedoes sliced through the water at midnight, striking the Poltava, the
Askold, and crippling two pre-dreadnought battleships outside the bay of Port Arthur.549
The Japanese fleet sailed on, launching its next strike at noon, engaging a Russian enemy
that began the day disorganized and ended demoralized, after less than sixty minutes of
fighting. There had been no warning, no declaration of war. The opening salvos of the
Russo-Japanese War set the Russians back on their heels—a position from which they
never recovered. “Everything went off as planned,” cabled Admiral Togo.550 The
telegram was meant for Japanese eyes only, but news of the humiliating Russian defeat
swept rapidly across Asia and Europe, unsettling Western governments, even as it
exhilarated Asian observers. While European nations had been busily building their
empires, cementing alliances, and eyeing each other with increasing suspicion, a small
Asian nation had been stealing a march on the Russian bear.
In Ireland and India, nationalist journalists watched in fascination, as Britain and
its continental allies promptly took sides, all the while loudly proclaiming their neutrality.
The Russo-Japanese War was the third imperial conflict of the new century, coming on
the heels of the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War. Those conflicts had proven not
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merely instrumental in advancing the Irish and Indian nationalist agendas: they were
essential to the process. Using Britain’s conduct of the wars as material evidence, the
nationalist press in India and Ireland, and, in particular, the Irish advanced-nationalist
press sought to illustrate the arrogance of the British Empire as it zealously pursued its
expansionist agenda. By underscoring the exploitation of manpower and natural
resources and emphasizing what it perceived as the callous disregard of public opinion in
Ireland and India, nationalist journalists hoped to establish the necessity of selfgovernment and self-reliance. Thus, Britain’s imperial wars played an active role in
laying the groundwork for the Indian Swadeshi movement and Irish Sinn Féin policy. In
turn, these campaigns of self-reliance would deepen and entrench attitudes toward the
British Empire that would evince themselves at the outset of World War I. In both cases,
it was the nationalist press in Ireland and India that shaped and formed the debate. Not
only did the newspapers aggressively disseminate knowledge of the movements and
promote the platforms of Sinn Féin and Swadeshi, but in at least one case—that of Arthur
Griffith—an editor was solely responsible for devising the basic tenets of the program.
No amount of public speeches could have transmitted word to the masses of the new
movements with the same rapidity as the press.
Although the time was fast approaching when nationalist journalists would turn
their attention to the construction of domestic programs, they would continue to remain
vigilant about reporting any international developments that could lend weight to the
nationalist cause. Coverage of Britain’s interaction with the Boxers and the Boers had
served to convince readers that the hopes and desires of subjects in Ireland and India
were of secondary interest to the imperial policy-makers residing in London, Dublin
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Castle, and Calcutta.551 Thus, any aspirations to nationhood would reach fruition only
through the efforts of Irish and Indian subjects, themselves. Accordingly, the years
between the end of the Boer War and the outbreak of World War I prompted nationalists
in both countries to search for ways in which to invigorate a nationalist movement which
had been proceeding only in fits and starts.

War in the East
Whereas the years immediately following the close of the Boer War brought a
period of relative peace for the British Empire—with no major deployment of military
forces—the opening decade of the twentieth century witnessed several key seismic events
capable of altering the imperial landscape. Looking for issues that would support their
own agendas, the nationalist press in Ireland and India directed their critical gaze at
political hotspots around the world. Although Britain managed to remain free of any
significant foreign entanglements, this did not stop the nationalist press from linking
global events in Asia, Africa, and continental Europe to the political and military policies
of the British Empire. Nationalist editors were determined to exploit to their advantage
any foreign events which could place Britain in an unflattering light.
Accordingly, the timely onset of the Russo-Japanese War afforded journalists
ample opportunity to hone their anti-imperialist rhetoric. In 1904, Russia’s imperial
designs on Korea and Manchuria had provoked an angry response from Japan. An
overconfident Russia adopted a hard line during negotiations—convinced its military
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could easily overpower any Japanese resistance. Reacting to Russian intransigence,
Japanese forces launched their surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and
proceeded to stun not only the Russians, but also all of Europe and Asia, with their
discipline and efficiency. Within a year, resounding victories by Japanese ground and
naval forces would prompt the intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt. The
outcome not only delivered a crushing blow to Russia, but also provided a solid
foundation for the beginning of Japan’s own empire. Just as the Boers’ victories at the
onset of the South African War had shaken Britain’s confidence in its military might, so
too the successful Japanese assault would wreak havoc with accepted international
hierarchy. No longer would assumptions of Western superiority be a foregone
conclusion.
If Irish and Indian coverage of imperial wars in Asia and Africa had already
revealed critical differences in their attitudes toward the British Empire, the RussoJapanese War would produce an unprecedented polarization between the advancednationalist press in Ireland and the nationalist press on the subcontinent. Britain, while
proclaiming its neutrality, had voiced its distrust of Russia. That suspicion was enough to
determine Ireland’s pro-Russian position for the course of the war. “Now, it is our
interest to see England’s downfall,” proclaimed the United Irishman, and our concern to
extricate ourselves from her ruin.”552 The paper reveled in the notion that Irish
nationalists had it within their power, referring to England, “to foil her designs and
frustrate her schemes, of regaining her world influence.”553 Even without the direct
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involvement of Britain in the hostilities, the advanced-nationalist Irish journalists were
determined to ensure that the conflict reflected poorly on the British Empire.
Yet there was a realization that the people of Ireland might not take an active
interest in a conflict between Russia and Japan. “Blinded by the narrowness of our
political training,” queried the United Irishman, “how little beyond curiosity and
speculation do the events of the present moment in the Far East excite in Ireland?”554
The paper attempted to lay out a rationale for Ireland to follow events half way around
the world. Although acknowledging how tempting it was to despise the Japanese for
what the paper referred to as arrogance, the United Irishman urged its readers to
remember that Japan was “but the catspaw of the moment of circumstances, and that
these circumstances are the insidious creation of England and England in America.”555
Indeed, the Southern Star went so far as to laud the Japanese people, asserting that their
advancement “in the paths of civilsation, power and progress has been one of the most
wonderful developments in National growth which the past century has witnessed.”556
According to the paper, Japan’s meteoric rise took on even more historical significance,
given that only a few years previously, it was only an “obscure island in the Far East,
inhabited by a small race of Yellow People.”557 Such characterization of the Japanese
people recalled earlier Irish denigration of the Chinese people as embodying “The Yellow
Peril” and demonstrated the racism that still permeated the Irish nationalist press.
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By comparison to the Boer War, in which the combatants had all been white and
Christian—and Irish soldiers had played an integral role—convincing the reader of the
import of the Russo-Japanese conflict was destined to be a hard sell, and one which
would be difficult to sustain. For much of the war, coverage reverted to the Irish press
model created during the Boxer Rebellion, with many papers simply reprinting whatever
news the cable services had assembled. There were occasional attempts to cover the war
from a unique angle, with the Donegal News offering a primer in Japanese pronunciation,
entitled “Geographical Jawbreakers,” while the Freeman’s Journal helpfully promoted a
new article in Scribner’s Magazine which promised to provide a portrait of the war from
the Russian side.558 This publication, the paper seemed to suggest, was a matter of great
import, given that “most of the accounts dialed up for ‘British’ consumption are distinctly
from the Jap side.”559 In addition to indicting the British press for printing only that
information which favored the Japanese cause, the use of the pejorative “Jap” left the
reader in no doubt as to the Freeman’s Journal’s support for the Russian effort.
Equally as important as the pursuit of nationalist goals within Ireland during this
period was the spread of Irish nationalism beyond the country’s borders. By the turn of
the century, the impact of the Irish advanced-nationalist press—and, in particular,
Griffith’s brand of journalism—was being felt not only within Ireland, itself, but also on
the far off shores of America, where so many Irish men, women, and children had
emigrated in their flight from the Great Famine (1845-1850). Not all Irish expatriates
living in the United States, however, had been chased from Ireland’s shores by the
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devastating potato blight. Fiery Irish nationalist John Devoy had been exiled to America,
after serving five years of a fifteen-year sentence for treason for his part in an 1866
Fenian uprising. In 1903, Devoy founded the New York-based Gaelic-American, whose
banner proudly blazoned, “A Journal Devoted to the Cause of Irish Independence, Irish
Literature, and the Interest of the Irish Race.” From the outset, the Gaelic-American bore
the imprint of Irish advanced-nationalism, its outraged output mimicking that of its
Dublin counterparts in terms both of content and tone. Unlike its Dublin-based source of
inspiration, the United Irishman, however, the Gaelic-American splashed coverage of the
Russo-Japanese war on its front page for the duration of the conflict. In addition to
accusing the British press of misleading its readers, Devoy’s journal indicted the
Japanese for “using the tactics of the burglar or the highway robber” in attacking the
Russian fleet without an official declaration of war.560 No sooner had those first shots
been fired in the conflict than the paper revealed its anti-British, pro-Russian proclivities.
Specifically, Devoy was convinced that Secretary of State John Hay was taking
marching orders from the British Government, and the editor looked to Irish-Americans
to quash a proposed alliance between America and Britain. Devoy informed his readers
that in the matter of the Russo-Japanese War, “our present Anglophile administration
under directions from Downing Street is entirely in accord with Japan.”561 Peppering its
editorials with one of Griffith’s pet phrases, the Gaelic-American asserted that the
American people had been “humbugged” by what it characterized as the “flood of
falsehood,” in an effort to paint Russia in the blackest shade of villainy, while
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simultaneously “cultivating sympathy with and admiration for Japan.”562 Like Griffith,
Devoy’s real purpose in defending Russia had less to do with the war and everything to
do with irritating the British by maligning their ally in the conflict.
If there remained any doubt that Devoy’s Gaelic-American was marching in
lockstep with Irish advanced-nationalist papers, the rampant anti-Semitism on view in its
coverage of the Russo-Japanese War made the connection unmistakable. In the issue of
14 May, an article entitled “The Jap and the Jew” offered a foray into murky racial theory
that revealed more about the writer than the subject.563 “Both have in their veins, as
illustrated by anthropological research and psychological comparison, the same blood,”
asserted the author.564 The article offered helpful insights, stating that both the Jap and
the Jew were not only “capable of violent emotion and fervor,” but also “capable of
intense fatalism, born in the case of the Jap by a nature naturally cruel and immune to
suffering and due in the Jew to a recognition of his lack of physical courage.”565
The paper assailed the Japanese for reported atrocities, but assiduously refused to
blame the Russian government for reported assaults on Jewish subjects, insisting that
Jewish antipathy to Russia was “merely a matter of an excited imagination and racial
prejudice.”566 The writer concluded, “What Russia does to a Jew within her domains is
of no more importance to a brother Jew in America than it is to any other American
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citizen. At least it should not be.”567 The Gaelic-American’s virulent anti-Semitism and
pro-Russian coverage of the Russo-Japanese War mimicked the reporting of the conflict
in the United Irishman, providing tangible proof that the ideas of Griffith and his fellow
anti-imperialists were taking hold among Irish nationalists worldwide. Devoy’s paper not
only ensconced itself firmly in Russia’s corner, but also railed against the possibility of
an Anglo-American alliance, warning its readers that America suffered by its association
with the British Empire.
While the nationalist press in Ireland and Irish-America offered unflagging
support of Russia, purely on the grounds of their pronounced disloyalty to the Empire, by
contrast, Indian journalists appeared to fall in line and follow the lead of the Empire. The
nationalist press in India spoke out fervently in support of Japan, on the surface appearing
to hew to the company line. Evidence reveals, however, that Indian motives for backing
the efforts of the Japanese had less to do with unquestioning loyalty and more to do with
serving their own interests. If the bloody conflict in South Africa had indicated that a
determined people could make life exceedingly difficult for the British forces, Indian
papers now pointed to the Russo-Japanese War as a tangible demonstration of Asian
superiority over the white man. M.A. Baig, a translator employed by the Government of
India, noted in his annual report, ”The sympathy of the entire Native Press was on the
side of Japan,” with word of each new Japanese victory “hailed with unbounded
jubilation.”568 Baig cited five reasons for India’s prejudice in favor of Japan, including
the belief that Japan was fighting in a just cause in the defense of its independence;
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religious “affinities” between Indians and their Asian brethren; charitable donations from
Japan during the famine of 1900; and the belief that Russia’s setbacks would prevent any
Russian incursion into India.
The last and perhaps most significant rationale Baig offered for India’s
sympathies was a native conviction that the all-encompassing nature of Japan’s success at
war and at home “had in some measure revolutionized the attitudes of the European mind
towards the capabilities of Asiatic races to work out their own salvation.”569 As if to
underscore Baig’s theory, Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s Marathi-language paper, the Kesari,
pronounced properly-equipped Asian forces “more than a match for any European army,”
and foresaw “nothing inherently improbable in the Asiatic nations becoming independent
and taking rank with their European rivals.”570 Not content to cheer from the sidelines,
Tilak’s paper lobbied the Native Princes to outfit a much-needed hospital ship for the
Japanese. Moreover, the paper launched a charity drive in the Deccan, collecting
donations one rupee at a time, and ultimately sending four installments of 500 rupees to
the Yokahama Specie Bank in aid of impoverished Japanese soldiers.571 Tilak looked to
the example of Japan as a template for India’s development as an independent nation.
There was, in his writing, a strong core of Asian nationalism that looked for a profound
significance in the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. The victory was important not
only for what it revealed about Japanese military strength, but also for what it announced
to the world about the strength of the Asian character. Moreover, Tilak was undoubtedly
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peering into the future—anticipating a time when India’s political and commercial
alliances lay with her Asian partners and not with the Raj.
Britain would have been wise to have taken note of the pan-Asian sentiment that
the native press had earlier expressed during the Boxer Rebellion. Then, journalists had
almost wistfully expressed admiration for the peasant farmers and their cause. The
Chinese rebels, however, were victims, and despite their efforts to eliminate the Christian
missionaries and oust the occupiers from their country, they could, in the end, function as
little more than a symbol of Asian despair at Western oppression. The rise of the
Japanese provided a dramatically different storyline, representing the first Asian nation to
challenge and defeat a European empire. These were not peasant farmers on a mission
whose failure was preordained; these were trained, disciplined warriors. As such, they
represented the hope for the emergence of a new Asian empire that would elevate the
status of all Asians, end the colonial status of millions, and usher in an era of
independence from the Western yoke.
The Indian native press was thus decidedly vocal in in its expression of sympathy
and support for the Japanese cause. “The Indians love the Japanese as their own kith and
kin,” gushed the Deshabhakta, demonstrating the surge of pan-Asian sentiment so
prevalent on the subcontinent.572 Reminding their readers of Japanese assistance during
the Indian famine, Tilak and his fellow editors exhorted their readers to reciprocate the
kindness and contribute to the Japanese cause, not merely in terms of monetary donations
and medical supplies, but also with the offer of Indian troops.573 Noting that all of this
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support ran counter to Britain’s demand that India remain neutral in the conflict, the
sharp-tongued Kál commented, “All that we are required to do under their rule is to pay
taxes to British officers and to be ready to starve at the approach of famine.”574 Having
criticized imperial policy for the manner in which it had conducted the wars in China and
South Africa, the paper now used the Russo-Japanese conflict as a vehicle to lash out at
Britain for her passive neglect of India.
Indian nationalist journalists saw in Japan’s ascendancy a shift in the dynamics
between Asia and Europe. Even before hostilities commenced, the Shri Sáyaji Vijay
identified the consequences at stake, declaring, “The war will decide the momentous
question whether Asia has vitality enough to maintain her own independence or whether
she is destined to be in a position of perpetual servitude to Europe.”575 The Kál, even
more pronounced in its anti-British sentiment than the Kesari, crowed, “Every Asiatic is
convinced that all European powers are bound to crumble before an energetic onslaught,
while the Hitechchhu trumpeted its belief that Europeans would be guilty of the most
profound folly if they continued to regard Asia “as only a happy hunting ground for the
people of Europe to extend their sway.”576 The Indian nationalist press was both
confident and forthright in its belief that Japan’s bold moves would dramatically alter the
balance between the continents.
More than offering promise for a resurgent Asia, however, the Russo-Japanese
War provided considerable opportunity for journalists to reflect upon what they viewed
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as pronounced differences between the status of Japan and the subcontinent. Pointedly
observing that Europe continued to dominate Asia, with the notable exception of Japan,
the Kál decried the fact that “Japan alone is completely independent, while India is
completely under British domination.”577 “Alas!” exclaimed the Baroda Vatsal, before
asking (referring to Indians), “When will they be free from this wretched condition of
slavery and be fired with the spirit that animates the entire population of Japan today?”578
The Aronodaya lamented, “The position of the people of India has become like that of a
child whose mother will not give it food and whose father will not allow it to beg.”579 A
degree of despair had crept into the columns of the native press, as India labored to
recover from an onslaught of natural and man-made disasters. In an effort to explain why
India gazed so “wistfully” upon the success of Japan, the Kál enumerated each adversity
of the past ten years, listing among others plague, famine, the impotence of the Indian
National Congress, the passage of “terrible and stringent laws,” and the failure of the
Government to grant political rights.580
The comparisons between the Japanese and the Indians echoed the tactics of the
Irish advanced-nationalist press during the Second Boer War. In the same manner that
the United Irishman and Workers’ Republic had used the example of the independenceloving Boers as a spur to goad their Irish readers into fighting for self-government, so too
Indian nationalist editors now identified the Japanese as a model for Indians to emulate.

577

Kál, 18 March 1904.

578

Baroda Vatsal, 22 May 1904.

579

Aronodaya, 28 August 1904.

580

Kál, 12 August 1904.

224

The Gujarati asserted, “The people of India cannot but derive some elevating inspiration
from the brilliant display of the magnificent qualities which the Japanese have exhibited
in this epoch-making war.”581 Given the pessimism regarding India’s future, Japan’s
successes certainly served as a beacon of hope, functioning as a possible template for
how India could obtain her independence.
Yet, there were many voices in the native press warning that such slavish
admiration of Japan would do nothing to advance the cause of India. The Gujarati, itself,
advised, “Those who are content to plume themselves upon Japanese victories labour
under very mistaken notions about the factors which go to build up the political greatness
of a nation.”582 The paper cautioned, “If India remains satisfied with beholding the
progress of other nations instead of endeavoring to ameliorate her own conditions, further
degradation for her is inevitable.”583 Moreover, not all journalists were convinced that
India was even capable of following Japan’s lead, identifying what they deemed stark
differences between the Japanese and Indian characters. In an article strikingly
reminiscent of D.P. Moran’s essay on Irish character flaws, the Aryávart praised the
Japanese as “energetic and diligent, unmoved by adversity and unflinching in danger,”
while dismissing the Hindu as “feeble and effete, sunk in sloth and indifferent to the best
interests of his country.”584 In a comparison that surely would have surprised Moran, the
Shri Fattehsinh Gazette spied a telling connection between the tactics of the Japanese and
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the Irish, both of whom were “bent upon gaining independence.”585 The paper contrasted
their actions with those of Indians, who had grown “inured to slavery and hypnotized by
the crooked policy of the British.”586 Weary of patiently coaxing their readers into
asserting their rights, many in the Indian nationalist press now resorted to candid
criticism of their countrymen, in an effort to break the pattern of Indian enfeeblement and
complacency.
The Russo-Japanese War granted Indian journalists scope to examine India’s
relationship with Britain, and to compare their imperial experience with those of India’s
Asian neighbors. Whereas Japan had closed its borders to foreigners and actively
maintained fierce control of its own government, India had been invaded, overrun, and
subjugated. In February of 1904, a twelve-year-old letter from British philosopher and
sociologist Herbert Spencer to Baron Kaneko, a Japanese jurist and philosopher, surfaced
in the London Times—and became a timely talking point for Bal Gangadhar Tilak in both
the Mahrátta and the Kesari. The letter had ostensibly cautioned the Japanese people to
“keep the Europeans and the Americans as much as possible at arm’s length,” and
suggested that Japan’s intention to open its empire to foreigners and foreign capital was
folly. Indeed, Spencer’s letter had specifically warned his Japanese correspondent, “If
you wish to see what is likely to happen, study the history of India.”587 “Unfortunately,”
Tilak lamented, “there was no Herbert Spencer in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to
give similar advice to the Indians when the country was exposed to the incursions of
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European nations like swarms of locusts.”588 Shivram Mahadev Paranjape, editor of the
Kál, also seized upon Spencer’s letter to condemn the actions of Christian nations who
“send, as pioneers, missionaries of ‘the religion of love,’ and then pick quarrels with
native races and take possession of their lands.”589 Paranjape excelled at cataloguing for
his readers the litany of grievances suffered at the hands of the European powers, as a
result of what he characterized as hypocritical policies.
As with their coverage of the Boxer Rebellion, many leading Indian journalists
viewed both religion and race as critical factors in the increasingly fractious relationship
between Asia and Europe. The Hitechchhu painted a picture of “white demi-gods”
utterly “panic-struck at the yellow peril,” while the Kál extended its commentary to
Africa and warned, “It is not only the Yellow Peril that Europe has to dread. A Black
Peril seems also to be in sight.” Exulting in the knowledge that the West “has been
beaten with its own weapons,” the Jam-e-Jamshed asserted that the Russo-Japanese War
had not only demonstrated Japan’s resources and daring, but also its training and
discipline—placing the “white, black and yellow races on the same level.”590 For an
Indian people perennially reminded of their “inferior” status, Japan’s rout of Russia
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provided tangible evidence that the days of Asian and African submission to Western
tradition, custom, and religion were nearing an end.
Tilak’s Marathi-language Kesari chose to harp on the religious bias that separated
the West and East, assailing the hypocrisy of Christians who “preach philanthropy,
benevolence, and the brotherhood of man,” while simultaneously pursuing policies
cloaked in “selfishness, cruelty and oppression.”591 “Though their religion teaches that
all men are the children of one God,” charged the Kesari, “they boldly maintain that the
world was created by God for them, and that all other people are intended to be their
slaves.”592 The paper provided its readers with historical examples of this pattern, noting
that Christian nations “have hunted the Red Indians in America out of existence and also
whitened the soil of Australia with the bones of the aborigines.”593 The message was
clear: the Christian British Empire would not be content until it had enslaved and
converted the whole of the Indian subcontinent. Christian hegemony was obviously not a
factor on which the Irish advanced-nationalist press was focusing. Indeed, they seemed
curiously unaware of the prejudice they were displaying in their persistent references to
the “Yellow Peril” and a “small race of Yellow People.”
Japan’s victory over Russia in the bloody Battle of Mukden afforded the Indian
nationalist press even more reason for exultation, providing what journalists deemed
demonstrative evidence of Japan’s military discipline. The Kesari hailed it as an “epochmaking victory,” while the Gujárati informed its readers that Japan had “covered itself in
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imperishable glory.”594 Notably, the latter paper attributed the victory to what it
characterized as “peculiarly Asiatic” qualities of fearlessness, imperturbability,
“thoughtfulness and resignation, abstinence and self-control, tenderness and
humanity.”595 The message was clear: these were the same qualities present in the Indian
people, who only needed to martial their inner resources to make the same dramatic
impression on the West as their Japanese brethren. Native journalists used the war as a
call to arms—a declaration that the time had come for India to seize control of its own
destiny—and Japan’s ultimate victory over Russia would only deepen those convictions.
The Praja Bandhu asserted, “The idea that Christian nations are destined to rule the
world has been rudely shaken to its foundations,” while the Gujarati Punch declared that
the war had taught the world that an Asiatic Power possessed both the intelligence and
the military capabilities to best a European Power on the field of battle.596 The Indu
Prakash issued the solemn pronouncement, “The restless West has rudely awakened the
slumbering East.”597 Despite the fact that India’s fairly harmonious association with
Britain bore little resemblance to the combative relationship between Japan and Russia,
Indian nationalist journalists continued to use the example of the war to encourage their
countrymen to break the bonds of decades of subservience.
Watching and reading from his vantage point in Dublin, Arthur Griffith was
encouraged by what he perceived as a possible shift in the balance of power in India.
Sharing the Indian editors’ contempt for the British, Griffith took delight in the idea that
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the Empire’s aura of invincibility had been irreparably punctured by the defeat of the
Russian Empire. The Irish editor was also quick to note the change in the tone of India’s
newspapers, crowing that the Hindu papers had supplanted their former “humbleness”
with a new “manlier spirit.”598 Griffith applauded the change in attitude wrought by the
one-two punch of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, crowing of Japan’s
ascendancy to the “paramount military, political, and commercial power of the Far
East.”599 Not only did Griffith allege that Japan’s surge to power had done irreparable
harm to British trade and commerce, but also he anointed Japan as the Protector of India,
“thus ending British-rule-by-prestige over the Hindus.”600 “India has developed a strong
national spirit,” Griffith exclaimed, “and embarked upon a fighting policy against
England.” 601 It suited Griffith to depict India as ablaze with revolutionary zeal—an
example to Ireland of a people committed to the glorious fight for independence.
Although the Partition of Bengal undoubtedly galvanized India’s nationalists, however,
there was, as yet, no cohesion between the Moderates, who wished to work with the
British Government, and the Extremists, who were beginning to espouse Home Rule.
Nor did all of India’s native journalists embrace the war’s end in a spirit of
optimism. Just as Irish advanced-nationalists had deplored the Anglo-American alliance,
so the chief source of unease for India’s nationalist editors was the renewal of the 1902
alliance between Japan and Britain, which the Bhála declared “has dealt a death blow to
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the military ambition of India.”602 There was the overwhelming sense that Britain had no
faith in its loyal Indian subjects, given that Britain chose to align itself once again with
Japan, a foreign power, “instead of keeping faith with them and training them for war.”603
With a threat of a Russian invasion no longer looming, the Bhála lamented what it
perceived as the increasing effeminacy of the Indian people. “In course of time,” warned
the Bhála, “the country will be converted into a huge sheep-fold and the people, like
sheep, will do nothing more than bleat when they are ill-treated.”604 The Indu-Prakash
worried that the alliance had robbed Japan’s defeat of Russia of any of its benefits for the
people of India, stating, “They expected that the rise of such a formidable power in Asia
as Japan, added to Britain’s old dread of Russia, would serve as a check on her despotism
in India.”605 “Instead,” argued the Indu-Prakash, “England has dexterously and at the
price of her dignity and prestige as a European Power, liberated herself from all fear of
Japan’s might and influence, as well as from the dread of a Russian invasion of India.”606
The renewal of the alliance may have improved the Empire’s relations with Japan and
lessened the fear of a Russian invasion of India, but it left the impression that Britain
would never entrust the defense of India to native troops. The Empire’s continued
enfeeblement of the Indian people nettled nationalist journalists, who resolved to instill in
their readers the same fire and intensity displayed by the Japanese.
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The Russo-Japanese War marked the last of the grand international conflagrations
jeopardizing the hard-won equilibrium of the British Empire.607 Despite the absence of a
British imperial war for more than a decade after the Boer War had wound to a close,
journalists in Ireland and India continued to turn their gaze overseas. Rather than
focusing on military tactics and casualty reports, Irish and Indian nationalist editors found
a rich source of inspiration in their mutual struggles for self-reliance. Journalists
instantly recognized the common elements in the Indian program of Swadeshi and the
Irish Sinn Féin policy, and undoubtedly derived a certain satisfaction in realizing that
their contemporaneous movements were threatening to become dangerous distractions for
the Empire. Significantly, nationalist editors went to great lengths to cover each other’s
internal battles with the Empire, in the process following their pattern of transforming
foreign events into fodder for their own domestic agenda. Irish journalists covered the
Partition of Bengal and the subsequent Swadeshi movement as if the events were clashes
in yet another of Britain’s imperial wars. For their part, Indian journalists tracked every
aborted phase of Ireland’s struggle to achieve Home Rule, informing their readership of
Irish tactics and British treachery. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Arthur Griffith assumed the
lead in this crusade, characterizing the fledgling movements of Swadeshi and Sinn Féin
as impassioned struggles pitting freedom-loving peoples against an overreaching Empire
determined to smother Irish and Indian independence.
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The Sinn Fein Policy
While the Indian nationalist press attempted to motivate the masses by
concentrating its attention on the conflict in Asia, Arthur Griffith instead used these years
to reinvigorate the cause of Irish nationalism by looking to the past. Significantly, the
editor once again looked abroad, to continental Europe’s recent history. In 1867,
Hungarian Franz Deak had launched a campaign of non-cooperation—refusing to send
representatives to the Imperial Parliament—which ultimately compelled Austria to form a
dual monarchy with Hungary. Griffith held up the Hungarian model as evidence that
Ireland could successfully combat the British without resorting to arms. Like his
Hungarian counterparts, Griffith advocated a political policy of non-cooperation,
demanding that Ireland withdraw its representatives from the British Parliament. In an
editorial entitled “Is Emigration Inevitable?” the United Irishman denounced the “bloody,
rapacious, and soul-shivering Imperialism of England” and proclaimed “Let us renounce
the disastrous policy of making the Parliament House of England the arena of the Irish
struggle—let us make the dissolution of the British Empire our immediate object and
“Delenda est Carthago!” our rallying cry . . . .”608 Griffith’s appropriation of the Elder
Cato’s classic call to arms indicated the editor’s desire for Ireland to adopt its own
scorched earth policy when it came to relations with England.
As the Indian nationalist press focused on the Russo-Japanese War throughout
1904, therefore, Griffith serialized “The Resurrection of Hungary” in the United
Irishman, persistently drawing parallels between the two countries. Griffith was adamant
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that “what the Hungarians did for Hungary, Irishmen can do for Ireland.”609 At year’s
end, desirous of reaching an even wider audience, the editor compiled the articles in a
single volume. Griffith was rewarded for his effort, selling 20,000 copies of The
Resurrection of Hungary within the first three months of its publication. Convinced of
the rightness of their thinking, and adamant that any solution must come from Ireland and
not Britain, Griffith and his fellow proponents soon adopted the name Sinn Féin—for
their movement.610 Convening the annual meeting of the National Council in December
1905, delegates proposed the new Sinn Féin policy of National Self-Determination, in
which members pledged themselves to aid and support any nationalist group “not looking
outside Ireland for the accomplishment of their aims.”611 Not surprisingly, the Sinn Féin
movement adopted the United Irishman as its official organ. Griffith’s paper
subsequently featured an invitation to join the new organization, urging its readers to
show their support of the National Council by filling in the handy form on page eight.
Not all advanced nationalists were enamored of Griffith’s plans for Ireland. D.P.
Moran, editor of the Leader, ridiculed adherents of the new political ideology, dubbing
them “Griffith’s Green Hungarian Band.”612 Socialist James Connolly offered more
substantive criticism, listing a catalogue of adverse conditions in Hungary that included
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historically high emigration to America, the “misery of the town and country workers,”
and the denial of the vote to the “producing classes,” as reasons Ireland should not adopt
the Hungarian model.613 “We are inclined to wonder,” mused Connolly, “if our Sinn
Féin orators know these things, or are they only presuming upon the ignorance of the
Irish Workers.”614 These criticisms notwithstanding, Connolly had strong praise for the
underlying concept of Sinn Féin, asserting, “It teaches the Irish people to rely upon
themselves, and upon themselves alone, and teaches them also that dependence upon
forces outside themselves is emasculating in its tendency, and has been, and will ever be
disastrous in its results.”615 Moreover, Griffith’s ideology met with the approval of
members of the Irish Parliamentary Party—long a target of the editor’s scorn—with T.M.
Kettle praising the program as “the largest idea contributed to Irish politics for a
generation.”616 The Sinn Féin emphasis on self-reliance did, indeed, invigorate the cause
of Irish nationalism and transform the political landscape—not only in Ireland, but also in
America, where John Devoy’s Gaelic-American was instrumental in disseminating word
of the program.
The economic policy expounded by Griffith and Sinn Féin, however, provoked a
measure of controversy, rejecting as it did Britain’s policy of free trade in favor of Irish
protectionism. Once again drawing inspiration from continental Europe, Griffith had
seized on the theories of the German economist Friedrich List, whose book The National
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System of Political Economy had been published in 1885. Writing in The Resurrection of
Hungary, Griffith hailed List as “the man who saved Germany from falling prey to
English economics,” and lauded the German for linking economic policy to the principle
of nationality.617 Already pledged to a glorious Gaelic revival, Griffith understandably
approved of List’s definition of a nation as possessing “a common language and
literature.”618 In Griffith’s estimation, England had ignored Ireland’s manufacturing
capabilities in favor of classifying the island’s resources as purely agricultural.619 The
inequity between Ireland’s “flocks and herds” and the manufactured goods of Britain
placed Ireland at a distinct commercial disadvantage, always dependent on her wealthier
trading partners.620 Warming to his subject, Griffith pleaded for the Irish “to clear their
minds of the pernicious idea that they are not entitled or called upon to give preferential
aid to the manufacturing industries of their own country.”621 As enamored of List’s
theory as he was of the Hungarian Policy, Griffith proved equally blind to its
shortcomings as an economic solution for Ireland, given the limited resources to which
Ireland had access on the island.622
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Yet, Griffith understood that there was resistance to his theories from those who
questioned the practicality of Sinn Féin’s policy of self-reliance. Responding to his
critics, as well as the unconverted, Griffith launched a follow-up to his serialization of
The Resurrection of Hungary, publishing a series of articles entitled “A Working of the
Policy” that would run in the United Irishman throughout 1905. The editorials offered
concrete proposals for transforming Ireland from a client state to a self-reliant country
ready to assume its place among the nations of the world. Championing Irish investment
in Irish industry and Irish consular representation on the Continent to promote trade,
Griffith also promoted the founding of an Irish national university, an Irish Bar, and an
Irish bank. Among his more provocative ideas was the establishment of an entente
cordiale between Ireland, the Transvaal, India, and Malta. Acknowledging the
complicity of Irish troops in suppressing dissent among the Boers, Hindus, and Maltese,
Griffith asserted that such an entente would prevent the countries “from being used to
strangle each other for England’s benefit.”623

The Swadeshi Movement
While Arthur Griffith was hammering out the details of the Sinn Féin policy,
Indian nationalist journalists were shifting the attention of their readers from the RussoJapanese War to a firestorm erupting within India’s own borders. On the surface, the
1905 Partition of Bengal—a populous province spanning 189,000 square miles and home
to Bengalee editor Surendranath Banerjea—must have seemed like a bold administrative
gesture, designed to ameliorate what Lord Curzon described as the “complete lack of
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touch between the centre and the extremities.”624 “The necessity for relief is
indisputable,” argued the Viceroy, adding, “The administration of Bengal is bad, and it is
bad because the work is far too great for any individual man.”625 Certainly, the Viceroy
was not blind to the possibility of protest from the residents of Bengal as well as from
Indian nationalists. In particular, he identified the “wire-pullers” and “frothy orators” of
the Indian National Congress as the font of agitation, noting, “They dominate public
opinion in Calcutta; they affect the High Court; they frighten the Local Government; and
they are sometimes not without serious influence upon the Government of India.”626
Bengal had long been a seat of unrest and was threatening to become a hotbed of
revolutionary crime. When word of the Government’s plans leaked to the public, the
rumblings of discontent soon grew to a roar.
Still, the Viceroy was convinced that however heated the protest against the
Partition might be, it would be local in nature, as well as short-lived. Remarkably, the
Viceroy seemed unconcerned about the impact the Russo-Japanese War was having on
Indian aspirations. Notwithstanding his cognizance of the fervor of Indian nationalists, in
this instance Curzon apparently elected to rely on the wisdom of a “Native gentleman,”
who had informed the Viceroy, “My countrymen always howl until a thing is settled;
then they accept it.”627 In pursuing the course of Partition, Curzon woefully
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underestimated the impact on the proud Indian psyche. Contributing to the native ire was
the manner in which the government elected to divide Bengal, bisecting the province into
an East Bengal with a Muslim majority and a West Bengal where a non-Bengali-speaking
majority could overrule the wishes of a Bengali-speaking minority. Critics suspected the
viceroy felt intimidated by the growing nationalist spirit among Hindus, and was
attempting to create an equally vocal Muslim contingent to counterbalance the threat.
The outcry in response to the Partition was immediate, insistent, and to Curzon’s dismay,
enduring, led by members of the Indian National Congress such as Gopal Krishna
Gokhale, who accused the British government of callously demonstrating “utter contempt
for public opinion.”628 The Partition of Bengal not only produced a predictable Bengali
backlash against the Empire, but, more importantly for the Raj, also gave birth to the
nationwide Swadeshi (“self-sufficiency”) movement. What had begun as a Bengal-based
economic protest urging the boycott of all things British would evolve into an inwardlooking and forward-thinking national program of Indian self-reliance.
Predictably, the Indian nationalist press, led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, mounted a
ferocious protest against the Partition. Whereas the Mahrátta employed a more measured
tone in criticizing the Government’s strategy, the Kesari, published in the vernacular,
issued a blistering condemnation of the imperial move, proclaiming: “Never before has
public opinion been so ruthlessly trampled under foot by a hard-hearted and autocratic
Viceroy as by Lord Curzon in the matter of the partition scheme.”629 For Tilak, a man
who had spent much of his life protesting the polices of the British in India, and
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bemoaning the absence of collective, concerted agitation on the part of India, the
Partition of Bengal offered unrivaled possibilities for achieving Indian solidarity. The
Kesari stated unequivocally, “A boycott of foreign goods is the only remedy lying in the
hands of an utterly helpless people like the Indians to enable them to compel Government
to accede to their demands.”630 Ever the opportunist, Tilak saw the efficacy of focusing
his readers’ anger, enlisting their energies in the cause of Swadeshi.
Throughout 1905 and 1906, the Kesari carped at those who did not comprehend
the magnitude of the moment, or the need for action, warning, “Mere words are bound to
be useless in removing the scales of selfishness and pride of authority that darken the
vision of officials.631 In Tilak’s estimation, boycott and Swadeshi were “two phases of
the same movement indissolubly connected together. Exclude the boycott from the
Swadeshi movement and the latter becomes lifeless. People will not persevere in the
Swadeshi movement, unless they burn with indignation at Manchester forcing upon us
thirty crores worth of piece-goods and robbing the country of so much wealth.”632 Tilak
was not the only Indian nationalist to make this connection. In a speech at College
Square in Calcutta in 1907, Bengalee editor Surendranath Banerjea elaborated on the
relationship between the two movements, explaining to his audience, “Boycott is the
negative and Swadeshi is the positive aspect of the same question, and I, for my part, am
not prepared to separate them.”633 Convinced that boycott and Swadeshi could not in and
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of themselves constitute an enduring program of Indian nationalism, Tilak added two
more basic tenets to the movement: the cause of national education and the pursuit of
swaraj—home rule—with the editor proclaiming, “Swaraj is my birthright and I shall
have it!”
Not surprisingly, Anglo-Indian papers such as the Times of India registered their
dismay both at the movement itself and, particularly, at its support in the native press. In
rejecting their complaints out of hand, Tilak asserted that the reason Swadeshi lacked
support among the Anglo-Indian press was “because there are comparatively few matters
relating to the Indian administration, which touch the Anglo-Indian Press to the quick as
they do the Native Press.”634 Still, just as Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin movement had its
notable detractors in the press, not everyone in the native press of India was as enamored
of the movement as Tilak. The Jam-e-Jamshed—which would eventually stake out a
position opposing the policies of the Indian National Congress—dismissed the campaign,
sniffing, “The silly vapourings against the British Government, the seditious circulars, the
letters of intimidation to peaceful citizens, and even outrages in certain cases have given
to the present agitation an aspect which is far from merely comic.”635 The Advocate of
India predicted that the Swadeshi movement was doomed to failure, and expressed
surprise that someone of Tilak’s stature would allow himself to become embroiled in
“such a piece of puerile folly.”636 The Mahrátta refuted that characterization, urging the
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Bengali population “to strain every nerve to persist in the movement,” confident that
Swadeshi would prevail.637 The Kesari—as always the more outspoken of Tilak’s two
papers—denounced the complacency and lack of vision of India’s middle and upper
classes, labeling their leaders “poltroons”—cowardly both in their demeanor and their
actions.638 The Bhala exhorted the Bengali people to “wreak vengeance upon
Government a hundredfold,” and “ostracize all black sheep amongst them, who are mean
enough not to stand by them in the present crisis.”639 While the Swadeshi movement had
its detractors, the vast majority of India’s native newspapers joined with the Mahrátta
and the Kesari to throw their combined weight behind the Swadeshi movement.

Hands Across the Sea
Even more unsettling for the British Empire, however, was the fact that news of
the Partition and the subsequent protests had reached an audience beyond the borders of
the subcontinent. If events took on significance beyond their expected import, it was
largely because the nationalist press in India and Ireland never stopped searching for
ammunition with which to press their case. It was not unexpected that the Partition of
Bengal would ignite a firestorm of controversy within Bengal and India. What proved
more telling—and more problematic for the British Empire—was the focus on the issue
by the Irish nationalist press. For Arthur Griffith and his Irish colleagues, events in India
could not have proved more felicitous. To Irish nationalist proponents, the Partition of
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Bengal and resultant outcry in India constituted yet another instance of imperial
meddling, misreading, and mishandling of a global event. The fact that Britain and India
were not, in fact, engaged in a war did not stop the Irish advanced-nationalist press from
characterizing the parties involved as foes. In the same manner they had appropriated the
Boer struggle for independence to exhort readers to go to battle on behalf of Ireland,
journalists now seized upon Partition and the ensuing protests as a model for the Irish to
emulate. “Our Mutual Enemy” ran the headline of the Connaught Telegraph, and, in an
attempt to shame its readers into action, followed up with a sub-heading which read
“Brave, India!—What is Ireland Doing?”640 In its coverage of a well-attended speech by
Camillo F. Saldanha on the state of “Young India,” the Freeman’s Journal reported the
audience responded with applause when the speaker alluded to “the bond of common
suffering and the bond of common hatred against the common oppressor of India and
Ireland.”641
While many in the advanced-nationalist press were urging Ireland to follow the
lead of India, there was also an attempt from some quarters to take credit for India’s new
political movement, suggesting that Indian nationalists had adapted Arthur Griffith’s
ideas for their own purposes. The Southern Star excitedly noted that Griffith’s
pamphlet, “The Resurrection of Hungary” had been translated into Cingalese and other
Indian dialects and had circulated throughout India, giving birth to the Swadeshi
movement.642 The Irish Independent informed its readers that Bengal had engaged in “a
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sort of Sinn Féin policy with remarkable effects,” and hoped that “the two movements,
Indian and Irish, might result to mutual advantage.”643 Noting gleefully that “England
may soon have more than one Ireland to deal with,” the paper provided a helpful pointby-point comparison between the grievances of the Indian and the Irish. In addition to
“crippled home industries,” the Irish Independent reeled off the suppression of public
meetings, the neglect of native languages, and, in particular, constraints on freedom of
the press as hallmarks of British rule. The Freeman’s Journal informed its readers that
Indian newspapers “are persistently persecuted” and that British authorities had
imprisoned the editor of the Punjabee for a period of two months.644
News of the Indian movement became so prevalent in the Irish nationalist press
that there was no longer any need to describe in detail the movement or its aims. The
anti-imperial goals of the Swadeshi boycott had become common knowledge. Editors
found they could insert the word not only as a means to incite their readership to action,
but also to provide the occasional moment of levity. When reports circulated that British
authorities had shipped a mere one dozen cats to India in an attempt to eliminate the
entire rat population of India and thus stem the spread of the plague, the Freeman’s
Journal expressed its skepticism—before waggishly suggesting the idea was Swiftian in
its conception and had perhaps been invented “by some Bengalese who believes in the
Swadeshi movement.”645 The invocation of the name of the great Irish satirist indicated
that the paper considered the British idea for controlling the devastating Indian plague
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equally as preposterous as Swift’s darkly comic proposal for coping with the Irish
poor.646 Crediting a Bengali native with proposing the scheme, moreover, was an
acknowledgement of how much Irish nationalists enjoyed watching Britain squirm under
the pressure of the Swadeshi movement.
Arthur Griffith clearly recognized the Indian program as the equivalent of his
Sinn Féin policy, which by 1906 had its own eponymous political organ as Griffith
replaced the United Irishman with the Sinn Féin weekly, Ireland’s new ‘National
Industrial Journal.’647 Its premier number, appearing on 5 May 1906, threw down the
gauntlet, charging, “It is because England has disarmed this country, because she has
impoverished it, because she is strong that we write ‘humbug’ to the policy of trusting in
England’s sense of justice.”648 Emblazoned on the front page of the four-page paper
were inspirational banners, featuring memorable sayings from political and literary
luminaries such as Frederick the Great and satirist Jonathan Swift. A particularly pointed
citation from Henry Grattan, the leader of the eighteenth-century Independent Irish
Parliament, warned, “When the liberty and security of one country depends on the honour
of another, the latter may have much honour, but the former can have no liberty.”649.
Never one to let an opportunity slip away, Griffith immediately set about drawing
the attention of his readers to the profound parallels between his political invention and
the new Indian movement, publicly applauding Swadeshi and the boycott and crowing
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“Hindus have learned that one ounce of the Sinn Féin policy is more effective than a ton
of appeal in getting home to the British conscience.”650 Denouncing editorials in the
British papers that claimed Swadeshi was proving a failure, the editor exhorted his
readers to emulate the Hindu oath never to buy British goods.651 In a comment that
managed simultaneously to tip its hat to the Swadeshi movement and take a swipe at the
Irish Parliamentary Party, the United Irishman suggested the time had arrived for Ireland
and India to unite. “A common enemy, a common purpose, and similarity of
circumstances,” asserted the journal, “should have long ago led to common action on the
part of the two peoples, had Ireland possessed leaders whose horizon was not bounded by
the British House of Commons.”652
Observers outside of Ireland and India were also taking stock of the parallels
between Swadeshi and Sinn Féin. After explaining to its readers that the Hindi and Irish
words were synonymous with “nous-même” (“ourselves”), the Parisian newspaper La
Liberté pronounced it “remarkable that the same idea should be being acted on at the
same time in Ireland and in India.”653 In London, the Nation proclaimed that “The spirit
of Swadeshi and Sinn Féin is everywhere making its way.”654 In England, a student at
Cambridge also noted the striking similarities between the Irish and Indian programs of
self-reliance. Though in 1907 Motilal Nehru had advised his son to steer clear of Irish
disturbances in Belfast, Jawaharlal Nehru’s response was to declare his admiration for
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Sinn Féin: “It is a most interesting movement and resembles very closely the so-called
Extremist movement in India. Their policy is not to beg for favours but to wrest them.
They do not want to fight England by arms, but ‘to ignore her, boycott Her, and quietly
assume the administration of Irish affairs.’”655 Nehru’s comparison of Sinn Féin to the
Extremists in India was an apt one, given that it was Tilak, the leader of the Extremist
movement, who was responsible for the distribution of Sinn Féin pamphlets in India.
To the same degree Tilak harbored a conviction that India’s prosperity depended
on her Asian alliances, Griffith was desirous that Ireland take her place among the
nations of Europe. To that end, Griffith often reprinted material from European
newspapers, and boasted in turn of the coverage Ireland received in continental journals.
He was particularly pleased when news of the Sinn Féin movement circulated on the
continent. In the issue of 18 November 1905, he crowed, “Fifteen French, four Belgian,
four German, two Spanish, two Dutch, one Austrian and one Italian newspaper publish
this week for the first time in their existence, news of the national existence of
Ireland.”656 Having observed at a distance Ireland’s land wars, Parliamentary
obstructionism, and boycotts, India was clearly mesmerized by this latest stratagem of
Ireland’s nationalists.
Just as Griffith and his fellow nationalist editors saw the wisdom of continually
placing the example of India before their readers, so did India’s nationalist journalists
document the newest tactics adopted by the Irish in their struggle for independence. The
Vehari exclaimed, “A terrible Swadeshi movement is set on foot in Ireland . . . the Irish
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have given up all hope of being benefited by laws passed by the British Parliament.”657
The paper issued a call to action, demanding not only a boycott of all universities
established by the British Government, but also urging its readers to follow Ireland’s lead
by boycotting enlistment in the British army and refusing to invest Indian capital in
Britain’s financial institutions.658 The Gujaráti also urged its readers to emulate the Irish,
asserting, “It is as a result of the sacrifices made by Irish leaders that Home Rule for
Ireland has been brought within the range of practical politics.”659 The paper added, “If
Indians want Home Rule at the hands of Englishmen, they should be prepared to undergo
similar sacrifices.”660 The Patriot invoked the name of Irish patriot Daniel O’Connell,
whose “monster meetings” in 1843 demonstrated his awareness of the vital role played
by the masses in political agitation.661 Michael Davitt’s letter to the editor of the Indian
Review found its way into the pages of the Mahrátta, whose editor clearly supported
Davitt’s contention that “It is not humanly possible for a people to be sincerely loyal to
an authority which grinds them down with oppressive taxation while denying them the
most elementary rights of constitutional rule.”662 Upon hearing of Davitt’s death in 1906,
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the Gujaráti Punch offered a mournful eulogy, intoning, “India’s heart, even in the midst
of her own wrongs and sufferings, ever goes out to Erin—her sister in woe.”663 The
expression of sympathy may have spoken as much to the unhappy reality of India and
Ireland’s continued domination by Britain as it did to the passing of Davitt.
If there was one native newspaper the Government of India perennially labeled as
dangerously seditious, it was the Bombay-based Kál. The paper urged its readership to
heed Griffith’s message and wrest primary, secondary, and collegiate education from the
grasp of the British Empire.664 As Griffith and Tilak had documented in their papers, a
British education omitted any mention of Irish or Indian culture and heritage, the English
language took precedence over the Irish language or any of the several hundred Indian
dialects, and British industry prospered at the expense of Irish and Indian industry. That
being the case, Kál suggested that an occupying force did not need to employ brutal
methods to produce a deleterious effect on the native population. Indeed, Kál claimed
that Britain’s “civilized mode of oppression and persecution is really far more dangerous
and disagreeable than open torture or ill-treatment.”665 Calling the effects of British rule
in Ireland and India “strikingly similar and equally deplorable,” the Kál exhorted its
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readers to follow the Irish example by becoming self-reliant, rather than depending upon
British Parliament to grant Home Rule.666
The Kál also relayed Arthur Griffith’s belief that the main problem confronting
the Irish is “They do not at present realize . . . that they form a nation.”667 The paper
equated the Irish predicament with India’s own dilemma, asserting that British rule
“undermines the sentiment of nationality . . . and reduces them [the natives] to a position
worse than that of actual slaves.”668 Bal Gangadhar Tilak similarly allotted generous
space to Arthur Griffith’s concept of nationality. Characterizing the misery of an Indian
subject of the British Empire as identical to that of an Irish subject, the Kesari
enumerated a quartet of elements identified by Griffith as the foundation on which to
build a national movement. The critical ingredients were “(1) The realisation of those
miseries; (2) the desire to be free from them; (3) patriots ready to work for freeing their
countrymen from their miseries and (4) an educated middle class willing to give
assistance to the patriots.”669 Indeed, Tilak worked to refine Griffith’s first element in the
evolution of national identity, by suggesting that misery was not, in itself, enough of a
spur to action; rather, there must be the recognition of a common danger. In Tilak’s
estimation, that pervasive threat came in the form of imperial oppression. The editor of
the Kesari asserted, “If no nation had been under foreign domination or at any rate
exposed to the danger of such domination, the idea of nationality would never have
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developed in the history of the human race.”670 Underscoring the need for a unified front
in the face of the British monolith, Tilak asserted, “The masses must have the power of
cohesion, otherwise they will be like the particles of sand on the seashore.”671 The editor
left to his reader’s imagination the unfortunate fate of those individual grains of sand
when the next wave of imperial dictates washed over them.
This era was marked by a demonstrative spirit of solidarity between editors in
Ireland, India (and even Irish-America), with a fluid exchange of ideas, as articles,
commentary, and letters to the editor were printed in one paper, and rapidly reprinted in
another. The Government of India had long prided itself on introducing western
conventions of civilization and the rule of law to India, just as Dublin Castle was
convinced that it exercised considerable restraint in dealing with the native Irish
population. Yet, what the British regarded as paternal patience and tolerance was
inevitably perceived by the native populace as condescension and patronization—a litany
of polices designed to make India less Indian, Ireland less Irish. Recognition of their
common plight forged a connection between Irish and Indian nationalist journalists.
The Mahrátta frequently excerpted editorials from John Devoy’s New York-based
Gaelic-American, which fresh from its piercing, if biased, analysis of the Russo-Japanese
War was calling for a triple alliance between Ireland, South Africa, and India. By joining
the battle on three fronts, the paper asserted, “the war against the tyranny of the British
can be brought to a successful and happy conclusion.”672
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Such articles provided fodder for Tilak’s ongoing battle with Gopal Krishna
Gokhale, the leader of the Moderate wing in the Indian National Congress. Cleverly
avoiding any appearance of a personal attack, Tilak instead let Devoy’s paper speak for
him. When Gokhale announced his belief that Ireland would achieve Home Rule within
a year, the Gaelic-American scoffed that Anglo-Indian administrators had “grossly
deceived” him, citing Ireland’s forty-year history of agitation and Britain’s equally long
refusal to capitulate. The paper was insistent that “the rights and the hopes of the Irish
and the Indian peoples are the same, and if one of them could be cheated out of their
rights, as any and every British Government is capable of doing, the other would be
defrauded in an equal measure.”673 In a sign that Irish-Americans—like the Irish—
recognized the pressing need to present a united front against the British Government, the
Gaelic-American rallied Tilak’s readers: “We say to the Indian people then, go on with
your Swadeshi movement.”674
Despite the fact that the Swadeshi movement monopolized the columns of the
Indian nationalist press, editors on the subcontinent continued to monitor imperial policy
abroad. In a move which set them apart from the anti-Semitic ravings of the Irish and
Irish-American nationalist press, journalists in India repeatedly pronounced their outrage
at Russian treatment of the Jews. The Madras-based Jaridah-i-Rosgar despaired that a
Christian nation was so demonstrably lacking in humanity as to permit such “brutal
murder,” while the Calcutta-based Bharat-Mitra directed its scorn not merely at Russia,
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but at Britain and all of the European powers.675 The paper found it disturbing that Prime
Minister Gladstone had spoken out so vehemently at the time of the Turkish atrocities in
Armenia, yet “now that the Jews are being so mercilessly massacred in Russia, no Power
thinks it worth its while to utter a single word.”676 In a similar vein, the Hitavarta
scoffed at the European powers whose “love of humankind would be overflowing” if
such a massacre had happened in Asia, but who refused to criticize the Christian Czar, in
a show of “political impartiality.”677 Once again, the Indian nationalist press had not only
brought to its readers’ attention atrocities committed by a European power, but also had
shown it was unafraid to make religion—and specifically Christianity—a critical issue in
its analysis of Britain’s imperial policy.
Nor were the attacks on the Jews the only foreign focus of the Indian nationalist
press. Whereas the Boer War had ended in 1902, three years later life for the Indian
population in the Transvaal had not improved. Equally galling to the native press were
the generous overtures made by the British to the Boer population, while loyal India was
perennially neglected and taken for granted. “The British pour milk into the Transvaal,”
charged the Swadesamitran, “while only water is given to the Indians.”678 The InduPrakásh seized this opportunity to compare Britain’s treatment of the Boers in the wake
of the South African War with the treatment of its Indian subjects in a time of peace. The
paper reminded its readers that the Boers had waged a bitter and violent three-year war in
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an attempt to oust the British from South Africa, only relinquishing their arms when the
promise of future self-government was extended. By contrast, India had been compliant
and loyal, and had “never once given an indication of a desire to put an end to Pax
Britannica.”679 Yet Britain had denied India even the hope of self-government,
persistently alluding to internal divisions. The Indu-Prakásh rejected that rationale,
claiming, “If Indians are unfitted for self-government on account of racial antipathies and
conflicting class interests, so are the white colonists of South Africa—and especially so
the uncompromising Boers.”680 In the eyes of many Indian nationalist journalists, tension
on the subcontinent between Hindus and Muslims paled in comparison to the Boers’
intolerant treatment of Indian immigrants and African natives.
Irish advanced-nationalists also directed their gaze overseas. This tumultuous
period coincided with the appearance of the Republic, a new Irish publication as
pronounced in its anti-imperialism as it was in its adherence to the doctrine of Sinn Féin.
Founded and edited by Belfast-born Bulmer Hobson—a member of the Irish Republican
Brotherhood and one of the future founders of the Irish Volunteers—the Republic had a
run of five months before merging with the Irish Peasant.681 During the paper’s brief
existence, it not only trumpeted the cause of Irish independence, but also of Indian and
Egyptian nationalism. Hobson accused British officials of mischaracterizing the Indian
Swadeshi movement as “a virulent outbreak of disaffection, engineered by underbred
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agitators for selfish ends,” and assured his readers that Indian and Irish nationalists shared
the same noble cause.682 Just as Hobson embraced the vision of an Irish Ireland, so he
continuously espoused the possibility of Indian unity.
Like Hobson, Arthur Griffith commandeered the pages of his paper to argue for
an Irish Ireland, but never ceased to exploit occurrences abroad. The paper included an
“Over the Frontier” column that featured extensive coverage of India and regularly
excerpted Indian papers. The names of prominent Indian nationalist leaders—from B.C.
Pal to Surendranath Banerjea—were given pride of place in the column, with Griffith’s
paper reporting dutifully on Pal’s monster meetings—patterned after O’Connell’s—and
the crowning of Banerjea as the “King of Bengal.”683 Griffith paid particularly close
attention to India’s quest for national education, reprinting the objectives of the National
Council of Education in Bengal.684 On 8 September 1906, Griffith updated his readers on
the progress of the Swadeshi movement, noting that the very idea of a united India was
once deemed “too absurd for consideration.”685 “But,” explained the editor, “the forcible
partition of Bengal, the defeat of a white power by a united people of another colour, and
the rise and spread of the Swadeshi movement, have all served in bringing together the
various races and the differing creeds of India in a national league of brotherhood.686
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In Griffith’s estimation, it was that very unity that the British Empire most feared,
with the editor alleging that imperial policy was specifically designed to set the factions
against each other. “The fundamental of British rule in India,” charged Griffith, “is to
keep the Indians from uniting for their country by accentuating their religious
differences.”687 Thus, “Mahommedans and Hindus have been set at each other’s throats
in India as Protestant and Catholic have been set at each other’s throats in Ireland.”688
Writing in the Republic, Bulmer Hobson supported Griffith’s allegations, pouring scorn
on a Times of London article which Hobson claimed was written in “the spirit of
deliberate murder and incitement to civil war.”689 The editor decried the fact that the
Muslim Indian “is patted on the pat and told that he can, and he will, clear the peninsula
of Hindoo editor and Swadeshi patriot alike.”690 Desirous of attributing the roots of such
sectarian strife solely to British meddling in Ireland and on the subcontinent, Arthur
Griffith chose to ignore the fact that Indian and Irish politicians were often complicit in
alienating their fellow countrymen. Tilak’s brand of nationalism was decidedly religious
in nature, and his emphasis on Hindu mythology and ritual certainly proved detrimental
to hopes of national unity, whereas Ulster’s Protestant politicians regularly characterized
Home Rule as “Rome Rule.” As a native of Belfast, Bulmer Hobson was more aware of
the enmity directed at Irish Catholics by Ulster Protestants.
Griffith, however, opted to ignore the homegrown voices of division, preferring to
focus only on the exciting new homegrown Indian resistance movement that paralleled
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his own Sinn Féin. The editor seemed to take inordinate glee in surmising what
Swadeshi might portend for the future of the British Empire, predicting, “Against the
enlightened and united India which we see being born, the power of England will be as
impotent as the waves against the Cliffs of Moher.”691 Sinn Féin was also swift to
acknowledge India’s efforts to hobble British banking, noting, “Almost simultaneously
with the awakening of a desire in Ireland for the foundation of a National Bank, a
movement has begun in India for the same purpose.”692 Given Griffith’s desire to
revitalize Irish industry, he sought to emphasize the economic success of the Swadeshi
movement, noting the “appreciable rise” in wages for local laborers.693
Envisioning Indian patriots as brothers-in-arms who were new to the struggle
against the British Empire, Arthur Griffith frequently imparted advice to his Indian
counterparts. Upon the election of a new Liberal government, Griffith warned that the
Indian National Congress would be as easily duped as the Irish Parliamentary Party into
believing that the Liberals had the good of the Indian and Irish people at heart. He
particularly took aim at John Morley, the new Secretary of State for India, asserting that
just as Morley had kept the Irish “in subjection to the interests of British Liberalism,” his
policies would keep the Indian populace “in economic subjection to the Lancashire
manufacturers.”694 The Mahrátta reprinted the Gaelic-American’s advice that Morley
was not to be trusted, stating, “The Liberal hypocrites and occult influences that dominate
the British policy alike in Ireland and India are using the reputation of Mr. Morley to
691
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deceive the Indian people as they are using that of Mr. Bryce in Ireland. These two
people have no more power to turn British policy in Ireland or India into channels of right
or justice than a New York street sweeper.”695
The Irish and Irish-American assessment of Morley may have been unnecessarily
harsh. As Chief Secretary for Ireland (1886, 1892-95) and Secretary of State for India
(1905-1910), Morley was uniquely positioned to assess the impact of repressive
legislation on Her Majesty’s subjects, and was often the Liberal voice of reason. When,
in 1907, Lord Minto, Viceroy of India, suggested the necessity of muzzling the native
press to prevent the spread of disaffection in the Indian Army, Morley observed that a
press law always seemed to be the first recourse of a ruler confronted with
unpleasantness.696 Making his own preference clear, he stated, “My principle is that a
press law should come, not first, but last.”697 Minto had confided his concerns to Morley,
opining, “We must remember that we are dealing with the press of a country entirely
different in its standard of morality and civilization than the countries of the Western
world.”698 While acknowledging that the press was exacerbating an already quarrelsome
pay dispute in the Indian Army, Morley was still moved to demand of Minto, “How
would a clumsy press law—and all such laws have been in every country,—Austria,
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Russia, Ireland,—clumsy, inflammatory, provocative—suppress all this?”699 Minto was
particularly incensed over the importation of pamphlets from the American-based Irish
nationalist organization, Clan-na-Gael, that had been “supplying large numbers of their
abominable publications to the Native troops.”700 Failing to understand how a new press
law could combat American publications, Morley replied acerbically, “Surely it does not
need an American leaflet to make a soldier, Native or European, think that his pay should
be raised.”701
A series of press prosecutions in Bombay gave Minto pause, and he confided in
Morley that he fully understood there was “considerable risk in muzzling free expression
of opinions,” but feared the dangers of an unfettered press “preaching of rebellion
amongst an ignorant and inflammable population.”702 Minto’s characterization of the
Indian masses not only recalled the words of Council member Alexander Arbuthnot
during deliberations on the 1878 Vernacular Press Act, but also those of Chichester
Fortescue denigrating Irish peasants at the time of the 1870 Peace Preservation (Ireland)
Act. Nearly three decades after the passage of the Vernacular Press Act, there continued
to exist among many quarters of officialdom a disdain for the Indian intellect and a fear
of an excitable Indian temperament. For those reasons, Minto was insistent that the
Government should not allow Bipin Chandra Pal “to stomp the country preaching
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sedition,” whereas Morley professed himself somewhat perplexed by the Government of
India’s surveillance and prosecution of Pal.703 In 1906, B.C. Pal and Aurobindo Ghose
had founded the newspaper Bande Mataram, focusing on issues of Indian nationalism
and Indian unity. Within a year, Ghose was sole editor, as Pal devoted himself to public
speaking, addressing the topics of Swadeshi and swaraj at monster meetings throughout
India.704 In Pal’s estimation, the desire for swaraj was a direct result of the British
mishandling of the boycott: “It is by hatching out boycott eggs that they have produced
self-government youngsters.”705 Alarmed by what they perceived as Pal’s inflammatory
rhetoric, the Government of India tracked Pal’s movements throughout Madras, attending
his public appearances and transcribing his speeches, which were not only printed in
Bande Mataram, but were also sold as pamphlets. Notwithstanding the surrounding
furor, Morley termed Pal’s offenses trivial and irrelevant and the Government’s actions
“foolish and impolitic.”706 Tried for sedition in British law courts, Pal appropriated a
notable Sinn Féin tactic by refusing to give evidence.707
Aware of the growing power of the native press, the Government enacted the
Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act, 1908, a bill that proscribed the publication of
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any commentary which functioned as an incitement to violence, and mandated the
confiscation of any offending paper’s printing press. The 1908 Newspapers (Incitement
to Offences) Act was the Government of India’s most efficient attempt, yet, to rid the
country of troublesome journalists. Officials convicted Shivram Mahadev Paranjape, the
editor of the Kál, on charges of sedition—stemming from articles on bomb-throwing—
and imprisoned Paranjape for a period of nineteen months. The Government, moreover,
took the opportunity to ban the Kál outright, and used the powers of the new act either to
suppress other papers convicted of sedition or drive the most subversive papers
underground.708 Whereas, in private, Morley may have questioned the 1908 law, he
ultimately defended the legislation in public. In a speech delivered to the House of
Commons, Morley underscored the power of the native press to persuade and influence.
“The native press aims at creating, not reflecting, public opinion,” charged Morley,
adding, “The violent language of the native press is no new thing, but it grows worse
from year to year.”709 The speech pointedly identified the Bombay and Bengal Provinces
as the hotbeds of sedition, but noted that the Punjab and United Provinces were showing
disturbing signs of following suit, and credited the “foolish” speeches of Bipin Chandra
Pal as stirring up anti-imperialist protest from “feather-headed students.”710
Pal’s speeches may have drawn the attention of authorities, but it was his arrest
that caught the attention of Griffith and his fellow Irish journalists, who admired Pal’s
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campaign of resistance. As in Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s 1897 trial for sedition, what was at
issue was the very definition of disaffection. Pal wondered aloud how the British
Government had managed to conflate disaffection with a simple want of affection. The
Indian leader disputed that claim, arguing that Indian people might not love their British
rulers, but the absence of warmth did not necessarily imply a desire to plot against the
Raj. When the Indian leader advocated a policy of “benevolent indifference,” Griffith’s
paper applauded the phrase, noting that India’s emphasis on home-made products and
national industry was the equivalent of Ireland’s own Sinn Féin policy.711 By the edition
of 30 March 1907, the paper was referring to the Swadeshi movement as the Indian Sinn
Féin movement. Ireland’s provincial papers followed suit, with the Anglo-Celt asserting
that the Sinn Féin movement “is being propagated in the various provinces.”712 The
paper was equally proud that progress of the Sinn Féin program in Ireland was being
monitored by the native press in India.713
Tilak also continued to make pointed and favorable comparisons between the two
movements. Referring to India as “a second edition of Ireland, subject, of course, to local
limitations,” the editor of the Mahrátta exhorted his countrymen not only to emulate Irish
obstructionism in Parliament, but also to gain an appreciation for the Sinn Féin policy.714
Tilak, in fact, was insistent that observation of Griffith’s program would prove instructive
and enlightening. Though he recognized that Ireland was pursuing a similar course to
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that of India’s nationalists, Tilak could not resist a pointed reference to the fact that
“Ireland is largely represented in the British Parliament while India is not.”715
A lack of representation in Parliament was not the only thing that differentiated
British treatment of Ireland and India. In addition to passing the Newspapers (Incitement
to Offences) Act in 1908, a mere two years later the Legislative Council of the GovernorGeneral of India passed the 1910 Press Act, which mandated licensing of all newspapers
and strengthened the bonds of censorship, forbidding the promotion of sedition or
disaffection, “whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication, or
otherwise.”716 It did not escape the notice of India’s nationalist journalists that two
separate pieces of legislation were enacted to rein in the native Indian press in a time of
peace, while no such laws were devised to deal with the Irish press during this same
period. The fact, moreover, that India’s nationalist press had been, for the most part,
demonstrably loyal during the Boer War and Boxer Rebellion—urging the Empire to
deploy Indian troops—while the Irish nationalist press liberally boasted of its disloyalty
and mounted anti-recruitment campaigns was yet another troubling indication of an
enduring imperial double standard.
Sinn Féin and Swadeshi were domestic movements; yet, their impact was felt far
beyond the borders of their origin. The very fact that the Indian Swadeshi movement and
the Irish Sinn Féin policy were moving forward concurrently garnered international
attention, from Britain’s allies as well as rivals. Regardless of the fiery oratory that
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accompanied their arrival on the scene, both programs were, by and large, peaceful in
design and execution—a fact that did not stop editors from depicting the Irish and Indian
participants as combatants engaged in a war with the Empire over the very soul of a
nation. It was not by happenstance that the socialist leader James Connolly entitled his
two-part polemic on the state of the subcontinent as “The Coming Revolt in India.”717
Implicit in the title was the prediction that Britain’s treatment of her supposed “jewel in
the crown” could only result in violence. Connolly hinted, moreover, that violent acts
might be the most effective method of compelling the British to capitulate, reminding
readers that it was the terror engendered by the Fenian conspiracy that hastened the
disestablishment of the Church, and “the smoke and fire of the Indian mutiny” that
precipitated—in the same year—the establishment of universities in Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras.718
Connolly refuted the argument that India had benefited by British rule, claiming
that sixteen million natives had died of starvation and that the Government spent only
one-fiftieth of its revenue on education in India, whereas it spent almost twice that
amount on education in England and Scotland. “India is regarded by its alien rulers as a
huge human cattle farm to be worked solely in the interest of the dominant class of
another nation,” claimed Connolly.719 Embracing the Marxist characterization of religion
as the “opium of the people,” Connolly expressed particular disdain for the role of

717

James Connolly, “The Coming Revolt in India II: Its Political and Social Causes” The Harp, February
1908. Internet; available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1908/02/india2.htm; accessed on 17
February 2013.

718

Ibid.

719

Ibid.

264

religion in Indian affairs, charging, “Religion, in fact, in India, as everywhere else, loses
by being identified with the forces of a tyrannical government.”720 Connolly warned that
India could expect charity—but not justice—from Britain, as government coffers would
reap no benefit from meting out justice. Together with other Irish and Indian nationalist
editors, Connolly was issuing a challenge to his readers to take their destiny into their
own hands, by whatever means necessary. Independence would not be magnanimously
granted; it must be wrested from the Empire, by word and by deed.
Accordingly, Irish nationalist editors continued to point to Indian struggles as
further evidence of Britain’s tyranny, while Indian national editors alluded to Britain’s
continued subjugation of Ireland—despite teasing with the promise of Home Rule—as
proof of the Government’s hypocrisy. These years were critical to the development of
the nationalist movement in India, Ireland, and Irish-America, the last of which was now
actively funneling funds—and weapons—across the sea to those who had formed the
physical force movement. Indeed, the Kál , edited by firebrand Shivram Mahadev
Paranjape, made no attempt to downplay its delight that the Gaelic-American “has now
hit upon a noteworthy expedient of at once promoting its own circulation and increasing
the sale of Mauser rifles,” by promising a new rifle to those who enlisted thirty new
subscribers.”721 Foreshadowing the embrace of physical force by some of India’s own
nationalists, the Kál indicated its approval of the Irish-American newspaper’s scheme:
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“Excess of oppression suggests secret methods of emancipation.”722 The Vihari was
equally bold in its pronouncement. “We commend to our countrymen the methods of
resistance, active and passive, resorted to by the Irish in dealing with the British
Government.”723 The paper unfavorably contrasted the “resolute” Irish nationalists with
their “weak” Indian counterparts, and recommended that the people of India stop
trembling and instead follow the Irish example. “The Irish who are tired of English
oppression,” pronounced the Vehari, “are proud of becoming martyrs in the cause of their
country’s emancipation.”724 Leaving no doubt where its sympathies lay, the paper
referred to the “Empire of the Feringees” as hell on earth.725 This level of anti-imperial
hyperbole marks the passage from what was once gentle criticism, to a new and
unabashed attack, and reflects the mounting frustration of India’s nationalists.
Nationalist journalists in both countries recognized the propaganda value of
charting each success—however small—of other British subjects struggling to escape
from imperial domination. If they were to ask their readers to make sacrifices, it was not
only helpful, but also necessary to characterize their national quest as part of a larger
movement within the Empire. Thus, Tilak, Paranjape, Banerjea, Griffith, Connolly, and
their colleagues celebrated their common cause, taking every opportunity in these years
to underscore the similarity of methods, attitudes, and objectives. In an editorial that
signaled Tilak was moving away from the agenda of the Indian National Congress, the
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Mahrátta—traditionally the more moderate of Tilak’s two papers—suggested that
constitutional methods had reached the end of their effectiveness. The paper
recommended that its readers direct their attention to “the course of a self-reliant
agitation conducted in Ireland, itself,” where Tilak was convinced “we may gain more
practical enlightenment than by marking the effects of the policy of obstruction pursued
by Irish members in Parliament.”726 Tilak’s pronouncement about the futility of relying
on the Indian National Congress indicated that India’s Extremists were determined to
pursue a parallel course to Griffith and the Irish advanced-nationalists.
Notwithstanding this period of marked solidarity, nationalist editors could not
sustain the heightened sense of comradeship, and the strong awareness of common cause
would dissipate in the coming years. When next India looked to Ireland, it would be in
the aftermath of the 1916 Easter Rising, when boycott and obstructionism had given way
to revolutionary violence. In the intervening years, matters within their own borders
would compel journalists to look inward for solutions, not outward for support. Swept up
in the vitality of their respective new movements, and immersed in the day-to-day
operation of their newspapers, editors in both countries pounded away at their recurring
themes: revival of native industry, reverence for ancient heritage, and insistence on a
program of national education that emphasized Irish or Indian culture and history.
Yet even as editors sought to focus on their domestic agendas, tensions among the
nations of Europe were coming to a head, and would once more impress upon journalists
the necessity of looking beyond their own borders. The Irish advanced-nationalist press
had railed as America forged an understanding with Britain, the Indian nationalist press
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had despaired as Britain forged an alliance with Japan, and editors in both countries had
rejoiced at finding themselves allied in the struggle for independence. Now, however, it
seemed the world was a jumble of alliances, and that tangled web would determine the
course of the coming conflict. The nationalist press in India and Ireland would need to
decide to whom they owed their own loyalties.
At the turn of the century, as the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War seized the
attention of Europe and the world, advanced-nationalist newspapers in Ireland had
viewed the British Empire with a pronounced animosity, whereas Indian nationalist
journalists had time and again pledged their oath of fealty. Now, buoyed by the promise
of the Third Home Rule bill coming to a vote in Parliament, the Irish Parliamentary Party
was in the ascendancy once more, as constitutional methods finally appeared ready to
produce the desired results. If Britain would finally grant some measure of independence
to Ireland, perhaps the long-standing ill-feelings would dissipate and eventually
disappear. By contrast, the voices of discontent in India had grown louder and more
strident, driven into hardened opposition by the Empire’s hapless handling of drought,
famine, and plague; by its suppression of the rights of Indians in the Transvaal; its refusal
to allow Indians a greater role in governing their own country; and its systemic neglect of
India as Britain sought to expand its Empire. “It seems that England will not stop till she
is completely ruined by her rage for unjust acquisition and the unjust maintenance of the
Empire,” warned the Kál.727 As the world hurtled toward war in August 1914, Irish
nationalists clung to hope, sensing a new beginning; Indian nationalists saw only the
beginning of the end.
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Conclusion

The British Empire was seemingly at its zenith—and yet it had never been more
vulnerable. The war in South Africa had not only depleted its manpower, but also had
revealed its weaponry as inadequate, and its tactics as outdated. The Boxer Rebellion had
fractured the coalition of the European powers, while the Russo-Japanese War and, in
particular, Germany’s naval build-up, had impressed upon Britain the vital necessity of
forming and renewing strategic alliances. Monitoring it all from the safety of the home
front and eagerly snapping up every piece of information leaked from the War Office
were the journalists of the Irish and Indian nationalist press—keen to use British conduct
in the wars as ammunition in their own internal battles with the Empire. Notwithstanding
the brilliant oratory of those in the Indian National Congress and the Irish Parliamentary
Party, the leaders of the two nationalist movements could not maintain forward
momentum without the will of the people. Therefore, for the nationalist movement to
prosper, the editors moved forward on twin fronts, not only laying down the foundations
of a viable national program, but also framing the debate in ways that would be both
meaningful and accessible to the masses.
To reach the common people, few avenues proved as direct, as effective, and as
impervious to attack as a newspaper column. A well-written editorial was a weapon to
which the Empire was extraordinarily susceptible, as it could not easily protect itself
without appearing to dishonor the tradition of a free press. Editors such as Bal
Gangadhar Tilak (Mahrátta, Kesari), Surendranath Banerjea (Bengalee), and Shivram
Mahadev Paranjape (Kál) in India and Arthur Griffith (United Irishman, Sinn Féin),
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James Connolly (Workers’ Republic), and D.P. Moran (The Leader) in Ireland, as well as
the exiled Irishman John Devoy (Gaelic-American) in America understood the power of
the pen to provoke outrage or evoke a sympathetic response. They designed their
newspapers to appeal equally to the intellect and the emotions. Under the guise of
educating their readers, editors shaped the form and content of their weekly lessons by
carefully selecting the evidence presented and the manner in which it was delivered.
The reciprocity of ideas, the parallel tracks of Irish and Indian nationalism, and
the emergence of a pantheon of extraordinary visionaries who brilliantly straddled the
worlds of politics and journalism mark this as a particularly telling era in the long history
of the British Empire. At the heart of the increasingly contentious relationship between
the British Government and the members of the nationalist press in both Ireland and India
was the fact that elements in both countries were chafing under British rule, eager to shed
their status as subjects of the British crown and to assert their independence. What
journalists sought was evidence to support their claim that the status quo was no longer
acceptable. With a seemingly relentless series of conflicts and conflagrations that
spanned several continents, the British Empire supplied the substance. The nationalist
journalists of Ireland and India provided the style.
War clearly benefited nationalists in both Ireland and India, delivering unexpected
dividends in the form of Britain’s transparent motives and surprisingly inept handling of
the crises. Coverage of the imperial wars offered an unequaled opportunity to place
before Indian and Irish readers proof of Britain’s expansionist obsession and often brutal
military tactics. The Irish and Indian nationalist press artfully manipulated news from
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South Africa and China, cherry-picking those items that supported their ideology and
invigorated their base.
A side-by-side examination of Irish and Indian coverage of Britain’s imperial
conflicts identifies comparable strategies adopted by Irish and Indian nationalist
journalists, but also underscores the glaring differences in the methods and motives of
those particular factions. The Irish nationalist press criticized the Empire almost wholly
on political grounds, perennially supporting the cause of Britain’s enemies. From the
outset, the nationalist press in Ireland felt little loyalty to the British Empire, and
consciously made every attempt to use the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War to its
advantage. In particular, the advanced-nationalist press—crusading for nothing less than
full Irish independence—eagerly relayed to their readers every British misstep, setback,
and reversal. The reporting was colored by animosity and driven by passion for the cause
of Irish nationalism. That Britain prosecuted the war in South Africa by adopting
methods that earned it the disapproval of much of the civilized world merely played into
the hands of the press in Ireland, giving it added ammunition with which to continue its
journalistic assault. Pro-Boer, Pro-Boxer, and anti-British in its rhetoric, the Irish
advanced-nationalist press, led by Arthur Griffith, reveled in its disloyalty—at the same
time claiming protection under the freedom of press granted to journalists as British
subjects. Irish nationalist journalists used the imperial wars to highlight, as well,
Britain’s flawed management of its colonies and cavalier treatment of its subjects—
exhorting its readers to wrest control of Ireland from the grasping hands of the Empire,
and decide, for good or for ill, their own destiny.

271

The Indian native press was much slower to exploit the wars, and, indeed, made a
great show of expressing its loyalty to the Empire. Whereas the Irish press
predetermined the manner in which it would cover the war, events in China and South
Africa proved the determining factors in how the Indian native press reported the
hostilities. Journalists used the imperial wars not only to underscore Britain’s
mishandling of its empire, but also to focus attention on the religious and, in particular,
the underlying racial prejudice which influenced the course of British policy. The
Empire’s willingness to use native troops in China while simultaneously refusing to
deploy them in South Africa—a White Man’s War—was exactly the evidence journalists
needed to bolster their assertion of an imperial double standard. The behavior of western
missionaries in China gave rise to suspicions about Christianity’s claim to brotherhood—
suspicions which were deepened as the Indian native press watched two Christian nations
engage each other in battle in the Transvaal. The destruction of farms and natural
resources and the internment of women and children handed Indian editors the necessary
tools to present a portrait of an Empire without conscience, adrift from its liberal
moorings. Britain’s handling of its imperial wars convinced Indian nationalists that
Home Rule must be the endgame—the reward for decades of selfless dedication and
loyalty to the British war effort in China, South Africa, and, ultimately, the battlefields of
the First World War. Those same wars convinced Irish advanced-nationalist journalists
that Home Rule for Ireland was no longer the panacea once imagined; only full
independence—a free Ireland for the Irish—would suffice.
Given the obvious contrast in their approaches to the wars, the nationalist press in
Ireland and India might have remained isolated cases--were it not for the British
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propensity to view them through the same filter of suspicion. Britain saw only the
similarities—attempting to apply the lessons of Ireland to a strikingly different situation
on the subcontinent. Ireland’s advanced-nationalists professed no loyalty to the Empire,
launched protracted anti-recruitment campaigns in their papers, and used their columns to
urge rebellion. India’s nationalist papers expressed loyalty, argued for the inclusion of
Indian troops within the British Army, and, until after the Great War, sought to remain
within the Empire. Yet, imperial authorities repeatedly enacted legislation designed to
censor and suppress native Indian papers and imprison their editors—with the
Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act 1908 and the 1910 Indian Press Act enacted in
times of peace. Britain’s conviction of its racial superiority was the foundation for its
condescension toward India’s uneducated masses, and fueled a belief that even the
mildest hint of anger or disaffection from the nationalist press could spark a revolution.
Issues of time and place played an integral role in British treatment of the Irish
and Indian nationalist press. The British Government could afford to be more tolerant of
Irish anti-imperial rhetoric, owing to the ease and speed with which officials could read
and suppress those newspapers. Authorities frequently seized hold of Arthur Griffith’s
United Irishman in the Post Office, halting its circulation throughout Dublin and the Irish
countryside. In India, however, the Marathi-language Kesari and Kál had circulated
throughout the Bombay Presidency and beyond, long before Government of India
translators could deliver an English translation of Tilak’s or Paranjape’s inflammatory
editorials. Always one step behind, the Empire overcompensated with aggressive
prosecutions, a stance criticized by Parliamentarians at home in England, who had the
advantage of being several thousand miles away from Indian agitation. By contrast, as a
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series of Press Laws and Coercion Acts indicate, Westminster always grew animated
over the prospect of a rebellion just across the Irish Sea. Fortunately for the officials,
easy access to the offending Irish papers—published in English—enabled Dublin Castle
to short-circuit their influence in a timely fashion. That felicitous pattern, however,
would soon change.
The very fact that Britain felt compelled to rein in the anti-imperial rhetoric of the
Irish and Indian nationalist press provides tangible evidence that the Government
acknowledged and feared the effectiveness of the war coverage. Imperial response
showed a marked change over time, with officials resorting to methods of coercion and
repression that proved diametrically at odds with Britain’s standing as a beacon of
liberalism. Increasingly embroiled in an international rivalry with Germany, and beset by
domestic strife in the form of labor disputes and women’s suffrage, the British
government was ill-equipped to cope with the barrage of criticism launched from the
pens of Irish and Indian nationalists. Despite its tortuous attempts to muzzle its critics,
the British government proved unsuccessful in meeting the challenge presented by the
combined journalistic assault. Ultimately, Britain’s reactionary response to Irish and
Indian criticism of its military policy served to unite journalists in a common cause.
The nationalist press in Ireland and India not only continued to exploit the imperial wars
as a means of furthering their agendas, but also ingeniously used each other’s tales of
resistance to buttress their own nationalist platforms and establish a global context for
their shared nationalist aspirations.
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Epilogue

A Serbian nationalist had assassinated Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Kaiser
Wilhelm was preparing to turn the full weight of Germany’s formidable military force in
support of its allies, and all of Europe was on the verge of mobilization. Yet, in the heat
of the long summer of 1914, it was not world war that preoccupied the British
Government; it was the very real possibility of civil war. At the heart of the tension was
the Government of Ireland Bill—long-delayed legislation that would establish an Irish
Parliament, eliminate the reign of Dublin Castle, and grant Home Rule to Ireland. In the
north of Ireland, Ulster’s Protestants, led by firebrand Unionist Edward Carson, were
incensed at the idea that the bill—which they derided as “Rome Rule”—would compel
them to answer to Catholic nationalists in the south.728
With passage of the Act imminent, irate Unionists founded the Ulster Volunteers,
a group that numbered in the hundreds of thousands by the summer of 1914. In
contravention of a December 1913 proclamation prohibiting the importation of weapons
into Ireland, the Ulster Volunteers illegally armed themselves with German guns—an act
the Anglo-Celt characterized as “a deliberate device by the Carsonites to intensify the
spirit of hatred towards Catholics in the ranks of the Protestant masses.”729 Not to be
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outdone, advanced nationalists formed the Irish Volunteers and sought to import their
own cache of 900 Mauser rifles.730 In India, the nationalist press lost no time weighing in
on the Irish crisis. “It would be by no means an exaggeration,” proclaimed the Bengalee,
“to say that the eyes of the whole world are just now turned towards Ireland.”731
For a British Government confronting the very real possibility of civil war in
Ireland over the impending passage of Home Rule, therefore, the timing of the First
World War must have seemed almost fortuitous. Rather than face the wrath of an
outraged Edward Carson and his fellow Ulster Unionists, who were growing increasingly
militant, the Government tabled indefinitely all discussion of the Government of Ireland
Bill—as well as the equally problematic Amending Bill desired by the Unionists—
claiming that the first order of business must be the war effort. Apparently struck by the
gravity of the moment, Irish Parliamentary Party leader John Redmond delivered a
stirring Westminster speech that not only offered Irish loyalty to the Government, but
also held out the prospect of harmony between Nationalist Catholics and Protestant
730
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Ulstermen. “I say to the Government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of
their troops from Ireland,” declared Redmond, adding, “if it is allowed to us, in
comradeship with our brethren in the North, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our
country.”732 The vision of nationalists and unionists uniting in support of Britain was a
welcome prospect for the beleaguered British Government, which only hours before had
feared it would become embroiled in two wars.
From across the Empire came an immediate outpouring of support for Britain in
its hour of need. Nationalist editors in both India and Ireland lifted their voices in a
rousing chorus of patriotic fervor, expressing gratitude for being part of the British
Empire, offering aid and assistance to the war effort, and pledging undying loyalty.
Redmond’s speech found its way into the columns of the Freeman’s Journal, the official
organ of the Irish Parliamentary Party, as well as the Irish Independent, the Connaught
Telegraph, the Anglo-Celt, and the Nenagh News, while the Southern Star expressed
confidence that the speech “was certain to make for a really united Ireland, peaceful,
prosperous and free.”733 The Gujarati exclaimed, “Never in the history of British India
has there been such an outburst of enthusiastic and fervent loyalty to His Majesty’s
Government as has been witnessed during the last few days.”734 For its part, the Indu
Prakash took a moment to proclaim a special pride in the performance of the Indian
press, which, it boasted, had “acquitted themselves brilliantly in educating the public into
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perceiving clearly the great issues of the war”—reminding its readers that Britain was the
‘champion of European Liberty.”735 The Kesari, however, sought to qualify that position,
insisting that “the duty of newspapers consists not only in publishing news but also in
commenting on them.”736 Tilak’s words harkened back to his manifesto of 1902, in
which he had stated unequivocally that the role of the press was not merely to parrot
official pronouncements, but also to uncover the shades of grey with which every
imperial issue seemed to be imbued.
For all their avowed loyalty, Indian journalists did not absolve the British Empire
of its continued neglect and misuse of Indian troops—a complaint which had first been
voiced in the Boer War. When informed that the combined forces of all of the European
powers totaled eighteen million, the Amrita Bazar Patrika offered the observation that
“this number could have been supplied to England by India alone, if the former had but
pursued a policy of greater trust and less suspicion towards her greater dependency.”737
More pointedly, Tilak’s Kesari found Britain’s attitude perplexing, given the contrast
between Irish and Indian attitudes toward the Empire. “It is an undisputed fact,” asserted
the paper, “that India is more loyal than Ireland which has offered to protect itself from
the enemy.”738 “But,” the Kesari continued, “Indians cannot evince their loyalty beyond
speaking and thinking of it. They cannot give any physical help. This is very
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regrettable.”739 Once again, Britain’s refusal to repay Indian allegiance with anything
other than suspicion and condescension rankled the nationalist press.
In Ireland, the initial effusive display of loyalty must have been heartening to
Government ministers who had steeled themselves to expect screeds of anti-British
venom. Appearances, however, were not what they seemed. Bubbling beneath the
surface of this display of Irish patriotic unanimity lay the roiling discontent of the Irish
advanced-nationalist movement, whose editors were conspicuous by their absence from
the outburst of flag-waving ardor. The radical press had proliferated during the preceding
decade, with twenty-three Dublin papers identifying themselves as socialist, associated
with the Sinn Féin movement, or linked to the Irish Republican Brotherhood at the onset
of the war.740 Just as British forces hunkered down in the trenches seeking safety from
German artillery, so did the British Government find itself under sustained attack—
bombarded by a relentless barrage of Irish criticism, launched from the pens of Arthur
Griffith, James Connolly, D.P. Moran, and their compatriots.
The question of how the Irish advanced-nationalist nationalist press would cover
Britain’s entry into the war had preoccupied the British Government, which had sought a
solution in the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), enacted in August 1914. The Act
empowered the Government to wield the weapons of censorship and suppression “to
prevent the spread of false reports or reports likely to cause disaffection to his
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Majesty.”741 Within the first few months of the war, however, the British Government
found itself harried and harangued by an increasingly entrenched group of journalistic
adversaries. In addition to the always problematic newspapers of Griffith and Connolly,
a new crop of papers had sprung into being, all taking aim at the British lion. The Irish
Freedom, founded in 1910, proved adamant in its anti-imperial stance, declaring that
“even if this paper stood alone in Ireland against all forces of stupidity and imbecility
which cluster around the new imperialism, even if we stood alone against a people gone
mad, we would still stand for right.”742 Characterizing the British Empire as a menace to
the peace of the world, the Irish Volunteer, the official organ of the Irish Volunteers,
exhorted its readers to break free of Britain’s hold. “Our only safety, our only hope of
national development and national honour,” decreed the paper, “lies in cutting ourselves
free from the last tie that binds us to English Imperialism.”743 Leaving no doubt as to
where its loyalties resided, the Irish Volunteer concluded, “Our only path to the glorious
and happy Ireland of our aspirations lies through the downfall of the British Empire.”744
In particular, the anti-recruiting articles, leaflets, pamphlets, and posters
sponsored by the advanced-nationalist press seriously undercut Britain’s ability to enlist
the necessary quota of Irishmen. In a pointed and fairly obvious attempt to curtail these
anti-imperial exploits, Parliament voted to amend the 1914 Defence of the Realm Act,
making interference with army recruitment an actionable offense. The patent
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responsibility of the Irish advanced-nationalist press for subverting recruitment raised the
ire of British politicians and Ulster Unionists, who rose to their feet in the House of
Commons and the House of Lords to demand that the Government take immediate action
against the “grossly seditious” Irish press.745 The Earl of Desart berated those Irish
newspapers whose articles and widely circulated leaflets were of “the most violent
character against England,” and produced a “considerable” effect on recruiting746 Of
special concern were the Irish Volunteer, the Irish Freedom, the socialist Irish Worker,
and Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin— four papers singled out by the Times of London for
their relentless anti-recruiting efforts.
The tactics of the advanced-nationalist press were not merely a distraction for the
British Government; they dramatically impeded the British war effort—hampering its
ability to recruit in Ireland and forcing it time and again to divert its attention from the
European front. The ability of the advanced-nationalist press to derail Government
efforts at recruitment in Ireland was particularly galling, given that Ireland had for
decades contributed overwhelmingly to the ranks of Britain’s imperial soldiers. Not only
did the advanced-nationalist press deter young Irishmen from enlisting in the British
army; but also they encouraged them to take up arms and fight for Ireland against the
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Empire.747 Socialist James Connolly was unrelenting in his stance concerning the war,
arguing that the conflict would do nothing to benefit the Irish worker. “If you are itching
for a rifle, itching to fight, have a country of your own,” argued Connolly, “better to fight
for our own country than for the robber empire. If ever you shoulder a rifle, let it be for
Ireland.”748 Parliamentary supporters of the Government responded to such anti-imperial
rhetoric with splenetic attacks on the writers, urging the Press Bureau to censor and
suppress the offending organs, including the Gaelic-American, copies of which Rowland
Hunt claimed were circulated in the thousands “for the purpose of poisoning the minds of
Nationalists in Ireland against the British Government.”749 Pushed to the limit, the
Government announced its intentions to suppress the offending newspapers.
Accordingly, Dublin Castle sent its emissaries to shut down the operations of Griffith’s
Sinn Féin, together with the Irish Freedom, Irish Volunteer, and Irish Worker.
In Ireland, Arthur Griffith met the news of the impending crackdown with his
customary sang-froid, convinced that the Government would never obtain a conviction.
“If it prosecutes us without packing the jury, we win; if it prosecutes us and packs the
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jury, we win,” Griffith taunted.750 The editor expressed confidence in the righteousness
of his position, avowing, “No unpacked Irish jury will brand felon on the brow of those
who have stood between the youth of Ireland and the plot to immolate them in England’s
interest.”751 For all his bravado, however, Arthur Griffith knew he could not combat the
wartime operation of Dublin Castle and elected to shutter the Sinn Féin, putting an end to
the series of aggressively anti-British articles for which he had become both renowned
and infamous.
Not one to be deterred by prosaic regulations, Arthur Griffith rebounded from the
suppression of the Sinn Féin with an ingenious plan to circumvent the Defence of the
Realm Act. Scissors and Paste was a wickedly clever invention comprised solely of
previously-published excerpts from other newspapers. The one fillip was that Griffith
artfully interspersed among breaking news of the war carefully chosen past
pronouncements from key political figures that undermined their current stance on the
conflict—thus providing subversive editorial commentary without writing a single
original word. Although the journal was technically not in violation of the Defence of
the Realm Act, Under-Secretary of State for War Harold Tennant informed Westminster
that the paper consisted of cuttings “selected for their derogatory references to the cause
or military operations of the Allies and for their praise of the methods and successes of
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the enemy.”752 Scissors and Paste soon followed the Sinn Féin newspaper into oblivion.
Within months, Griffith was publishing yet another newspaper, Nationality.
While Arthur Griffith used the opening months of the war to exhort his
countrymen to thwart the British war effort, his counterpart in India, Bal Gangadhar
Tilak, took a different approach to the war, as did most of the Indian nationalist press.
Newly released from a six-year prison term for sedition just prior to the onset of the war,
the editor of the Mahrátta and the Kesari chose not to impede the war effort, and even
traveled the country in support of war bonds. Indeed, in his articles and speeches, the
editor joined the chorus of Indian nationalist organs who had urged support of the
Empire, in the belief that the British Government would ultimately have to reward Indian
cooperation.
Yet, Tilak also realized that the nationalist movement in India had foundered
during his incarceration. Not only had the Government of India dampened Tilak’s
influence by imprisoning him for six years, but also authorities had permanently removed
as an agitator Tilak’s fellow Chitpavan Brahmin, Shivram Mahadev Paranjape. Once
considered Poona’s two “most influential journalists,” Tilak and Paranjape both
languished in jail, leaving the movement relatively rudderless.753 Despite Tilak enduring
the longer prison sentence, the Kesari and Mahrátta managed to survive their editor’s
incarceration, while the Kál did not outlive Paranjape’s much shorter absence. Already
subject to the 1908 Newspapers Act and the 1910 Press Act, the onset of the First World
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War brought yet another restrictive bill. In March 1915, the Legislative Council passed
the Defence of India Act, 1915, roughly equivalent to the Defence of the Realm Act in its
aim and scope. Like that 1914 legislation, the Defence of India Act, 1915 singled out the
press for heightened scrutiny, threatening the suppression of newspapers, confiscation of
machinery, and imprisonment of offending editors.
Undaunted by his lengthy imprisonment—or by the parade of new regulations—
Tilak sought to infuse the nationalist cause with new energy and purpose. As the war
dragged on, Tilak became convinced of the foolishness of delaying the next move until
the end of hostilities, in the possibly vain hope that the British would show their
appreciation in some vague and indeterminate manner. At the end of the year, the Indian
National Congress and the All-Indian Muslim League, which had been founded in 1906,
convened for a joint session in December 1915, signing the Lucknow Pact, which
promised Hindu-Muslim cooperation in attaining rights for the Empire’s Indian subjects.
Building on that newfound sense of unity, Tilak joined with Annie Besant—the leader of
the Theosophical Society—as well as the Muslim leadership, to found the All India
Home Rule League in 1916. Its aim was simple: if India was going to continue to
support the British Empire with men, money, and natural resources, it expected the
Empire to grant self-government at the conclusion of hostilities. Always aware of Tilak’s
enormous influence with the masses, the Government of India once again charged the
editor with sedition, for a series of lectures he delivered in 1916. Although Tilak’s first
two sedition trials in 1897 and 1908 had ended in convictions, Muhammad Ali Jinnah—
who would become Pakistan’s first Governor-General—successfully defended Tilak on
the 1916 accusations, and the Bombay High Court dismissed all charges against Tilak.
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1916 would, of course, prove to be a watershed year for Ireland, as well. Tired of
waiting for the enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill, and no longer content to accept
any form of government that required the country to remain part of the Empire,
advanced-nationalists moved the country inexorably towards the Easter Rising. The
advanced-nationalist press in Ireland was the single most effective weapon in the arsenal
of those seeking Irish independence. Indeed, the evidence for the integral role played by
that particular segment of the Irish press is reflected in the number of journalists who
actively participated in the 1916 Easter Rising. Among those executed for their
involvement were James Connolly (Workers’ Republic), Patrick Pearse (Irish Freedom),
Sean MacDiarmada (Irish Freedom); and Roger Casement (Irish Freedom).
Significantly, so great was his reputation for exhorting his countrymen to press for
independence that Dublin Castle ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Arthur Griffith
(Nationality), although the editor played no part whatsoever in the Easter Rising.
At the war’s end, the Government of India would continue to focus on the power
of the nationalist press to promote disaffection, with Justice Rowlatt presiding over the
Sedition Committee. The Committee sought to investigate acts of terrorism—most
notably in Bengal and in the Punjab—as well as possible links to the governments of
Germany and Russia. Passed in spite of vocal opposition lodged by Indian members of
the Supreme Legislative Council, the Rowlatt Act dramatically curtailed civil liberties,
and effectively extended wartime legislation to a country then at peace. Quickly dubbed
the “Black Acts” by outraged nationalists, the legislation drew the ire of the Indian
nationalist press, as well as the attention of Arthur Griffith’s Nationality and other Irish
advanced-nationalists organs, which noted a more than passing resemblance to the
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wartime Defence of the Realm Act. The press took an even more ardent interest in the
1919 British massacre of unarmed Indian civilians at Amritsar—an event which
immediately followed on the heels of the Rowlatt Act’s passage.754 One year later, the
shooting of Irish civilians in Croke Park earned the event the dubious sobriquet of the
Irish Amritsar.755 Once again, editors in India and Ireland looked across the sea and
found common cause in their treatment at the hands of the Empire.
Britain emerged from the First World War victorious, but bloodied and reeling. It
had engaged the foe on several continents, but, almost as tellingly, it had also battled
adversaries on the home front—journalists critical of its imperial alliances, recruitment
policy, and military strategy. In Ireland, the Empire had responded with surveillance and
suppression—which led neither to an increase in British army recruits, nor even to the
cessation of anti-imperial rhetoric. Rather, the draconian measures prompted heightened
resentment and renewed attacks in the advanced-nationalist press of an even more
aggrieved and aggressive tone. By the same token, Britain’s refusal to acknowledge the
validity of the criticism emanating from the Indian nationalist press materially hampered
its war effort. The failure to acknowledge the contributions of India, compounded by a
persistently paternalistic attitude toward Indian troops and a pattern of regarding its
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Indian subjects with suspicion would have grave consequences for future relations
between India and the Empire.
Over the course of two decades, while the Empire eyed new territory, shifted
alliances, and fought from the Transvaal to the trenches of France, the nationalist press in
India and Ireland waged their own war of words. They used the columns of the
newspapers to launch ideological trial balloons, school and drill their recruits, and whet
their readers’ appetite for the ultimate prize: independence. For Irish and Indian
nationalist editors, it became a simple case of publish or perish—and their combined
journalistic output inflicted wounds that would fester and refuse to heal. There would be
no retreat, no end of hostilities until the Empire lowered the Union Jack, raised the white
flag of surrender, and retired from the field.

288

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Papers in the Indian Office Records, British Library
Grant Duff Collection. MSS EUR F 234.
Morley Collection. MSS EUR D 573/1-5; 573/7-25.
Curzon Collection. MSS EUR F 111-112.
Lytton Collection. MSS EUR E 218/146-147.
Papers of Sir Richard Temple. MSS EUR F 86/214.
Political and Secret Records. IOR\L\PS\7\316.
Public and Judicial Papers. IOR\L\PJ\6\484, 488.
Papers in the British National Archives, Kew, England
Cabinet Records. CAB 37
Dublin Castle Papers. CO 904, 906.
Records of the Colonial Office: Ireland. CO 903.
Papers in the National Library of Ireland, Dublin
Arthur Griffith Papers
William O’Brien Papers
Native Newspapers in the India Office Records, British Library
Annual Report on the Native Press of the Bombay Presidency for the Year 1903.
L\R\5\158
Annual Report on the Native Press of the Bombay Presidency for the Year 1904.
L\R\5\159.
Reports on the Native Papers – Bengal Presidency. L\R\5\25-41.
Reports on the Native Papers – Bombay Presidency. L\R\5\133; 136; 156-169.
Reports on the Native Papers - Madras. L\R\5\109-112; 119.
Reports on the Native Papers – Northwest Territories. L\R\5\76-79; 89.
Reports on the Native Papers – Punjab. L\R\5\183-186; 195.
Irish Newspapers
An Geadhal
Anglo-Celt (Cavan)
Connaught Telegraph
Donegal News
Evening Herald (Dublin)
Fianna Fail (Dublin)
Freeman’s Journal (Dublin)
Ireland (Dublin)
Irish Freedom (Dublin)
Irish Independent (Dublin)
Irish People (Dublin)

289

Irish Volunteer
Irish World (Dublin)
Irish Worker (Dublin)
Kildare Observer
Meath Chronicle
National Volunteer
Nenagh Guardian
Nenagh News
Scissors and Paste (Dublin)
Sinn Féin (Dublin)
Sligo Champion
Southern Star (Cork)
The Irishman (Dublin)
The Leader (Dublin)
The Nation (Dublin)
The Republic (Dublin and Belfast)
The Spark (Dublin)
United Irishman (Dublin)
Workers’ Republic (Dublin)
Indian Newspapers
Advocate of India
Akhbár-i-‘Am
Amrita Bazar Patrika
Aronodaya
Aryavart
Bande Mataram
Bangabandhu
Bangavasi
Baroda Vatsal
Basumati
Bengalee
Bhála
Bharat Mitra
The Champion
Charu Mihir
Civil and Military News
Darussaltanat and Urdu Guide
Decca Prakush
Deshabhakta
Gujarati
Gujarati Punch
Gurakhi
Guzerat Mitra
Hablul Mateen

290

Hindustan
Hitavadi
Hitavarta
Hitechchhu
Indian Mirror
Indian Spectator
Indu Prakash
Jam-e-Jamshed
Jámi-ul-Ulúm
Jaridah-i-Rosgar
Jyoti
Kaiser-i-Hind
Kál
Kálidás
Karachi
Kerala Sanchari
Kesari
Khulna
Koh-i-Núr
Lokopakari
Mahrátta
Manbhum
Mihir-o-Sudhakar
Moslem Chronicle
Native Opinion
Oudh Times
Paisa Akhbár
Patiála Akhbár
The Phoenix
Power and Guardian
Prabhat
Praja Bandhu
Pratavasi
Pratod
Prekshakm
Public Gazette
Puduvaimitran
Puduvai Nésan
Rahbár
Rangalaya
Rosnama-i-Mukaddas Hablul Mateen
Samiran
Sanjivani
Sat Dharm Pracharák
Shri Fattehsinh Gazette

291

Shri Savaji Vijay
Siálkot Paper
Som Prakash
Swadesamitran
Swadesi
Taj-ul-Akhbár
Tripura Hitaishi
Vehari
Vrittanta Chintamani
Vrittanta Patrika
Wakíl
Wasir-i-Hind
English Newspapers
Daily Express
Evening Telegraph
Manchester Guardian
The Nation
Times (London)
American Newspapers
Gaelic-American (New York)
New York Daily Tribune
New York Herald
New York Times
Australian Newspapers
Launceston Examiner
Government Publications
Admiral Togo's official report of the attack on Port Arthur, 10 February 1904. Internet.
Available at http://www.russojapanesewar.com/togo-aar1.html. Accessed on 14
February 2013
The British Monarchy, Internet. Available at http://www.royal.gov.uk/HMTheQueen/
TheQueenandspecialanniversaries/Factfiles/QueenVictoriasDiamondJubilee.aspx;
Accessed on 27 January 2013.
Council of India. Act No. IX of 1878. An Act for the better control of Publications in
Oriental Languages.
Defence of the Realm Act 1914 (DORA); Internet; Available at
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/first_world_war/
pdefence.htm.

292

Emperor vs. Bal Gangadhar Tilak on 9 November, 1916. Bombay High Court. Internet.
Available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1188602/. Accessed on 11 March 2013.
Far Eastern Staff Plans of Naval Operations, 1901-3. Internet. Available at
http://www.russojapanesewar.com/russ-game.html. Accessed on 14 February
2013.
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, Volumes 200, 242 (1870).
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Series 4, Volume 77 (1899); 78-79 (1900).
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Series 5, Volumes 65, 68 (1914); 70 (1915)..
_____. Public General Acts. 33 and 34 Victorie. London, 1870. The Peace
Preservation Act (Ireland Act), 1870.
Indian Penal Code. Internet. Available at http://indianlawcases.com/ActIndian.Penal.Code,1860-1557. Accessed on 25 December 2012.
Indian Press Act, 1910. Internet. Available at http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/
textofcentralacts/1910.pdf. Accessed on 30 March 2013.
Ray, R.E.A. Report on the Activities of Terrorists in Bengal. Calcutta: Bengal
Government Press, 1931.
Samanta, Amiya K., ed. Terrorism in Bengal: A Collection of Documents on Terrorist
Activities from 1905-1939. Six volumes. Calcutta: Government of West Bengal,
1995.
Sedition Committee Report. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing,
India, 1918.
Treaty of Nanking,1842, Article I. Internet. UCLA International Institute. Available at
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=18421. Accessed on 13
March 2013.
British and Irish Periodicals
Bodkin, M. McD. “Why Ireland is Disloyal,” in Fortnightly Review. December 1902,
Volume 72. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 1019-1027.
Brayden, W.H. “Press Prosecutions in Ireland.” In The Speaker: The Liberal Review.
May 4, 1901. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 132-134.

293

Griffin, Lepel. “South Africa and India.” In The Nineteenth Century and After: A
Monthly Review. May 1902. Volume 51. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 706715.
H.C. “Some Indian Questions.” In The Speaker: The Liberal Review. Sep 20,
1902.Reprinted in British Periodicals, 649-650.
Howorth, Henry H. “Our Indian Troops.” In The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly
Review. January 1900, Volume 47. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 36-40.
Irish Volunteers, “Manifesto to the Irish Volunteers.” In The Irish Review. Vol. 4, No.
42. Sep.-Nov., 1914, 281-286.
Rees, J.D. “The Native Indian Press.” In The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly
Review. May 1901. Volume 49. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 817-828.
Sen, A.P. “Does English Education Breed Sedition in India?” In Westminster Review,
August 1902, Volume 158. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 168-178.
TRUTH. “Why the Native Press Should Be Licensed.” In Calcutta Review. January
1900. Volume 110, Pg. 219. Reprinted in British Periodicals, 130-151.
“The Progress of the World,” in The Review of Reviews; Aug 1914; 50, 296; British
Periodicals, pg. 85.
Miscellaneous Published Material
Banerjea, Surendranath. Address to the Eleventh Congress, Poona, 1895. In G.A.
Natesan, Indian National Politics: Indian National Congress, 1898.
Besant, Annie. England, India, and Afghanistan and the Story of Afghanistan or Why the
Tory Government Gags the Indian Press: A Plea for the Weak Against the Strong.
Adyar, Madras, India: Theosophical Publishing House, 1931.
Bose, Subhas Chandra. The Indian Struggle. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964,
Connolly, James. “British and Russian Imperialism I,” in Workers’ Republic, 3
September 1898. Internet. Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/
connolly/1898/09/britrus1.htm. Accessed on 31 March 2013.
_____. “The Coming Revolt in India: Its Political and Social Causes.” The
Harp. Feb 1908. Internet. Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/
connolly/1908/02/india2.htm. Accessed on 17 February 2013.
_____. “Home Rule Journalists and Patriotism: An Object Lesson.” In Workers’
Republic, 13 August 1898. Internet. Available at http://www.marxists.org/
archive/connolly/1898/08/journalists.htm. Accessed on 23 March 2013.
294

_____. “Our Duty in This Crisis.” Irish Worker. 8 August 1914. Internet. Available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1914/08/dtycrsis.htm. Accessed on 17
February 2013.
_____. “Resolution of Sympathy with the Boer Republics.” Workers’ Republic.
20 June 1900. Internet. Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive
/connolly/1900/06/ sympboer.htm. Accessed on 17 February 2013.
_____. “The Roots of Modern War,” in Workers’ Republic, 18 August 1898. Internet.
Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1898/08/rootowar.htm.
Accessed on 31 March 2013.
_____. “Sinn Fein, Socialism, and the Nation.” Irish Nation. 23 January 1909.
Internet. Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1909/01/
sfsoclsm.htm. Accessed on 17 February 2013.
_____. “The South African War I.” Workers Republic. 19 August 1899.
Internet. Available at Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/
1899/08/sawar1.htm. Accessed on 17 February 2013.
_____. “The South African War II.” Workers Republic. 18 November 1899. Internet.
Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1899/11/sawar2.htm.
Accessed on 17 February 2013.
_____. “Speech on War’s Outbreak.” Irish Worker. 5 September 1914. Internet.
Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1914/09/wrsotbrk.htm.
Accessed on 17 February 2013.
Dacosta, John. Remarks on the Vernacular Press Law of India, or Act IX. of 1878.
London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1878.
Davis, Richard and Marianne Davis, eds. The Rebel in His Family: Selected Papers of
William Smith O’Brien. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1998.
Davitt, Michael. Michael Davitt: May’s Most Famous Son. Connaught Telegraph.
Internet. Available at www.mayo-ireland.ie/Mayo/ News/ConnTel/ CTHistry/
MIDavitt.htm. Accessed 14 November 2003.
De Valera, Eamon. India and Ireland. New York: Friends of Freedom for India, 1920.
Devoy, John. Michael Davitt: from the Gaelic American. Edited by Carole King and
W.J. McCormack. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2008. First
reprinted in installments in the Gaelic American in 1906.

295

Ghose, Aurobindo. Sri Aurobindo’s Political Thought. Haridas Mukherjee, Uma
Mukherjee, eds. Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1958.
Griffith, Arthur. The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland. Dublin:
University College Dublin Press, 2003. First published 1904.
Heehs, Peter, ed. The Essential Writings of Sri Aurobindo. Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1998.
Henry, R.M. The Evolution of Sinn Fein. New York: B.W. Huebsch, Inc. 1920.
Kaiser Wilhelm. In Germany History Documents. Internet. Available at
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm? document_id=755;
Accessed on 22 May 2013.
Khan, Muzaffer Husain, B.A., LL.B., High Court, Vakil. The Indian Press Act, Act I of
1910. Calcutta: R. Cambray & Co., 1919.
Macaulay, Thomas Babington. “Minute on Indian Education,” Modern History
Sourcebook. Internet. Available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/
mod/1833macaulay-india.asp. Accessed on 17 January 2013.
Martin, W.A.P. The Siege in Peking, China against the World. New York: F.H. Revell,
1900.
Marx, Karl. “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right."
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Paris, 7 & 10 February 1844. Internet.
Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critiquehpr/intro.htm. Accessed on 27 March 2013.
Mitchel, John. Jail Journal of John Mitchel. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1913.
Morley, Viscount. Speech Delivered by the Right Honourable John Morley, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons on the Indian Budget, 6
June 1907. Cited in Sydney Smith, the Edinburgh Review. Volume 206, Harvard
College Library.
_____. Recollections. Two volumes. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1917.
Nehru, Jawaharlal. Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Two volumes, edited by Dorothy
Norman. New York: The John Day Company, 1965.
O’Brien, William. Evening Memories. Dublin and London: Maunsel and Co., Ltd.,
1920.

296

_____. Irish Ideas. London: Longman’s, Green, and Co., 1893.
_____. The Irish National Idea. Cork, Ireland: Printed and Published for the Cork
Young Ireland Society by Francis Guy, 70, Patrick Street, 1886.
_____. Recollections. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905.
Spencer, Herbert. Letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892. Internet. Available at
http://praxeology.net/HS-LKK.htm. Accessed on 2 February 2013.
Stephens, James. Arthur Griffith, Journalist and Statesman. Dublin: Wilson, Hartnell, &
Co., 1924.
Swift, Jonathan. Drapier Letters. Internet. Available at http://www.usna.edu/
EnglishDept/ilv/swift.htm. Accessed 7 December 2003.
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar. “Address to the Indian National Congress, 1907.” Modern
History Sourcebook. Internet. Available at http:// www.fordham.edu
/halsall/mod/1907/Tilak.html. Accessed 29 December 2004.
_____. Letters of Lokamanya Tilak. M.D. Vidwans, ed. Poona: Kesari Prakashan, 1966.
_____. Loyamanya Tilak in England, 1918-19: Diary and Documents. V.D. Divekar, ed.
Pune: Tilak Smarak trust, 1997.
_____. Selected Documents of Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Four volumes.
Ravindra Kumar, ed. New Delhi: Anmal Publications, 1992.
Webb, Alfred. The Autobiography of a Quaker Nationalist. Cork: Cork University
Press, 1999.
Secondary Sources
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London and New York: Verso, 1983.
Barns, Margarita. The Indian Press: A History of the Growth of Public Opinion in India.
London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1940.
Bender, Jill C. “Mutiny or Freedom Fight? The 1857 Indian Mutiny and the Irish Press.”
In Simon Potter, Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921. Dublin: Four
Courts Press, 2004.
Brasted, Howard. “Indian Nationalist Development and the Influence of Irish Home
Rule.” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1980, 37-63.

297

_____. “Irish Models and the Indian National Congress, 1870-1922.” South
Asia, Vol. 8. No. 1-2 (1985). 24-45.
Brillman, M. L. “A Crucial Administrative Interlude: Sir Antony MacDonnell’s Return
to Ireland, 1902-1904.” In New Hibernia Review, Volume 9, Number 2. Summer
2005, 65-83.
_____. “Loyalty and Repeal: The Nation, 1842-46.” Irish Journalism Before
Independence: More a Disease than a Profession. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2011.
Brown, Stephen J. The Press in Ireland: A Survey and a Guide. Dublin: Browne and
Nolan Limited, 1937.
Butt, Ikram Ahmed. Lord Curzon and the Indian States, 1899-1905. AuthorHouse, 2006.
Cahill, Sean (Seán Ó Cathail). “The Politics of the Irish Language under the English and
British Governments,” In The Proceedings of the Barra Ó Donnabháin
Symposium; Internet. Available at http://irelandhouse.fas.nyu.edu/docs/CP/
4172/0111- 0126_PoliticsOfTheIrishLanguage.pdf. Accessed on 22 March 2013.
Cashman, Richard I. The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in
Maharashtra. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
Ch’en, Jerome. “The Nature and Characteristics of the Boxer Movement—A
Morphological Study.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
University of London, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1960.
Codell, Julie F., Ed. Imperial Co-Histories: National Identities and the British and
Colonial Press. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003.
Colum, Padraic. Arthur Griffith. Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, 1959.
_____. Ourselves Alone: The Story of Arthur Griffith and the Origin of the Irish Free
State. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1959.
Cook, S,B. Imperial Affinities: Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges Between
India and Ireland. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993.
Crangle, John V. “Irish Nationalist Criticism of the Imperial Administration of
India (1880-1884).” Quarterly Review of Historical Studies (India), 1971/72,
Vol. 40, No. 4: 189-194.
Crawford, Arthur. England Sympathizes with the Peoples of India: Opinions of The
English & Anglo-Indian Press, 1894-1899. London: William Fraser, 1901.

298

Cumpston, Mary. “Some Early Indian Nationalists and Their Allies in the British
Parliament, 1851-1906.” English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 299
(Apr., 1961), 279-297.
Das, M.N. India under Morley and Minto. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1964.
Davis, Richard. Arthur Griffith. Dundalk: Dungalgan Press for the Irish Historical
Association, 1976.
_____. Arthur Griffith and Non-Violent Sinn Fein. Dublin: Anvil Books, 1974.
_____. “The Influence of the Irish Revolution in Indian Nationalism: The Evidence of
the Indian Press 1916-22.” South Asia, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1986), 55-68.
_____. “India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda.” Journal of the Asiatic Society of
Bangladesh. Volume XXII, No. 1, April 1977, 66-89.
De Nie, Michael. “’Speed the Mahdi!’ The Irish Press and Empire during the Sudan
Conflict of 1883-1885.” In Journal of British Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4. October
2012.
Echenberg, Myron J. Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague, 18941901. New York and London: NYU Press, 2007.
Edgerton, Robert B. Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military.
Basic Books, 1999.
Esherick Richard. The Origins of the Boxer Uprising. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987.
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin
Books, 1983.
Fingerhut, Jeffrey. “Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the
British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army.” Military Affairs,
Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1984).
Foley, Tadgh and Maureen O’Connor, eds. Ireland and India: Colonies, Culture, and
Empire. Irish Academic Press, 2006.
Fraser, T. G. “Ireland and India.” In Keith Jeffery, ed. “An Irish Empire?” Aspects of
Ireland and the British Empire. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.

299

Gilbert, Marc Jason. Lord Lansdowne in India: At the Climax of an Empire, 1888-1894,
A Study in Late Nineteenth Century British Indian Policy and Proconsular Power.
Los Angeles: University of California, 1978.
Glandon, Virginia. Arthur Griffith and the Advanced Nationalist Press, Ireland, 19001922. New York: Peter Lang, 1985.
Gopal, Ram. Lokamanya Tilak: A Biography. London: Asia Publishing House, 1956.
Gopal, S. British Policy in India 1858-1905. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1965.
_____. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884. London: Oxford University Press,
1953.
Gordon, Leonard A. Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974.
Hampton, Mark. Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950. Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2004.
Hobbs, Andrew. “When the Provincial Press Was the National Press, c. 1836-1900;”
Internet. Available at http://www.academia.edu/187659/ When_the_
provincial_press_was_the_nationalpress_c.1836-1900. Accessed on 27 January
2013.
Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire 1875-1914. Great Britain: Abacus Press, 1987.
Holmes, Michael and Denis Holmes. Ireland and India: Connections, Comparisons,
Contrasts. Dublin: Folens, 1997.
Inamdar, N.R., ed. Political Thought and Leadership of Lokamanya Tilak. New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company, 1983.
Inglis, Brian. The Freedom of the Press in Ireland, 1784-1841. London: Faber and
Faber, Ltd., 1954.
Jackson, Alvin. Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York:
St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997.
Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East 1750-1850.
London: Fourth Estate, 2005.

300

Jeffery, Keith, ed. “An Irish Empire?” Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
Jog, N.G. Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilka. Delhi: Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962.
Legg, Marie-Louise. Newspapers and Nationalism: The Irish Provincial Press, 18501892. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999.
Kabdebo, Thomas. Ireland and Hungary. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001.
Karmarkar, D.P. Bal Gangadhar Tilak: A Study. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1956.
Kaul, Chandrika. Media and the Empire. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Kee, Robert. The Green Flag. Three volumes. London: Penguin Books, 1972.
Keer, Dhananjay. Lokamanya Tilak: Father of the Indian Freedom Struggle. Bombay:
Popular Prakashan, 1969. First published 1959.
Kennedy, Christopher M. Kennedy. Genesis of the Rising 1912-1916 : A Transformation
of Nationalist Opinion. New York: Peter Lang, 2010.
Khan, Mohammad Shabbir. Tilak And Gokhale: A Comparative Study Of Their SocioPolitico-Economic Programmes Of Reconstruction. Ashish Publishing House,
1992.
Knudson, Jerry W. “Late to the Feast: Newspapers as Historical Sources.” In American
Historical Association Perspectives (October 1993); Internet. Available at
http://www.historians.org/perspectives /issues/1993/9310/9310ARC.cfm.
Accessed on 13 March 2013.
Lahiri, Shampa. Indians in Britain: Anglo-Indian Encounters, Race and Identity 18801936. London, Frank Case, 2000.
Larkin, Felix M. “Arthur Griffith and the Freeman’s Journal. Irish Journalism Before
Independence: More a Disease than a Profession. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2011.
Legg, Marie-Louise. Newspapers and Nationalism: The Irish Provincial Press, 18501892. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999.

301

Lowry, Donal. “Nationalist and Unionist Responses to the British Empire in the Age of
the South African War.” In Simon Potter, Reporting the British Empire,
c. 1857-1921. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004.
_____. The South African War Reappraised. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2000.
MacMunn, Lieutenant General Sir George. The Martial Races of India. London:
Sampson, Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., 1933.
Mansergh, Nicholas. The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Maume, Patrick. The Long Gestation: Irish Nationalist Life, 1891-1918. Dublin: Gill &
Macmillan, 1999.
Maye, Brian. Arthur Griffith. Dublin: Griffith College Productions, 1997.
McCracken, Donal P. The Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War. Belfast:
Ulster Historical Foundation, 2003. First published Johannesbuurg and
Capetown: Perskor Publishers. 1989.
_____. The Irish Pro-Boers 1877-1902. Johannesburg and Capetown: Perskor, 1989.
McGovern, Bryan P. John Mitchel: Irish Nationalist, Southern Secessionist. University
of Tennessee Press, 2009.
Meehan, Ciara. “The Prose of Logic and Scorn: Arthur Griffith and Sinn Fein, 19061914. Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease than a Profession.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
Morgan, Kenneth O. Kenneth O. Morgan, “The Boer War and the Media.” Twentieth
Century British History, Vol. 13, No.1, 2002.
Mukherjee, Prof. Harida and Prof. Uma Mukherjee. “Bande Mataram” and Indian
Nationalism (1906-1908). Being a study in the ideas of India’s First Freedom
Movement based on those rare editorial articles of Sri Aurobindo and Bepin
Chandra Pal which first appeared in the famous Bande Mataram daily between
1906 and 1908. Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1957.
_____. Sri Aurobindo’s Political Thought (1893-1908). Calcutta: Firma K.L.
Mukhopadhyay, 1958.
Munter, R. L. A Hand-List of Irish Newspapers, 1685-1760. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967.

302

North, John S. The Waterloo Directory of Irish Newspapers and Periodicals, 1800-1900.
Waterloo: North Waterloo Academic Press, 1986.
Novick, Benjamin Z. “DORA, Suppression, and Nationalist Propaganda.” In New
Hibernian Review. Vol 1, No. 4, Winter 1997, 41-57.
O’Hegarty, P.S. Sinn Féin: An Illumination. Dublin: Maunsel & Co., Ltd., 1919.
O’Malley, Kate. Ireland, India and Empire: Indi-Irish radical connections, 1919-64.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008.
Omissi, David and Andrew S. Thompson, Eds. The Impact of the South African War.
Houdsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002.
Omissi, David. “Some Perceptions of Race and Empire.” The Impact of the South
African War. Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002.
Oram, Hugh. The Newspaper Book: A History of Newspapers in Ireland, 1649-1983.
Dublin: MO Books, 1983.
Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. New York: Random House, 1979.
Potter, Simon. News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System,
1876-1922. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
_____. Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire,
c. 1857-1921. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004.
Rafter, Kevin, Ed. Irish Journalism Before Independence: More a Disease than a
Profession. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
Regan, Jennifer M. Cosmopolitan Nationalism in the Victoria Empire: Ireland, India,
and the Politics of Alfred Webb. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2009.
______. “We Could Be of Service to Other Suffering People.” In Victorian Periodicals
Review. Volume 41, Number 1. Spring 2008.
Rosenkranz, Susan. “Breathing Disaffection: The Impact of Irish National Journalism on
India’s Native Press,” in Southeast Review of Asian Studies (SERAS), 2005.
_____. “Publish or Perish: The Role of the Native Press in Promoting
National Identity in Ireland and India,” in Ireland and India: Colonies, Culture,
and Empire. Irish Academic Press, Ltd., 2006.

303

Roy, Somnath. “Repercussions of the Vernacular Press Act, 1878.” Journal of Indian
History. No. 135, Vol. XLV, Part III, December 1967.
Silvestri, Michael. Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory. Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009.
_____. “The ‘Sinn Fein of India’: Irish Nationalism and the Policing of Revolutionary
Terrorism in Bengal, 1905-1939.” Journal of British Studies. October, 2000.
Streets, Heather. Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial
Culture. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
Sundaram, Chandar S. “Treated with Scant Attention”: The Imperial Cadet Corps,
Indian Nobles, and Anglo-Indian Policy, 1897-1917.” In Journal of Military
History. Volume 77.1, 41-70.
Tahmankar, D.V. Lokamanya Tilak: Father of Unrest and Maker of Modern India.
London: John Murray, 1956.
Van de Ven, Hans. “Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the Boxer Rebellion.”
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3. Jul., 2006.
Wilde, Richard H. “The Boxer Affair and Australian Responsibility for Imperial
Defense.” In Pacific Historical Review. Vol. 26, No. 1. (Feb., 1957), 51-65.
Wollaeger, Mark. “Seduction and Estrangement: World War I Recruiting Posters and the
Politics of Ulysses.” Internet. Available at http://hjs.ff.cuni.cz/archives/v2/
wollaeger/index.htmlhttp://hjs.ff.cuni.cz/archives/v2/wollaeger/index.html.
Accessed on 26 February 2013.
Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
_____. Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

304

VITA
SUSAN ANN ROSENKRANZ
Education
Ph.D., History, Florida International University History (August 2013)
Dissertation: To Hold the World in Contempt: The British Empire, War, and the
Irish and Indian Nationalist Press, 1899-1914. Dr. Rebecca Friedman, Chair.
MA, History, Florida Atlantic University, 2005
Thesis: Four Hostile Newspapers: The Role of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Arthur
Griffith in Constructing a National Identity in India and Ireland. Dr. Heather
Frazer, Thesis Advisor
Bachelor of Arts, Theatre, Florida State University, 1974

:

Teaching Experience
2011-Present Graduate Teaching Assistant, Florida International University
World History; Western Civilization: Modern Europe
2005-2012
Public School Teacher, Coral Glades High School, Coral Springs, Fl.
Courses: World History; Government and Economics; Drama I, II, III, IV;
Introduction to Film; Mass Media; French I
Teaching Awards: 2009, 2010
2004-2005
Adjunct Professor, Florida Atlantic University (Dept. of
Communications) Courses: Introduction to Media Studies
2003-2005
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Florida Atlantic University
Western Civilization; World History
Other Professional Experience
2003-Present Public history documentarian
1984-2003
Freelance writer/producer for broadcast and cable clients, including HBO,
CBS, and National Geographic
Grants and Fellowships
Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies Travel Award, 2005
Levenson Chair in Asian Studies Grant, 2005
FAU Graduate Fellowship for Academic Excellence, 2004
John O’Sullivan Travel-to-Research Grant, FAU Department of History, 2004
FAU Graduate Grant Committee grant for thesis research, 2004
FAU Graduate Grant Committee travel grant: Conference; Galway, Ireland, 2004
Awards and Honors
SEC/AAS Graduate Student Paper Prize – Honorable Mention, 2005
Frances Edelman Award for Teaching Assistant of the Year (History), FAU, 2004
Super Graduate Assistantship, FAU Department of History, 2004

305

Publications
2005
“Publish or Perish: The Role of the Native Press in Promoting National Identity
in Ireland and India,” in Ireland and India: Colonies, Culture, and Empire
(Irish Academic Press, Ltd., 2006
2005

“Breathing Disaffection: The Impact of Irish National Journalism on India’s
Native Press,” in Southeast Review of Asian Studies (SERAS), 2005.

Presentations
2013
“The Perfect Place to Become Violent: The Playboy Riots in Early Twentieth
Century America.” Presented at American Conference of Irish Studies, South;
Georgia Southern University
2005

“Breathing Disaffection: The Impact of Irish National Journalism on India’s
Native Press,” Presented at Southeast Conference for Association of Asian
Studies, University of Kentucky

2004

“Publish or Perish: The Role of the Native Press in Promoting National Identity
in Ireland and India.” Presented at the Fourth Annual Conference on
Colonialism, National University of Ireland, Galway

Public History Documentaries - as Writer, Director, and Producer
2009
The Jaffe Center. The Jaffe Center houses an internationally acclaimed
collection of artist’s books, in a new wing of the FAU Library.
2003-05 Arthur and Mata Jaffe Collection: Books as Aesthetic Objects.
1992-94 Circus of Hope: The Story of the Belfast Community Circus School.
Documentary set against the background of marching season in Belfast.
Filmed entirely on location in Northern Ireland, before the IRA ceasefire.
Professional Memberships/Affiliations
American Conference for Irish Studies
American Historical Association
North American Conference on British Studies
Southeast Conference, Association for Asian Studies
Phi Alpha Theta, Florida Atlantic University chapter: Vice President, 2003
Writers Guild of America, East (Inactive)
Courses Prepared to Teach
Survey courses: World History; Western Civilization; Modern Europe
Non-Western History: Modern India
European history: Modern Europe; Nineteenth Century Europe; 20th Century Europe to
WWI; British Empire; Modern Britain; Modern Ireland
Film and Media: Intro to Media Studies, Intro to Film

306

